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Part I
General Introduction
1
2In January 2005, Varian, one of the most inĘuential contributors to the revealed prefer-
ence literature, ran a search for ‘revealed preference’ on Jstor and Google Scholar, and found
997 and 3600 papers, respectively. In August 2014, I repeated this exercise and found up to
1035 new results on Jstor and 17400 new results on Google Scholar since 2005. is clearly
indicates that the revealed preference method is a highly relevant and popular approach.
In this doctoral dissertation, I formulatemethodological extensions of the revealed pref-
erence approach founded by Samuelson (1938, 1948) and Houthakker (1950). e revealed
preference approach allows us to impose consistency on observed choices from (usually lin-
ear) budget sets1. First of all, I will modify the standard revealed preference principles to test
consistency of choices from ĕnite choice sets. Second, I will generalise the narrowly deĕned
revealed preference axioms (GARP in particular) to incorporate psychological realism in
the models. Speciĕcally, I will identify preferences for others’ consumption and preferences
for value (diamond effects). Finally, I will show how revealed preference techniques can
help us estimate the distribution of welfare measures and predict the distribution of demand
correspondences in a setting where panel data is unavailable.
In my General Introduction, I will consider the foundations of revealed preference the-
ory by Samuelson (1938, 1948) and Houthakker (1950). en I will discuss the potential
of revealed preference theory from a methodological perspective. Seminal contributions
by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982) will be brieĘy explained. Moreover, I
will argue that the revealed preference method can not be conĕned to one theory or one
application. e method can be used to study a large variety of research questions. Finally,
I will discuss the main themes in the revealed preference literature (testing, identiĕcation
and prediction) and position my results in this framework.
1Note that in particular settings (e.g. experimental and transportation related studies) the term ‘revealed pref-
erence’ has a slightly different connotation. It may refer to the observation of real market decisions, as opposed to
letting respondents choose in hypothetical situations, without (implicitly or explicitly) imposing rationality.
3Background Paul Samuelson established the foundations of revealed preference in his
1938 Economica article. In order to understand the intentions of Paul Samuelson, it is im-
portant to understand the evolution of the economic science until 1938.
In the nineteenth century, there was serious debate among economists whether the eco-
nomic science should move towards political economy, putting emphasis on values and
ethics, or towards a more empirical (positivist) approach, putting the economic science on
par with natural sciences. John Stuart Mill, as well as John Neville Keynes, argued in favour
of the distinction between positive and normative economics. Keita (2012) pointed out that
these economists were most likely inĘuenced by the empiricist views developed by Locke
and Hume.
However, studying economic decisions in a similar way as chemistry and physics study
natural phenomena appeared to be rather ambitious, if not problematic. Aer all, social
sciences like economics study real humans, whose behaviour is intrinsically different from
natural phenomena. One crucial difference is that human actions are based on internal con-
siderations about their own well-being. To successfully create theories of human behaviour,
researchers needed a measure for well-being. is led to the utilitarian approach, founded
by Jeremy Bentham (1879) and James Mill. Utilitarianism is based on the principle that
people’s well-being can be measured in terms of individual pleasure and pain (the feliciĕc
calculus of pleasure and pain).
By the end of the nineteenth century, economists like Cournot, Dupuit and Gossen
started to develop theories based on individual utilities. e true neo-classical revolution
began around 1870. Jevons (1879) published eory of Political Economy, in which he ob-
served that the marginal utility (the ĕnal degree of utility) associated with some good is de-
creasing in the level of consumption of this good. More generally, the neo-classical approach
deviated from the classical approach in that 1) the purpose of all observed behaviour is as-
sumed to be the maximisation of individual utilities, 2) more attention is given to changes
in utilities (the marginalist paradigm) and 3) decision-makers are atomic elements such as
4individuals, households or ĕrms, rather than groups of agents from a certain economic or
social class. Despite its potential to formulate economic theories in rigorous mathematical
terms, the utilitarian approach experienced failure. First of all, it was argued that individual
utilities are not measurable, as they are the result of internal considerations on the account
of the consumer. Second, even if there was an objective measure for utility, it is practically
impossible to observe levels of utility.
For these reasons, Hicks and Allen (1934), Pareto (1927) and Slutsky (1915) started to
treat utility as an ordinal concept rather than a cardinal measure. is ‘escape from psychol-
ogy’ (Giocoli (2003)) relaxed the assumptions that utility is cardinally measurable, and that
it can be summed across various individuals. Instead, these authors came up with ordinal
utility theory, which assumes that each individual can rank alternatives according to his or
her preferences.
In 1938, Paul Samuelson attempted to go one step further. He argued that, on the one
hand, many assumptions on the preferences of individuals had been dropped since the time
of Gossen. Two notable examples of such assumptions are the linearity of marginal utility
and the measurability of utility in a cardinal sense. Aer all, ordinal utility theory restricts
itself to the analysis of indifference elements and the relationship between relative prices
and the slopes of indifference curves. On the other hand, Samuelson (1938) observed that
the ordinal utility theory still relied on assumptions which were hard to verify. e theory
typically assumes that themarginal rate of substitution is increasing. Samuelson (1938) pro-
posed to replace the ordinal utility theory with a more direct approach. Instead of putting
restrictions on preferences, which are unobserved, Samuelson put restrictions on demand,
which is observable. is contribution can be seen as the foundation of the revealed prefer-
ence approach.
Foundations In his 1938 Economica article, Samuelson considered the choices made by
an ‘idealised’ homo economicus. e revealed preference logic, as explained by Samuelson
5(1938), is as follows:
‘If this cost [the cost associated with prices of one position applied to the
batch of goods bought in a second position] is less than or equal to the actual
expenditure in the ĕrst periodwhen the ĕrst batch of goodswas actually bought,
then it means that the individual could have purchased the second batch of
goods with the price and income of the ĕrst situation, but did not choose to do
so. at is, the ĕrst batch (x) was selected over [the second batch] x’.’
is clearly illustrates how revealed preference relations (the ĕrst bundle is preferred to
the second bundle) are constructed. Quite remarkably, the construction of revealed prefer-
ence relations has hardly changed over the past decades. Samuelson (1938) proceeded by
formulating axioms on the demands (rather than the preferences) of consumers. Specif-
ically, he postulated that the ‘idealised’ individual’s behaviour is consistent. Consistency
means that if the ĕrst batch was selected over the second, then the second batch can not
be selected simultaneously over the ĕrst. Given price vectors pt and quantity vectors qt
associated with different observations t; v 2 T , let us formalise the (weak) direct revealed
preference relationR0 :
p0tqt  p0tqv ) qt R0 qv
en Samuelson’sWeak Axiom of Revealed Preference indicates that if qt R0 qv , we can
not simultaneously have thatqv R0 qt. At the time, Samuelson (1938) presented his revealed
preference approach as an alternative to ordinal utility theory, hoping to get rid of the utility
concept all together. However, by 1948, Samuelson appears to recognise that his revealed
preference theory and ordinal utility theory are complementary. Following Little (1949) he
used revealed preference to construct ‘revealed preferred’ or ‘revealed worse’ regions in an
indifference map and to approximate the indifference curve. It appears that Samuelson’s
6research program had evolved from replacing ordinal utility theory towards using revealed
preference to empirically verify concepts of the ordinal utility theory (Samuelson (1948)).
One of the unanswered questions in Samuelson’s 1938 Economica article was whether
theWeak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP henceforth) exhibits all of the implications
associated with the utility maximisation hypothesis. It was clear that the postulate of utility
maximisation implied theWARP,while it was uncertainwhetherWARP implied consistency
with a well-behaved preference ordering. In 1950, Houthakker showed thatWARP does not
capture all aspects of the utility maximisation hypothesis. Houthakker (1950) strengthened
the WARP by introducing transitivity of demand and indirect revealed preference relations
R: For each sequence of bundles qa;qb; :::;qs we have that
qt R0 qa , qa R0 qb , ::: , qs R0 qv ) qt R qv
Houthakker’s Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference indicates that if qt R qv , we can not
simultaneously have thatqv R0 qt. e StrongAxiomof Revealed Preference (SARP hence-
forth) exhibits all of the testable implications associatedwith the utilitymaximisationmodel.
Extended and restricted domain versions of revealed preference Summarising, the re-
vealed preference approach evolved from being ‘a possible alternative to ordinal utility the-
ory’, over ‘complementary to ordinal utility theory’ to ‘equivalent to ordinal utility theory’.
Many researchers have described this as the failure of the revealed preference research pro-
gram. Fortunately, this did not stop the revealed preference approach frommoving forward.
Let me discuss two promising ways in which revealed preference research proceeded aer
1950.
First of all, Arrow (1959), Richter (1966), Sen (1971) and Suzumura (1976)made progress
by extending and generalising the existing methods. Pollak (1990) referred to this research
as the extended domain version of revealed preference. Arrow (1959) generalised Samuel-
7son’s work in two ways. On the one hand, he incorporated the possibility that decision
makers choose more than one alternative. On the other hand, the author allowed for more
general sets of alternatives. Indeed, the theory had long been conĕned to analysing de-
mand from budget sets (budget triangles in a two-goods case). In his paper, Arrow (1959)
allowed for choices made from traditional budget sets but also from two-element sets and ĕ-
nite choice sets. e corresponding preference orderings build on binary comparisons of al-
ternatives. is generalisation was far from trivial, because it paved the way for applications
of revealed preference theory to decisions by, for instance, governments (see for instance
Basu (1980) on revealed preference of government). Rather than choosing between various
bundles from budget triangles, governments typically choose from a ĕnite set of alterna-
tive projects. In this context, authors have come up with alternative axioms on observed
behaviour (such as Weak and Strong Congruence by Richter (1966)) and alternative ratio-
nality concepts (such as G-rationality by Suzumura (1976) or regular rationality by Richter
(1966)). In Chapter 2, I will build the bridge between this extended version of revealed pref-
erence theory and standard revealed preference theory in the tradition of Samuelson (1938)
and Houthakker (1950). In particular, I consider revealed preference tests for choices from
ĕnite choice sets (rather than linear budget sets) while still using standard utility functions.
Second, Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) andVarian (1982) developed a version of revealed
preference for settings with limited information on prices and quantities, i.e. when the set
of observed prices and quantities is ĕnite. Pollak (1990) referred to this research as the re-
stricted domain version of revealed preference. is is in sharp contrast with the initial con-
tributions of Samuelson and Houthakker. Samuelson and Houthakker, on the one hand,
applied their revealed preference principles to the demands of consumers, assuming the ob-
servability of a demand system. Afriat (1967), on the other hand, used only a ĕnite set of
prices and quantities as inputs. It is worth noting that the two different approaches corre-
spond to two different purposes. While standard domain revealed preference is particularly
concerned with ‘exhausting the implications of revealed preference theory’, the restricted
8domain version aims at ‘testing the utility maximisation hypothesis on the basis of ĕnite sets
of prices and quantities’ (see Pollak (1990)). Otherwise stated, the restricted domain version
is more well-suited as a practical test of consumer behaviour. It allows to verify statements
on the rationality of consumers, or recover elements of the underlying preference structure,
without imposing structure on utility functions and without assuming the observability of
a full demand system. While the equivalence between SARP and the utility maximisation
hypothesis seemed to render revealed preference redundant, Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973)
and Varian (1982) clearly demonstrated the method’s methodological potential.
emethodological contributions of Afriat, Diewert and Varian Afriat (1967) ĕrst ap-
plied the revealed preference method to a data set S = f(pt;qt)j8t 2 Tg which contains a
ĕnite number (T ) of price vectors pt and quantity vectors qt. He presented an approach to
decide whether an observed data set of type S is utility consistent, i.e. whether there exists
a utility function that can generate the observed data set. Afriat (1967) concluded that such
utility function exists provided that the data setS satisĕes the property of cyclical consistency.
Cyclical consistency is deĕned as follows:
qt R0 qs , qs R0 qr , ::: , qv R0 qt
) p0tqt = p0sqs = p0rqr = p0vqv
Otherwise stated, if some series of direct (and weak) revealed preference relations form
a cycle, it must be the case that the expenditures in the corresponding periods are equal.
Afriat (1967) proceeded by showing that the cyclical consistency requirement is equivalent
to level consistency, which is formalised as consistency with a system of linear inequalities
(the so called Afriat inequalities).
ut   uv  vp0v(qt   qv)
9If there exist utility levels ut and uv and strictly positivemultipliers v such that the in-
equalities hold for all observations v and t, the data are said to be level consistent. Afriat
(1967) used this system of inequalities to re-construct a utility function that could have gen-
erated the observed data. Speciĕcally,
u(q) = min
v
uv + vp
0
v(q  qv)
is a utility function that ‘realises the utility hypothesis on S’. In this way, Afriat (1967)’s
method allows us to test consistency with the utility hypothesis (by verifying consistency
with a systemof linear inequalities) and construct a utility function that imposes consistency
on the observed data.
Diewert (1973) clariĕed Afriat (1967)’s exposition by making assumptions on the utility
functions u(q): e author found, for instance, that Afriat’s notion of cyclical consistency
is equivalent to the existence of a locally non-satiated utility function. Moreover, Diewert
(1973) found that information on a ĕnite number of choices (from linear budget sets) does
not enable researchers tomake a distinction between consistency with a locally non-satiated
utility function on the one hand, and a locally non-satiated utility function which is also
increasing, continuous and concave on the other hand.
Let me ĕnally discuss Varian’s contributions to the revealed preference approach. First
of all, Varian (1982) developed a characterisation which is formally equivalent to Afriat’s
cyclical consistency, but which is easier to test in practice. Towards this end, Varian (1982)
made use of the strict direct revealed preference relation P :
p0tqt > p
0
tqv ) qt P qv
He reformulated cyclical consistency as follows: if qt R qv , we can not simultaneously
have that qv P qt. In other words, if qt is (indirectly) revealed preferred over qv , it should
not be the case that qv is strictly directly revealed preferred over qt. is became known as
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the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP henceforth). It is easily seen that this
characterisation is similar in spirit to Samuelson’s WARP and Houthakker’s SARP.e only
difference is that GARP allows for indifference curves with Ęat parts and SARP does not. In-
terestingly, Varian (1982) showed that checking consistency with GARP is computationally
more efficient than checking consistency with Afriat’s inequalities.
Deĕnition 0.1. GARP
e setS = f(pt;qt); t= 1; :::; Tg is consistent withGARP if there exist direct revealed
preference relationsR0 and indirect revealed preference relationsR such that
1. if p0tqt  p0tqv; then qtR0qv ;
2. if qtR0qr;qrR0qs; :::quR0qv; then qtRqv ;
3. if qtRqv , then p0vqt  p0vqv .
Intuitively, Statement 1 constructs direct revealed preference relations: if qv was in the
interior of the budget set associated with period t (so that qv was affordable at time t al-
though qt was chosen), we can say that qt is directly revealed preferred over qv . Statement
2 imposes transitivity on the direct revealed preference relations, thereby constructing indi-
rect revealed preference relations. Finally, Statement 3 imposes expenditure minimisation:
if qt is equally good or better than qv , then qt should not be strictly cheaper in period v
(since otherwise there would be no reason to choose qv in period v).
emethodological contributions ofAfriat, Diewert andVarian have promoted revealed
preference as a useful tool for empirical analysis. In the same way as standard economet-
rics allowed to test and re-construct (parametric) demand systems, the revealed preference
approach allowed to test consistency with the utility hypothesis and re-construct elements
of the underlying preference structure without imposing restrictions on demand or utility
functions. However, in order to be truly successful, the revealed preference program also
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needed measures by which the (empirical) performance of the axioms could be assessed.
Fortunately, over the past decades, many authors have made progress in this area.
On the one hand, a decent empirical method should not reject some null hypothesis
while it is true (Type I error). In this respect, Varian (1990) argued that the (exact) revealed
preference tests are overly restrictive. It is indeed reasonable to argue that consumers make
optimisation errors when maximising their utility. For this reason, Afriat (1967) proposed
to replace the requirement of exactly optimising behaviour by the requirement of nearly
optimising behaviour. In this way, rationality is not automatically rejected when a small
violation of a revealed preference axiom occurs. An alternative deĕnition of GARP is then
Deĕnition 0.2. e-GARP
e set S = f(pt;qt); t = 1; :::; Tg is consistent with e-GARP if there exist direct re-
vealed preference relationsR0(e) and indirect revealed preference relationsR(e) such that
1. if et  p0tqt  p0tqv; then qtR0(e)qv ;
2. if qtR0(e)qr;qrR0(e)qs; :::quR0(e)qv; then qtR(e)qv ;
3. if qtR(e)qv , then p0vqt  ev  p0vqv .
e values et in vector e relax the rationality requirement when et < 1: Indeed, et < 1
implies that fewer revealed preference relations R0(e) and R(e) are constructed and that
the expenditure minimisation requirement in Statement 3 becomes weaker. Varian (1990)
characterised this efficiency index:
et = min
qvR(e)qt
p0tqv
p0tqt
Intuitively, et compares the minimum expenditures needed to purchase a bundle qv
which is revealed preferred over qt with the actual cost of observation t. e lower et, the
more money was wasted in period t. It is oen convenient to consider a uniform bound, a
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ĕxed e that relaxes each budget constraint by the same fraction. I will refer to this goodness-
of-ĕt index as Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index.
On the other hand, empirical analysis is concerned with Type II error. A test is less
sustainable (Type II error is high) when observations from some alternative hypothesis do
not lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Similarly, if one particular revealed pref-
erence test was unable to reject the utility maximisation hypothesis when confronted with
random choice patterns (which do not correspond to decisions of real humans), the test
would be rather useless. Bronars (1987) formalised a measure for the strength of a revealed
preference test, discriminatory power. Discriminatory power measures the extent to which
revealed preference tests can detect and reject random choices. ere are various meth-
ods to simulate random bundles. Bronars’ method draws random budget shares from the
uniform distribution. e bootstrap approach draws budget shares from the distribution
of observed budget shares across the sample and randomly allocates these shares to an in-
dividual’s consumption in various periods. A ‘strong’ revealed preference test is then able
to reject consistency with the utility maximisation hypothesis when confronted with these
random data sets. e power is by now a widely used measure of empirical success in the
revealed preference literature.
Critical discussion e revealed preference program is praised because it avoids putting
structure on utility functions. As such, the method abstains from imposing unveriĕable
assumptions on the preferences of consumers. is means that revealed preference allows
for a pure test of rationality which is independent of functional form restrictions (thereby
avoiding a ‘dual’ hypothesis). Moreover, it allows to analyse different individuals separately
when different prices and consumption choices are observed per individual. As a result, de-
batable preference homogeneity assumptions are unnecessary. Finally, as argued above, it
is straightforward to check consistency with revealed preference conditions. One can sim-
ply check whether the conditions are not mutually exclusive, or in more complicated cases,
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one can formulate a standard linear programming problem. However, the method has also
received considerable criticism.
1. First of all, revealed preference tests oen lack discriminatory power. It is easy to
construct a setting in which no violations of the standard revealed preference axioms
(WARP, SARP or GARP) are possible. is occurs when the prices and incomes,
associated with various observations, are such that the budget lines completely dom-
inate each other. Otherwise stated, revealed preference tests are generally permissive
if there is much variation in incomes and little variation in (relative) prices. A per-
missive revealed preference test is unable to produce tight bounds on, for instance,
demand in counterfactual price-income regimes.
2. Second, themethod implicitly assumes preference stationarity while testing the utility
maximisation hypothesis. erefore, Grüne (2004) argued that a revealed preference
test jointly veriĕes consistency with the utility hypothesis and stability of preferences.
Indeed, preference stability is an inevitable assumptionwhen performing the rational-
ity test. More importantly, this implies that the revealed preference method is neces-
sarily based on repeated observations (of the same individual), because it is evenmore
contestable to assume that preferences are homogeneous across people. e revealed
preference approach is therefore less well-suited to deal with cross-sectional data sets.
3. ird, the original axioms (WARP, SARP and GARP) were built on the decisions of a
(narrowly deĕned) homo economicus. Rabin (2002) provided an insightful overview
of some of these assumptions. e homo economicus is, for instance, self-interested,
purely concerned with ĕnal consumption outcomes and discounts his future well-
being exponentially. ese restrictive assumptions have led many researchers to dis-
trust the revealed preference approach.
ere are two ways to deal with Problem 1. e ĕrst possibility is to apply the revealed
preference principles to experimental data. In an experimental setting, it is possible to con-
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trol the prices and incomes, and set these elements in such way that discriminatory power
is maximised. I refer to Sippel (1997) and Harbaugh et al. (2001) for applications of re-
vealed preference axioms to experimental data. In fact, my contributions in Chapters 1 and
3 also illustrate the usefulness (and strength) of revealed preference tests in an experimen-
tal setting. e second possibility is to combine the revealed preference restrictions with
nonparametric estimates of Engel curves. is is more common in applications to observa-
tional data (for instance expenditure data from budget surveys). Blundell et al. (2003, 2007,
2008) used this procedure to obtain tight bounds on their demand estimates. In Chapter 5, I
will present an alternative approach to combine (stochastic) revealed preference restrictions
with nonparametric estimates of population preferences.
Problem 2 can also be addressed by setting up experiments. In an experiment, the con-
sumption decisions are made in a relatively small time frame, so that preference stability
seems a reasonable assumption. Moreover, Stigler and Becker (1977) argue against the aban-
doning of preference stationarity. It is possible to let the arguments of the preferences change
but not the preference itself, or consider a more general (but homogeneous) speciĕcation of
the preference ordering (cfr supra). Finally, the revealed preference approach of Blundell
et al. (2003, 2007, 2008) can be applied to cross-sectional data (provided that Engel curves
can be estimated).
Finally, while it is true that many assumptions of the neo-classical approach are em-
pirically unsustainable (Problem 3), it is important to note that the revealed preference
framework is Ęexible enough to characterise alternative assumptions on preferences. Ra-
bin (2002), for instance, discussed an approach to incorporate psychological phenomena
into economics, in a way that (still) permits the use of revealed preference theory. Indeed,
researchers havemade new assumptions about preferences (for example on the arguments in
the utility function) without automatically rejecting the assumptions of preference stationar-
ity or utility maximisation. Browning (1989), for example, developed a revealed preference
test for consistency with the life cycle model. is model speciĕcally takes into account
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that consumers care about current and future consumption. Moreover, Crawford (2010)
presented a revealed preference test of the habits model. e habits model allows the con-
sumer’s utility function to depend on past consumption decisions. Demuynck and Verriest
(2013) built further on this method to develop a nonparametric test of rational addictions.
Summarising, researchers have made considerable progress in incorporating more realistic
- psychological - insights into revealed preference models. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with new
extensions of the standard revealed preference tests.
I conclude from this that many arguments against the revealed preference literature are,
in fact, arguments against a particular theory which is tested or a certain application which
is chosen. Hands (2013) correctly argued that
‘Revealed preference theory is not simply a theory. It is a broad research pro-
gram in the theory of consumer choice. e revealed preference research pro-
gram can be thought of as an extended theoretical family - a family containing
various family members with different conceptual insights, theoretical struc-
tures, and paradigmatic applications.’
General themes in revealed preference is versatility in terms of theoretical and prac-
tical applications also implies that the revealed preference method enables researchers to
answer a variety of questions. Varian (2006) made an overview of these questions. I will fo-
cus on testing, identiĕcation and prediction. e thesis will be structured around these main
themes.
e ĕrst main theme is the veriĕcation of the rationality hypothesis for a given data set.
Aer all, many economic models are based on the assumption of optimising behaviour on
behalf of the economic agents who are analysed. Rationality, albeit crucial to the model and
its implications, is taken as given. However, in the spirit of Karl Popper, it is necessary to
critically investigate the rationality assumption, and falsify the assumption in settings where
it does not hold. Moreover, individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their preferences,
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their available budget sets and their ability to optimise utility. We can reasonably argue that
particular individuals are more likely to be irrational than others. Choosing irrationally has
been shown to be equivalent to wasting money. For this reason, it is important to identify
who exactly is less rational. Governments could use this information to ‘target’ their policy
to protect the more vulnerable consumers.
e second main theme is the identiĕcation of the underlying preference structure. e
Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference, for instance, allows to identify the (binary) re-
vealed preference relations from the data. Similarly, the Afriat inequalities allow to recover
‘utility levels’. Moreover, Varian (1983) has shown how one can test for additional structure
on utility functions, such as weak separability of the utility function in its arguments. Sepa-
rability is an interesting property from the perspective of aggregation. More recently, authors
have come up with revealed preference restrictions for collective (household) consumption
decisions. e collective model (Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988)) allows
household members to have different utility functions, and takes into account that intra-
household bargaining power can shi over time. In this framework, recovery can also apply
to the identiĕcation of the household members’ resource shares, which conveys informa-
tion on their respective bargaining power. Cherchye et al. (2011a) have shown how to use
revealed preference techniques to bound the resource shares of both partners, even if the
allocation of private goods is unobserved, or in the presence of publicly consumed goods.
Information on the sharing rule gives insight into the distribution of welfare in a household.
e third theme is prediction. Aer all, the revealed preference conditions can be applied
to bound demand correspondences in counterfactual price-income regimes. Blundell et al.
(2003, 2007, 2008) have made seminal contributions. Information on demand responses is
relevant both to policy makers and ĕrms. Firms, on the one hand, could use this informa-
tion to anticipate demand reactions to changing prices. Policy makers, on the other hand,
could estimate the impact of policy measures (i.e. that inĘuence the purchasing power of
households) on the households’ consumption.
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Overview of the contributions In my dissertation, I hope to contribute to the testing, re-
covery and prediction purposes by extending the revealed preference axioms and methods.
e extensions either propose a solution to Problems 1 - 3 (see supra) or improve the existing
solutions.
In the ĕrst part, I deal with testing consistency of consumption choices by (individual)
children. Given that the setting is experimental, problems of power (Problem 1) and prefer-
ence stationarity (Problem 2) are mitigated. However, we will argue that the standard con-
sumption experiment - letting children choose from linear budget sets - imposes an overly
large computational burden on the respondents. Aer all, the experiment would require
children to exhaust their budget completely. is is not an easy task when more than two
goods are presented. e taskmight be so challenging that it actually interferes with the util-
ity maximisation hypothesis. For this reason, we let children choose from ĕnite choice sets
rather than linear budget sets. However, this implies that the standard revealed preference
test for individual rationality (i.e. the GARP) must be modiĕed. e standard GARP test
is then a sufficient condition for rationality, but not a necessary one. We will come up with
alternative rationalisation concepts, depending on whether utility functions are allowed to
be monotone, concave, etc.
In the second part, I consider recovery. In particular, I want to learnmore about the sub-
ject of consumers’ preferences. I have already argued that the original neo-classical prefer-
ences are unrealistic (Problem 3). Several authors have come up with alternative speciĕca-
tions of utility, taking into account future or past consumption. In this part, I consider two
alternative extensions of the revealed preferencemethodology. First, I study other-regarding
preferences in the collective framework (see for instance Cherchye et al. (2011a)). I use ex-
perimental data on joint consumption decisions by children to identify marginal willingness
the pay for others’ consumption. Second, I introduce diamond goods in a unitary frame-
work. Diamond goods are special in the sense that utility is not only derived from their
intrinsic consumption components, or their quantities, but also from their value. I propose
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a method to capture the ‘diamondness’ of commodities and apply the approach to observa-
tional data from the Russian LongitudinalMonitoring Survey. Both papers have in common
that a rather restrictive model (unitary or egoistic) is relaxed by introducing an additional
parameter (which either captures selĕshness or diamondness). In this way, this part also
ĕts in the ‘PEEM’ (portable extensions of existing models) research program developed by
Rabin (2013).
In the third part, I study amethod to bound the distribution of welfaremeasures and de-
mand predictions in a setting where panel data are unavailable. In a similar way as Blundell
et al. (2003, 2007, 2008), I use nonparametric estimation techniques which, in combina-
tion with the revealed preference restrictions, allow for a rather powerful test on the basis
of cross-sectional data. is deals with the aforementioned Problems 1 and 2. However,
our approach builds on stochastic revealed preference methods. is permits us to include
more general forms of unobserved heterogeneity and to bound the distribution of welfare
measures and demand correspondences rather than bounding welfare and demand for a
representative consumer.
As a ĕnal remark, please note that the different chapters in this dissertation are self-
contained. e chapters, albeit related, present distinct contributions to the revealed prefer-
ence literature. For this reason, I modify my notation to the problem under consideration.
It is therefore possible that different chapters use different notation. Moreover, I repeat
the exposition of GARP at some points in the dissertation, to emphasise the underlying as-
sumptions which are generalised in the respective chapter. Similarly, I discuss the empirical
performance measures which are sometimes speciĕcally tailored to one particular data set.
In this way, I hope to contribute to a Ęuent reading of the chapters.
Part II
Revealed preference tests of
consistency based on experimental
data
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In this part, I focus on revealed preference tests of consistency with the utility max-
imisation hypothesis on the basis of experimental data. I already argued that the revealed
preference approach is particularly successful when applied to experimental data. First of
all, the assumption of preference stationarity seems more reasonable given the limited time
span between the successive decisions. Second, experimenters can choose a particular de-
sign (i.e. a set of prices and available budgets) in order to maximise the discriminatory
power of the test. Higher discriminatory power implies that the method is better able to
reject consistency with the utility maximisation hypothesis when confronted with totally
random, irrational choices.
More importantly, an experiment can shed light on consumption decisions which are
practically unobservable. e expenditures of children, in particular, are typically not avail-
able from budget surveys. However, children inĘuence the consumption behaviour of their
parents. ey can also spend small amounts of (pocket)money. In this sense, their decisions
matter for economic analysis. Furthermore, insight into the rationality of children is impor-
tant from a ‘paternalist’ point of view. Parents should protect children who are vulnerable
to irrational decisions.
I apply the revealed preference approach to (experimental) consumption decisions by
individual children. e analysis is similar in spirit to the experiment set out by Harbaugh
et al. (2001). In the same way, children choose commodity bundles from ĕnite choice sets.
It seems reasonable to argue that choosing from ĕnite choice sets is less cumbersome than
spending a given amount of money on various goods with different prices. Budget exhaus-
tion would require the children to use calculators (especially in a setting withmore than two
goods). e computational burden would likely interfere with the optimality of children’s
choices. However, the aim of this part is to obtain insight into the rationality of children
and the drivers of rationality.
In Chapter 1, I investigate whether rationality is related to intelligence. Harbaugh et al.
(2001) brieĘy touched upon the subject, by linking rationality to mathematical skills. In
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Chapter 1, I use teacher based assessments of intelligence to investigate whether, and to what
extent, smart children tend to behavemore rational. I speciĕcally recognise themultidimen-
sional nature of intelligence. More generally, this chapter illustrates consistency checks for
experimental data as well as a number of common empirical performance measures in the
revealed preference literature, such as pass rates, power and the violation index.
In Chapter 2, I present revealed preference conditions for consistency with utility max-
imisation in a ĕnite choice-set setting. Finite choice sets are explicit in the experiments in
Chapter 1 and Harbaugh et al. (2001), but they also occur in many real-life settings. When
choice sets are ĕnite, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where the un-
derlying utility function is weakly monotone, strongly monotone and/or concave. More-
over, I discuss a number of conditions under which the usual revealed preference test (i.e.
GARP) is still valid. Finally, I compare results from the different rationalisability concepts
with the results from Chapter 1 and the results from Harbaugh et al. (2001), who tested for
consistency with a strongly monotone utility function. e results clearly depend on which
rationalisability concept is applied.
Chapter 1
Are the smart kids more rational?1
1.1 Introduction
We use experimental data to study the ‘rational’ consumption behaviour of children. Con-
sidering children of different ages, we assess the empirical validity of the rationality as-
sumption. Next, we also explain the degree of rationality in terms of the children’s personal
characteristics. In this respect, a speciĕc feature of our study is that we relate rational con-
sumption to alternative dimensions of intelligence. In particular, we investigate how verbal
skills (language) and non-verbal skills (mathematics) deĕne the (ir)rational consumption
behaviour of children. Or putting it differently, are the ‘smart’ kids more rational? And,
if so, does the type of smartness matter? is introductory section motivates our research
question, and indicates how this study relates to the existing literature.
Motivation. e literature has devoted considerable attention to studying whether eco-
nomic models are applicable to children.2 e aim is to understand the children’s decision
1is chapter is based on joint workwith Sabrina Bruyneel (KULeuven), Laurens Cherchye (KULeuven), Bram
De Rock (ULB) and Siegfried Dewitte (KU Leuven). I refer to the working paper version of Bruyneel et al. (2012a).
2See, for example, Harbaugh et al. (2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), Farrell and Shields (2007), Lundberg et al. (2009),
and references therein.
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behaviour, and to gain insight into the evolution of this behaviour when children grow older.
Clearly, a better understanding of children’s economic behaviour allows for a better mod-
elling of this behaviour. For instance, household consumption models that include children
usually treat these children as either some ‘public good’ entering their parents’ utility func-
tions or as rational decision makers maximising their own utility.3 is immediately raises
the question whether and to what extent children can actually be considered as rational con-
sumers. We refer to Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Lundberg et al. (2009) for a more elaborated
discussion of this type of arguments.
Next, there is the obvious observation that children oen do have to make consumption
decisions (e.g. on how to spend their pocket money or how to choose the games they play).
In this respect, Choi et al. (2014) argue, rather convincingly, that the quality of such con-
sumption choices can be measured by the degree of rationality. In particular, they show that
irrational choices imply a ‘waste of money’. In a similar vein, Echenique et al. (2011) indi-
cate that irrational consumers are subject to being exploited as a ‘money pump’. is pleads
for protecting and guiding children’s behaviour more carefully if this behaviour turns out to
be irrational. In this respect, identifying the children’s characteristics that drive rationality
can also lead tomore effective protection and training of those children who are particularly
vulnerable.4
Methodology and related literature. Observational ‘real-life’ data usually do not contain
sufficient information on children’s consumption to study rationality of their behaviour.
erefore, most papers cited above make use of experimental data to study children’s be-
haviour.5 In line with this common practice, we also conduct an experiment in the current
3For example, Blundell et al. (2005) and Cherchye et al. (2012) propose household consumption models that
treat children as public goods, while Becker (1974), Dauphin et al. (2011) andDunbar et al. (2013) considermodels
that assume children are individually rational decision makers.
4For example, Choi et al. (2014) argue that insight into the relationship between rationality and personal char-
acteristics can prove useful to design appropriate social programs (Manski (2001)) and paternalistic policies (aler
and Sunstein (2003)).
5One exception is the study of Farrell and Shields (2007), which uses child diary information contained in the
British Family Expenditure Survey. However, the cross-sectional data used by these authors do not allow for testing
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study. Speciĕcally, for each individual child we gather data on 9 (unsophisticated) discrete
consumption choices. As we will indicate, this experimental setup effectively allows for a
powerful test of rationality.
Our experimental design is similar to the one ofHarbaugh et al. (2001), who also focused
on verifying whether children can be modelled as rational decision makers. However, it is
worth emphasising two main differences between these authors’ study and ours, which -in
our opinion- make our study a valuable extension of this original one. Firstly, as for our
testing methodology, we use a different procedure to check rationality, which is specially
tailored for discrete choice settings such as ours. Secondly, and more importantly, our ex-
perimental data set is richer than the one of Harbaugh, Krause and Berry in that it includes
more detailed information on the children’s personal characteristics. Most notably, as in-
dicated above, we have information on alternative dimensions of child intelligence. As we
will explain, this effectively provides a more balanced insight into the driving forces of eco-
nomically rational behaviour. It will turn out to be important to explicitly account for the
multidimensional nature of intelligence to identify signiĕcant effects.6
At the methodological level, we use so-called ‘revealed preference’ tests to check ratio-
nality of the children’s consumption behaviour.7 A particular feature of this revealed pref-
erence approach is that it starts directly from the observed choices and does not require any
functional speciĕcation of the individual preferences. It directly veriĕes the testable implica-
tions of rationality on the raw consumption data. Conveniently, this avoids that rationality
of observed behaviour is rejected simply because of functional misspeciĕcation. Moreover,
revealed preference tests can bemeaningfully applied to small data sets. For our experiment,
this means that we can analyse rationality of choices for each child separately and, thus, that
the rationality of the children’s decision behaviour itself.
6In this respect, Harbaugh et al. (2001) only considered the effect of mathematical skills in their original study,
and their results did not reveal a signiĕcant relation between rationality and mathematical ability. In Section 1.5,
we will indicate that the effect of mathematical ability on rationality only appears signiĕcantly if one controls for
differences in verbal skills (in our case language). is shows the importance to simultaneously account formultiple
dimensions of intelligence when studying its effect on rationality of consumption behaviour.
7See Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950), Richter (1966), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982)
for seminal contributions on the revealed preference approach that we adopt here.
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we can avoid the debatable assumption that (e.g. observably similar) children have homo-
geneous preferences. Finally, and also because of these reasons, it has been argued in the
literature that revealed preference tests are specially useful within an experimental context
such as ours.8
Paper outline. Section 1.2 describes the speciĕcities of our experiment. As indicated
above, we confronted each child with 9 choice problems. In each problem, the child had to
choose between 7 commodity bundles, whichmakes that we observe 9 consumption choices
in total. In this section, we will also explain how we obtained our variables on the children’s
personal characteristics. In particular, following the argumentation of Hoge and Coladarci
(1989) we use teacher assessments to construct our indicators of intellectual skills.
Section 1.3 presents our revealed preference test of rationality. Because our experiment
involves discrete choices, we cannot straightforwardly apply the usual revealed preference
tests, which are designed for standard (continuous) budget sets.9 erefore, we discuss an
adapted revealed preference test that can deal with our type of discrete choice data.
Section 1.4 presents the results of our revealed preference tests for the children in our
sample. We discuss pass rates and discriminatory power of our test. In addition, if a child’s
observed consumption behaviour turns out to be irrational, we measure how close it is to
rationality by using the violation index.10 Intuitively, this index evaluates the degree of ra-
tionality by the amount of money that is wasted by making irrational decisions. Adopting
the argument of Choi et al. (2014) that we cited above, this index thus quantiĕes the ‘quality’
of the observed consumption decisions.
Section 1.5 investigates the personal characteristics that drive rational behaviour. A par-
ticular focus is on the question whether and to what extent ‘being smart’ relates to ‘being
8See, for example, Sippel (1997), Harbaugh et al. (2001), Andreoni and Miller (2002), Caplin et al. (2011),
Bruyneel et al. (2012b) and Caplin and Dean (2014). Cox (1997) also provides an extensive discussion on the use
of revealed preference methodology in combination with experimental data.
9See, for example, Varian (1982) for more discussion on standard revealed preference tests.
10See Varian (1993) for a discussion of this violation index.
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rational’. A main ĕnding here will be that such an investigation must take the multidimen-
sional nature of intelligence (verbal versus non-verbal skills) into account.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 e experimental data
In this section, we ĕrst describe how we obtained our data on children’s personal character-
istics. Next, we explain our experiment to collect (discrete) choice data. Wewill also indicate
how this experimental design impacts on the revealed preference test that we present in Sec-
tion 1.3.
Personal characteristics. Our sample includes a total of 100 children residing at three
different schools that participated to our experiment (39 fromkindergarten, 31 third graders
and 30 sixth graders). e selection of classes and schools in the sample is presented in Table
1.1.
kindergarten third grade sixth grade
School I 1 class (15) 1 class (16) 1 class (11)
School II 1 class (13) 1 class (15) 1 class (19)
School III 1 class (11) 0 classes 0 classes
Table 1.1: Information on schools and classes (number of children per class)
Child ages range from 5 to 12 years, with a mean value of approximately 8 years. Hoge
andColadarci (1989) argue that teacher based assessments form a reliable source of informa-
tion on children’s characteristics11 because teacher based assessments and achievement test
scores are typically highly correlated. Following the argumentation of Hoge and Coladarci
(1989), we asked teachers about each child’s intellectual skills, which include language as a
verbal skill and mathematical ability as a non-verbal skill. We also consider creativity as an
11In fact, Borkenau and Liebler (1993) argue that acquaintances can, quite accurately, assess a person’s intelli-
gence. In a recent paper by Lonnqvist et al. (2012), for instance, teacher and parent ratings are used to evaluate the
cognitive abilities of children.
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additional dimension of intelligence12. Next, we also asked for the number of older siblings
in the child’s family. We will motivate our use of data on older siblings in Section 1.5.
We used two different indicators to quantify the three intellectual skills. e ĕrst indi-
cator has possible scores ranging from 1 (= bottom 2 % compared to peers) to 8 (= top 2
% compared to peers), and the second indicator has possible scores ranging from 1 (= very
weak compared to peers) to 10 (= very strong compared to peers). See Appendix 1.A for
more details. Our following empirical exercises will make use of a composite of these two
indicators13, which is constructed in two steps. First, we transformed (i.e. multiplied by
10/8) the scores for the ĕrst indicator so that they also ranged from 1 to 10. Subsequently,
our composite skills indicators are computed as the average of these transformed scores for
the ĕrst indicator and the original scores for the second indicator. As an alternative we can
select only one indicator per dimension of intelligence. is does not affect the results in
Section 1.5 too much because of the high correlation between both indicators.
Table 1.2 provides summary information on the children’s personal characteristics for
our sample. Generally, for the different characteristics we obtain quite some variation across
the participants of our experiment. is observation is particularly useful in view of our
explanatory analysis in Section 1.5, where we will relate this variation to differences in ra-
tionality of the children’s consumption behaviour.
obs mean std dev min max
age 100 8.04 2.825 5 12
mathematics 99 7.364 1.686 2.75 10
language 99 7.283 1.601 2.75 10
creative 99 7.24 1.489 3.875 10
older siblings 93 0.935 0.987 0 5
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for children’s characteristics
12e triarchic theory of intelligence (Sternberg (1985)), for instance, stresses the importance of creativity.
13ese indicators are highly correlated, with correlations ranging from 0.899 (for the creativity measures) to
0.925 (for the mathematics measures).
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Experimental design. As indicated in the Introduction, our experiment is similar in de-
sign to the one of Harbaugh et al. (2001). As a starting point, we take from these authors that
it does not seem appropriate to ask the participants of our experiment to select commodity
bundles from a continuous budget set (deĕned by given prices and budget). Because such
a selection process involves abstract mathematical reasoning, this seems too difficult a task
for young aged children. e complexity of the choice problem - the children do not under-
stand it - and its computational difficulties might interfere with the desire to make optimal
decisions.
To account for this difficulty, we confronted the children in our experiment with 9 un-
sophisticated discrete choice problems, each characterised by a choice set Ct consisting of
(only) 7 consumption bundles. More precisely, we conceived 9 different price regimes. For
a ĕxed budget, each such price regime deĕnes a budget hyperplane. en, we selected 7
quantity bundles from every budget hyperplane, and in each choice problem we asked the
children to pick their preferred bundle from these 7 bundles. us, our experiment is such
that children did not face explicit prices and budgets when selecting their consumption bun-
dles, but we can interpret their choices as deĕned under implicit prices and budgets. Clearly,
this considerably facilitated the children’s decision process; they simply had to select 9 com-
modity bundles from choice sets Ct that contained only 7 elements.
More speciĕcally, the children could choose quantity bundles that were composed of
three commodities: grapes (units of 10 grams), mandarins (units of 12.5 grams) and letter
biscuits (units of 5 grams). e 7 bundles in a given choice set always contained the three
‘extreme’ bundles with all budget spent on a single commodity, and four other ‘intermediate’
bundles with positive quantities for our three commodities. Appendix 1.B reports the choice
sets we used and the associated (implicit) prices14. In Section 1.4, we will argue that these
choice sets imply a powerful revealed preference test of rationality.
14Although some bundles included fractions of the commodities, the experimenter did not report aversion to
these bundles. e children were provided with separate segments of themandarin. Grapes and letter biscuits were
distributed in units.
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e whole experiment is carried out in the classrooms of the four participating schools.
Each child is invited to taste the grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits prior to the exper-
iment. ese tasted commodities are of the same brand and have the same quality as the
commodities in the actual decision problems. Finally, the children were truthfully told that,
at the end of the experiment, they would receive one consumption bundle that would be
taken randomly from the 9 bundles they selected. is should improve the external validity
of our study. We provide more details on our experiment in Appendix 1.B. Importantly,
given our speciĕc setup, we may safely abstract from intertemporal issues like savings and
interdependent consumption choices.
Table 1.3 provides summary information on the individual budget shares of the three dif-
ferent commodities. e fact that children chose positive amounts of all commoditiesmakes
us conclude that each commodity is effectively desirable. On average, the letter biscuits com-
modity seems to be the more popular one. However, the reported standard deviations also
reveal quite some heterogeneity over the choices made. Generally, all this suggests that our
experimental data provide a useful basis to assess rationality of consumption choices.
Table 1.3 also gives separate budget share information for female andmale participants in
our experiment. It seems that there are no speciĕc gender effects in terms of the commodities
that are selected. Actually, this is a systematic ĕnding for our sample of children: for none of
the exercises discussed in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, we found signiĕcant differences betweenmale
and female participants. erefore, and to compactify our exposition, we will not report
on gender effects in these following exercises. Evidently, results for the male and female
subsamples are available from the authors upon simple request.
As a ĕnal point, it is worth noting that our discrete choice setting raises some particular
issues. Firstly, it could well be that for a number of children the 7 options in some choice
problem did not include the children’s most preferred bundle deĕned over the entire budget
set associated with the corresponding (implicit) prices and budget. However, during our
experiment it was clear that our selection of choices strikes a right balance between simpli-
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grapes mandarins letter biscuits
all children .317 .245 .438
(.172) (.190) (.258)
kindergarten .273 .174 .553
(.204) (.180) (.284)
third grade .312 .235 .452
(.117) (.173) (.208)
sixth grade .378 .347 .275
(.159) (.179) (.178)
female .307 .245 .448
(.170) (.184) (.263)
male .329 .244 .427
(.175) (.199) (.255)
Table 1.3: Average budget shares (standard deviations between brackets)
fying the problem and exhausting all budget possibilities (see also our empirical analysis in
Section 1.4). Secondly, and related to this, standard revealed preference tests assume con-
tinuous budget sets, while our setup implies discrete choice sets. is makes that we need
an adaptation of the standard revealed preference test of rationality, which we discuss next.
1.3 A revealed preference test of rationality
As explained in the previous section, the children were faced with 9 different discrete choice
sets Ct. Each choice set contained 7 quantity bundles taken from a budget hyperplane.15
e children had to choose one quantity bundle qt 2 R3+ (with t = 1; : : : ; 9) from this set.
For each individual child, this deĕnes the data set
S = f(Ct;qt) ; t = 1; :::; 9g :
e data set S is consistent with rationality if there exists a continuous and strongly
monotone utility function U which rationalises the data, in the following sense.
15More precisely, there exist (implicit) pricespt and an (implicit) budget yt such that, for all z 2 Ct,ptz = yt.
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Deĕnition 1.1. Let S = f(Ct;qt) ; t = 1; :::; 9g be a set of observations. A strongly mono-
tone utility function U provides a rationalisation of S if and only if for each observation
t = 1; :::; 9 we have U (qt)  U (z) for all z 2 Ct:
Note that, although we used implicit prices and budgets to design the experiment (i.e. to
describe the hyperplanes used in the construction of the choice setsCt), we do notmake use
of this information in our deĕnition of rationality and, thus, we cannot use this information
in the corresponding revealed preference test of rationality. As an implication, our test re-
sults will not depend on the fact that the children were not aware of the actual price-budget
information.
e following concepts will be crucial ingredients of our revealed preference test of ra-
tionality.
Deĕnition 1.2. Let S = f(Ct;qt) ; t = 1; : : : ; 9g be a set of observations. en for any
s; t = 1; : : : ; 9:
(i) qt is directly revealed preferred over qs (i.e. qtR0qs) if there exists a z 2 Ct such that
z  qs;
(ii) qt is strictly directly revealed preferred over qs (i.e. qtP0qs) if qtR0qs and qs 62 Ct;
(iii) qt is revealed preferred over qs (i.e. qtRqs), if there exist observations u; v : : : ; w
such that qtR0qu, quR0qv , …, qwR0qs.
Essentially, this deĕnition makes clear the preference information we can extract from
a child’s observed choices contained in some data set S. e intuition goes as follows. As
for statement (i), if the child chooses qt in Ct, then (s)he must prefer qt over all available
bundles z 2 Ct. Because we assume strictly increasing utility functions (i.e. stronglymono-
tonic preferences), this also means that the child prefers qt over any qs for which z  qs.
Statement (ii) builds further on the ĕrst statement and concludes from qtR0qs that there
exists z 2 Ct such that z  qs. en, because qs 62 Ct we must have that z 6= qs, which
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means that z strictly dominates qs in at least one commodity while not having less of any
other commodity. Strictly increasing utility then implies that z is strictly preferred to qs,
which carries over to qt being strictly preferred to qs. Finally, statement (iii) imposes that
preferences are transitive.
While Deĕnition 1.2 resembles the standard deĕnition of revealed preference relations
(as, for example, in Varian (1982)), it is substantively different because it is deĕned in terms
of discrete choice sets and does not use price information to reconstruct the preference re-
lations. More precisely, let pt and yt represent the prices and budget information that de-
scribes the choice setCt (i.e. for all z 2 Ct : p0tz = yt). en, it is easy to verify thatqtR0qs
(respectively qtP0qs) implies that p0tqt  p0tqs (respectively p0tqt > p0tqs). Importantly,
however, the reverse implication does not hold necessarily, because the discrete choice set
Ct does not contain all the bundles on the continuous budget hyperplane deĕned by pt and
yt (i.e. the set fz : p0tz = ytg). Consider for instance the data set presented in Figure 1.1.
.
good 2
good 1
z11
z21
z12
z22
Figure 1.1: Rational choices that violate GARP
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ere are two choice sets C1 = fz11; z21g and C2 = fz12; z22g. We assume that z11 is
chosen from C1 (q1 = z11) and z22 is chosen from C2 (q2 = z22). It is easy to see that these
choices violate GARP. However, the choices are rationalisable by a strongly monotone and
non-concave utility function if we take the ĕniteness of the choice sets (C1 and C2) into
account. For example, the dashed curve provides a (non convex) indifference curve which
rationalises all choices.
e following proposition deĕnes a revealed preference test of rationality for our discrete
choice setting. In particular, it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a strongly
monotone rationalisation of the information contained in the data set S. Chapter 2 (specif-
ically: Appendix 2.A, eorem 2.4, proof for SMARP) contains the formal proof of this
result.16
Proposition 1.3. Let S = f(Ct;qt) ; t = 1; : : : ; 9g be a set of observations. en, there
exists a strongly monotone utility function U that provides a rationalisation of S if and only
if, for any s; t = 1; : : : ; 9, qtRqs implies not qsP0qt.
e revealed preference condition in this result states that, if some bundle qt is revealed
preferred over a bundle qs, then it cannot be that qs is strictly directly revealed preferred
over qt. In other words, we cannot have a cycle of revealed preference relations containing a
direct revealed preference relation that is strict. e rationality condition in Proposition 1.3
is closely related to the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP; see again Varian
(1982)), which is the standard condition for rationality in the revealed preference literature.
Similar to before, the important difference is that our rationality condition is deĕned for
discrete choice sets and, unlike GARP, does not use price information. As a ĕnal remark,
it is important to note that different rationalisation concepts, which would coincide in a
setting with linear budget sets, no longer coincide when choice sets are ĕnite. Speciĕcally,
16As is clear from the text, the following rationality condition is speciĕc to discrete choice settings in which
each choice set contains a ĕnite number of bundles taken from one and the same budget hyperplane. We can refer
to Harbaugh et al. (2001), Polisson and Quah (2013) and Chapter 2 for revealed preference tests of rationality in
alternative discrete choice settings.
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different assumptions on the monotonicity and/or concavity of the utility function can lead
to different results. is point is further elaborated in Chapter 2.
1.4 Testing rationality
In this section, we present our test results for the children under study. We begin by con-
sidering pass rates for our rationality tests. Here, a particular focus will be on whether these
pass rates vary depending on age. Next, to enable a better interpretation of these pass rates,
we also compute the discriminatory power of the revealed preference test for our experimen-
tal design. In the current context, power stands for the probability of detecting (simulated)
irrational behaviour. Finally, we also report results on the violation index for our sample.
As indicated in the Introduction, this measure quantiĕes how close observed behaviour is to
rational behaviour, which actually allows us to measure the ‘quality’ degree of the observed
consumption decisions.
Pass rates. As mentioned before, our setup allows us to carry out the revealed preference
test for each child separately. Per respondent, we obtain a positive response if his or her
choices can be rationalised and a negative response if his or her choices are not rationalisable.
As such, we obtain 100 independent tests of rationality. Pass rates then capture the average
response across the sample. Table 1.4 presents the results for each age category. We learn
that pass rates are generally low but increasing with age. However, even the older children
in our sample behave irrationally.
To put this ĕnding into perspective, it is useful to compare the results in Table 1.4 with
the ones obtained by Bruyneel et al. (2012b). For a similar experiment (with three goods and
the same prices and budgets) on undergraduate students, these authors obtained a substan-
tially higher pass rate of 92%. As such, we can conclude that younger aged children appear
considerably less rational than young adults.
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At this point, we remark that this conclusion is partly at odds with the results of Har-
baugh et al. (2001). ese authors focused on children of the second and sixth grade, and
compared their results for these groups to the ones for undergraduate students. For the sec-
ond graders they also obtained a very low pass rate (of 26%). However, the pass rate for the
sixth graders was closely similar to the one for the undergraduate students (i.e. both rates
were situated between 60% and 65%). One possible explanation for our different results
is that we consider choice problems involving three goods, whereas Harbaugh, Krause and
Berry concentrated on a simpler setting with only two goods. One may argue that adding
goods makes consumption decisions more difficult, and that this effect is more pronounced
for younger consumers.
pass rate obs
all children 0.43 100
[0.331;0.529]
kindergarten 0.31 39
[0.162;0.458]
third grade 0.48 31
[0.301;0.659]
sixth grade 0.53 30
[0.348;0.712]
Table 1.4: Individual rationality: pass rates, [95 per cent conĕdence bounds]
Power. To enable a better interpretation of the pass rates in Table 1.4, we also computed
the discriminatory power of our rationality test. is power is deĕned as the probability
of detecting ‘irrational’ behaviour (i.e. behaviour that is not consistent with utility max-
imisation as characterised in Deĕnition 1.1). As such, this power value provides a natural
benchmark for the pass rates that we discussed above: if power is situated below the rejec-
tion rates for our sample (i.e. one minus the pass rate), then we can conclude that observed
behaviour appears even less rational than (simulated) irrational behaviour, which obviously
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provides a strong rejection of the rationality hypothesis.17
To simulate irrational behaviour, we use the bootstrap method for panel data as de-
scribed by Andreoni and Miller (2002) within a similar experimental context.18 Essentially,
this method mimics random behaviour for each choice set by drawing randomly from the
children’s observed choices for that set (i.e. 100 choices for each of the 9 different choice
sets in our setting). In other words, the bootstrap procedure draws bundles from the ob-
served probability density function. is gives insight into the expected distribution of vi-
olations under random choice, while incorporating information on the observed choices.
Corresponding results for an alternative power method (Bronars’ approach) are discussed
in Chapter 2.
More speciĕcally, we conducted Monte Carlo-type simulations that include 10000 iter-
ations. is obtained a power value for our test of 0.87. In other words, the null hypothesis
of rational - optimising - behaviour is rejected with a probability of 87% when the alterna-
tive hypothesis holds. e alternative hypothesis stipulates, in this case, that the observed
choices in the sample constitute a set and that choices are made from this set at random
(with replacement). A power measure of 0.87 is clearly very high, which conĕrms that the
experiment is well-designed. Also, and importantly, it is much above the rejection rates that
can be computed from Table 1.4. In our opinion, this provides some (albeit moderate) sup-
port in favor of the null hypothesis of optimising behaviour for our sample of children: even
though our pass rates are rather low in absolute terms, they are reasonably high in view of
the power of our test.
For robustness, we also consider an alternative bootstrapping procedure which takes
into account that the distribution of choices is speciĕc to the age group under considera-
tion. In particular, we drew (random) bundles from the observed distribution of choices
by, respectively, kindergarten respondents, third graders and sixth graders. is gives a
17See Beatty and Crawford (2011) for an extensive discussion of this interpretation.
18We refer to Bronars (1987) and Andreoni et al. (2011) for more discussion on alternative methods to measure
the discriminatory power of revealed preference tests.
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bootstrap power of 0.91 for kindergarten respondents, 0.78 for third graders and 0.74 for
sixth graders. Again, these power estimates are considerably higher than the corresponding
rejection rates in Table 1.4.
Violation index. As a further investigation, we also computed a violation index  for the
choices in our experiment. e violation index relaxes the expenditure minimisation re-
quirement conditional on a set of revealed preference relations. To compute this index, we
make use of the (implicit) prices and budgets underlying the construction of our choice sets.
More precisely, for each choice observation t we compute
t =
minqsRqt p
0
tqs
p0tqt
:
is violation index takes the ĕniteness of the choice sets into accountwhen constructing
revealed preference relationsR. Otherwise stated,R refers to the corresponding relation in
Deĕnition 1.2.
Consider for instance Figure 1.2 which presents two choice sets C1 = fz11; z21g and
C2 = fz12; z22g. Suppose that the implicit prices corresponding to the choice sets are given
by
p1 = [3; 2]
p2 = [2; 3]:
A respondent has chosen bundleq1 = z11 from choice set 1 and bundleq2 = z22 from choice
set 2.
q1 = [3; 3=2]
0
q2 = [3=2; 3]
0:
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One can see that this data set is rationalisable (in a discrete setting), and speciĕcally, q2
R q1. However, it is possible that 1 < 1; indicating a waste of the implicit budget. In a
non-discrete setting, the respondent could have saved money (speciĕcally, p1(q1   q2) =
3  (3   3=2) + 2  (3=2   3) = 1:5) in period 1 by purchasing q2 instead of q1 because
q2 is also preferred over q1. Graphically, the dashed line presents the lower expenditures in
period 1 associated with bundle q2. However, q2 was not included in the discrete choice set
in period 1. e discreteness of the choice set thus leads to an implicitmoneywaste although
the respondent is fully rational. For this reason, t gives the extent to which the consumer
is vulnerable to money losses. is vulnerability depends on the individual’s preferences,
his or her level of rationality and the construction of the choice set. erefore, t (i.e. the
amount of money wasted) gives a lower bound on rationality. e condition that t = 1
is sufficient to impose (exact) rationality. By contrast, lower values indicate that part of the
implicit budget may have been wasted.
.
good 2
good 1
z21
q1 = z
1
1
q2 = z
2
2
z12
Figure 1.2: Illustration of the violation index in a ĕnite choice set setting
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e violation index  is then simply the minimum t deĕned over all t:
 = minf1; :::; 9g:
Building further on the above explanation of t, Choi et al. (2014) interpret this violation
index as a measure of the quality of the observed consumption decisions.19
Table 1.5 presents some descriptive statistics for the violation index. We ĕnd that the
mean value of the index equals 69%, which means that children ‘waste’ no more than 31%
of their budget, on average. Similar to our results on pass rates, this can be interpreted
as signalling a rather low quality of the children’s decision making process. At this point,
however, it also worth remarking that there appears to be quite some heterogeneity across
individual children. For example, just like for our pass rates, we again observe an age effect:
third graders and sixth graders waste no more than 27% of their budget. is is about 10%
to 15% less than the corresponding budget waste by children from kindergarten. Finally,
we also computed the violation index for random data simulated along the lines described
in the previous paragraph. We obtain a violation index of 43% for the random data. is
clearly indicates that the children’s behaviour - albeit not fully rational - is more consistent
with the utility maximisation hypothesis than the random, simulated data sets. In the next
section, we provide a more in-depth analysis of (observable) characteristics impacting on
the quality of children’s consumption decisions.
Variable obs mean std dev min max
all children 100 .688 .361 .11 1
kindergarten 39 .604 .382 .111 1
third grade 31 .737 .321 .11 1
sixth grade 30 .747 .363 .111 1
Table 1.5: Individual rationality: a violation index
19See Varian (1993) for more discussion on the violation index.
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1.5 Explaining rationality
As a preliminary step, we consider Table 1.6, which provides descriptive statistics on the
characteristics of both the group of rational children (i.e. children that pass our revealed
preference test) and the group of irrational children (i.e. children that fail our revealed pref-
erence test). We again observe an age effect. Moreover, there seem to be some differences
for the personal characteristics. However, these differences do not appear to be very pro-
nounced. We ĕnd no signiĕcant differences when comparing mathematical or language
skills for the two groups of children under consideration. is ĕnding falls in line with the
one of Harbaugh et al. (2001), who also considered the relationship between rationality and
mathematical ability, and did not detect a signiĕcant effect either.
Variable nr rat nr irrat mean rat mean irrat sd rat sd irrat
age** 43 57 8.605 7.614 2.77 2.814
mathematics 43 56 7.358 7.368 1.855 1.561
language 43 56 7.061 7.453 1.713 1.503
creative* 43 56 7.439 7.087 1.604 1.39
older siblings 40 53 .925 .943 .944 1.027
Table 1.6: Characteristics of rational and irrational children (* = signiĕcant difference at
10%; ** = signiĕcant difference at 5%)
Importantly, however, the mean values in Table 1.6 are unconditional in nature. For
example, computing the average difference of mathematical skills for rational and irrational
children does not correct for language differences between these two groups of children. To
allow for a conditional analysis, we will next regress our rationality results simultaneously
on alternative dimensions of intelligence. is will lead to more reĕned insights because
it effectively exploits the multidimensional nature of intelligence20. In fact, this also makes
better use of the richness of our data on personal characteristics.
Following up on our discussion in the Section 1.4, we conduct two types of regression
exercises: probit regressions with the rationality indicator (0 if the child is irrational and 1
20Following the well-known Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory (Carroll (1993)), IQ must be considered as a multidi-
mensional concept.
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if the child is rational) as dependent variable and fractional response regressions with the
violation index (situated between 0 and 1) as dependent variable. To estimate the latter type
of regression, I follow a procedure set out by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). ese authors
proposed quasi-maximum likelihood to estimate a fractional response model when the de-
pendent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, with many observations at the boundary (in
casu: 1)21. While a standard regression (OLS) on transformed data (e.g. the logit transfor-
mation) cannot properly deal with values at the boundary, the enhanced generalised linear
model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) can take these values into account.
In each regression, we include age dummies (kindergarten and third grade) and the
number of older siblings as control variables. Given our previous results we expect neg-
ative signs for the age dummies (especially for the kindergarten coefficient). Next, the use
of older siblings as a control is inspired by the literature claiming that living in a family with
older siblings impacts positively on the rationality of the younger children, because it makes
these younger children better informed decision makers.22
Our core focus is then on investigating how verbal skills (language) and non-verbal skills
(mathematics) deĕne rationality of children’s behaviour. In particular, we address two ques-
tions. First, we want to verify whether the smarter kids are more rational. In this respect,
it is worth to recall that our four intellectual characteristics are measured by comparing the
children to their peers. As such, if a child achieves a high score for a particular dimension,
this indicates that this child does relatively well as compared to other children of her/his
age. Next, we also aim to identify the speciĕc personal characteristics that drive rational-
ity. Is it the case that some intellectual characteristics bear a stronger relation to rationality
than others? And does the effect of alternative dimensions of intelligence move in opposite
directions? A priori, because rational consumption behaviour may be argued to require ab-
stract/mathematical thinking, onemay believe thatmathematical abilitywill relate positively
21is method requires specifying robust standard errors, a logit link function and the binomial distribution. It
is available in STATA under the command ‘glm y x, link(logit) family(binomial) robust’.
22See, for example, John (1999) for a recent survey.
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to rationality, while the expected effect of language may be less pronounced.
Table 1.7 presents our regression results. For our two dependent variables (i.e. the ra-
tionality indicator and the violation index) we have analysed two regression speciĕcations.
Our main focus will be on speciĕcation 1, which (only) includes language and mathemati-
cal skills as indicators of (verbal and non-verbal) intellectual ability. As a robustness check,
we also considered speciĕcation 2, which includes creativity as an additional dimension of
intelligence.
rationality indicator (0 or 1) violation index (between 0 and 1)
speciĕcation 1 speciĕcation 2 speciĕcation 1 speciĕcation 2
kindergarten -.588* -.564* -.677 -.631
(.331) (.339) (.456) (.463)
third grade -.028 .113 -.042 .042
(.345) (.352) (.471) (.465)
mathematics .247* .265* .293* .291*
(.138) (.158) (.169) (.175)
language -.321** -.506*** -.382** -.475**
(.14) (.175) (.179) (.189)
creative .315** .192
(.128) (.124)
older siblings .013 .019 .184 .185
(.144) (.145) (.148) (.146)
constant .563 -.567 1.538* .818
(.741) (.867) (.887) (1.012)
obs 92 92 92 92
pseudo R2 .0786 .1329
Table 1.7: Regression coefficients (robust standard errors between brackets) (* = signiĕ-
cant at 10%; ** = signiĕcant at 5%; *** = signiĕcant at 1%); we use maximum likelihood
estimation for our probit regressions (with the rationality indicator as dependent variable)
and quasi-maximum likelihood estimation for our fractional response regressions (with the
violation index as dependent variable)
If we ĕrst regard the control variables, we ĕnd that they all have the expected sign: being
in the kindergarten has a negative effect on (the degree of) rationality, while having older
siblings has a positive impact. However, the only signiĕcant effect is the one for age (i.e. the
kindergarten dummy).
Let us then turn to our more interesting results on the different intellectual characteris-
1.5. EXPLAINING RATIONALITY 43
tics. First, if we consider our (main) speciĕcation 1, we ĕnd that mathematical ability has a
positive and signiĕcant impact on rationality. In other words, if children outperform their
peers in mathematics, then there is a higher probability that they take rational decisions.
Interestingly, this result is robust for both the rationality indicator and the violation index
as dependent variables. is is in line with Burks et al. (2009), who found that cognitive
skills signiĕcantly impact on economic preferences and choices, favouring the individuals
with better cognitive skills. Next, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we ĕnd that language
has a strongly and signiĕcantly negative impact on being rational. Again, this ĕnding holds
for our two dependent variables. It appears that, on average, having better language ability
goes together with less rational decision making.
An obvious question here is how we can square these results with our earlier ĕndings
(based on Table 1.6), where we concluded that neither mathematics nor language seemed to
be related to rational behaviour. e explanation for this paradox is that, as we also men-
tioned above, Table 1.6 captures unconditional effects, whereas the regression results in Ta-
ble 1.7 deĕne conditional effects: our regressions effectively condition on the level of verbal
skills when assessing the impact of non-verbal skills, and vice versa. us, to identify the
positive effect of mathematical ability on rationality, it turns out to be important to control
for the fact that language ability has an opposite effect on rationality. Because mathemati-
cal and language skills are positively correlated (i.e. children oen perform well (or badly)
in both mathematics and language simultaneously), one risks to miss the signiĕcant effects
when conducting an unconditional analysis. In our opinion, this may also explain the result
of Harbaugh et al. (2001) that we mentioned above. It seems that these authors found no
effect of mathematical ability on the observed rationality of children’s behaviour because
they did not correct for differences in language skills.
To conclude, we consider the regression results for our speciĕcation 2, which includes
creativity as an additional explanatory variable. Importantly, we observe that our signiĕcant
effects for mathematical and language skills remain (roughly) the same as in our regressions
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that use speciĕcation 1. Next, the (positive) effect of creativity is signiĕcant when explaining
the (binary) rationality indicator. However, the effect is not conĕrmed in the regression of
the violation index. Remember that the effects of mathematical skills and language skills are
stable across all four speciĕcations. is leads us to conclude that language skills (as indica-
tor of verbal intelligence) and mathematical skills (as indicator of non-verbal intelligence)
are the more important drivers of rational consumption behaviour by children. Interest-
ingly, this coincides with the theory of Gardner (1983), who argues that there are distinct
types of intelligence, and that linguistic intelligence and logical-mathematical intelligence
are very important in our society.
Finally, note that the regression results in Table 1.7 should be interpreted with care. First
of all, the estimates from non-linear models (probit, glm) may suffer from omitted vari-
able bias even when the omitted variable is not correlated with the included variables (see
e.g. Yatchew and Griliches (1985)). Second, the coefficients are no longer signiĕcant when
correcting for multiple-testing using the Holm-Bonferroni method23. On the other hand,
measurement errors in the explanatory variables may cause the regression parameters to be
biased.
1.6 Conclusion
Focusing on the consumption behaviour of children, we investigated the relationship be-
tween taking rational consumption decisions and being smart. To do so, we designed an
experiment involving unsophisticated discrete consumption choices (with only three com-
modities). In addition, we developed a revealed preference test that is speciĕcally designed
for analysing the resulting choice data. Using teacher based assessments, we also obtained
information on the children’s personal characteristics, which we related to the children ob-
served degree of rationality.
23Note however that the Holm-Bonferroni method is rather conservative.
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e analysis of our experimental data obtained twomain conclusions. A ĕrst conclusion
is that, on average, children’s consumption behaviour appeared not fully rational. In this
respect, however, we also observed a clear age effect: children tend to behave more rational
when growing older. More generally, we found quite someheterogeneity in rationality across
children.
Our second important conclusion then pertains to relating this heterogeneity to spe-
ciĕc child characteristics. Our particular focus here was on the effect of intellectual ability.
Speciĕcally, we considered indicators of verbal (language) and non-verbal (mathematical
skills) intelligence. As a robust ĕnding, we obtained that mathematical ability positively im-
pacts on children’s rationality, whereas language skills have a signiĕcantly negative effect.
More generally, we take our results to mean that it is particularly important to acknowledge
the multidimensional nature of ‘being smart’ when relating rationality to intelligence.
We believe that an interesting avenue for follow-up research consists of explaining our
results in terms of the characteristics of the decision processes that underlie the observed
consumption behaviour. For example, such an analysis may clarify our (perhaps somewhat
surprising) result on the negative effect of language skills on the rationality of children’s con-
sumption decisions. Referring to our discussion in the Introduction, such an investigation
can contribute further to a better protection of those children who appear to be particularly
vulnerable consumers.
1.A Questions posed to teachers
For each of the dimensions taken up in Table 1.2 we asked the following questions to the
teachers (translated from Dutch):
1. ‘How would you position [ĕrst name] [surname] in terms of [mathematical, lan-
guage or creativity] skills, when comparing [him]/[her] to all other pupils of similar
age whom you have taught? Excellent (top 2%), Very good (top 10%), Good (top
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25%), Average (top 50%), Less than average (bottom 50%), Bad (bottom 25%), Very
bad (bottom 10%), Terrible (bottom 2%). (Indicate one answer, e.g. if you ĕnd that
the pupil is good, but that he/she does not belong to the top 10%, indicate top 25%.)’
2. ‘Howwould you rate the [mathematical, language or creativity] skills of [ĕrst name]
[surname], if you compare [him]/[her] to average peers? (indicate one possibility)?
1 (very weak) to 10 (very strong)’
1.B Details on our experiment
1.B.1 Prices and choice sets
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 present the prices regimes that we used to construct our choice sets and
the 9 discrete choice sets themselves.
Prices
1 unit of grapes 1 unit of mandarins 1 unit of letter biscuits
8 4 1
8 3 2
9 3 1
1 8 4
2 8 3
1 9 3
4 1 8
3 2 8
3 1 9
Table 1.8: e price regimes deĕning the choice sets
1.B.2 Experimental design
e children were welcomed one at a time in a separate room. Before starting the experi-
ment, each child was allowed to taste the grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits. ey were
instructed that these products were similar to the products they could choose in a next step.
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It was stated multiple times that each product was from the same brand and had the same
quality.
We explained that they had to choose 9 successive times but that they would only receive
one (randomly selected; see below) consumption bundle aerwards. Subsequently, each
child was presented with the ĕrst of nine choice sets. He or she could choose one out of
seven plates. Each plate displayed a consumption bundle consisting of a combination of
grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits.
Aer a plate had been chosen by the child, we presented the next choice set, while again
stating that his or her second choice was as important as the ĕrst one, and that choices were
independent of each other. is process was repeated nine times. At the end of the ex-
periment, the children were invited to draw a card with a number from one to nine. ey
received the corresponding consumption bundle.
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Quantities
Grapes Mandarins Biscuits
Choice 1
1.5 0 0
0 3 0
0 0 12
0.5 1 4
0.75 0 6
0.75 1.5 0
0 1.5 6
Choice 2
1.5 0 0
0 4 0
0 0 6
0.5 1.33 2
0.75 0 3
0.75 2 0
0 2 3
Choice 3
1.33 0 0
0 4 0
0 0 12
0.44 1.33 4
0.66 0 6
0.66 2 0
0 2 6
Choice 4
0 1.5 0
0 0 3
12 0 0
4 0.5 1
6 0.75 0
0 0.75 1.5
6 0 1.5
Choice 5
0 1.5 0
0 0 4
6 0 0
Quantities
Grapes Mandarins Biscuits
2 0.5 1.33
3 0.75 0
0 0.75 2
3 0 2
Choice 6
0 1.33 0
0 0 4
12 0 0
4 0.44 1.33
6 0.66 0
0 0.66 2
6 0 2
Choice 7
0 0 1.5
3 0 0
0 12 0
1 4 0.5
0 6 0.75
1.5 0 0.75
1.5 6 0
Choice 8
0 0 1.5
4 0 0
0 6 0
1.33 2 0.5
0 3 0.75
2 0 0.75
2 3 0
Choice 9
0 0 1.33
4 0 0
0 12 0
1.33 4 0.44
0 6 0.66
2 0 0.66
2 6 0
Table 1.9: e 9 discrete choice sets
Chapter 2
Revealedpreference theory forĕnite
choice sets1
2.1 Introduction
Finite choice sets Revealed preference theory was initially developed to deal with situa-
tions where choices are made from linear budget sets. Although the theory has been ex-
tended to deal with nonlinear budgets (See, for instance, Yatchew (1985), Matzkin (1991),
Forges andMinelli (2009), Cherchye et al. (2014)), none of these papers looks at the situation
where choice sets are ĕnite. However, in many settings choice sets are inherently ĕnite.2
A ĕrst and obvious case where ĕnite choice sets occur naturally is when the goods un-
der consideration can only be bought in discrete amounts. In such cases, the choice set can
be represented as the intersection of a linear budget set and the space Zn+. is particular
setting is studied in a recent paper by Polisson and Quah (2013). ey show that for such
choice sets, the standard revealed preference condition (i.e. GARP) characterises the data
1is chapter is based on joint work with omas Demuynck (Maastricht University). I refer to the working
paper version of Cosaert and Demuynck (2013) and the article version of Cosaert and Demuynck (2014b).
2Recently Forges and Iehlé (2013) discussed the revealed preference conditions when the available data only
consist of a so called ‘essential experiment’ given by observed consumption bundles and a feasibility matrix. In
such setting the experimental observer only knows to which extent a bundle that has been chosen at some date is
also available at another date.
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sets which are rationalisable by a utility function which is separable in an unobserved good
which can be consumed in continuous quantities. Independently of our work, Forges and
Iehlé (2014) generalise the results of Polisson and Quah (2013) by characterising the neces-
sary and sufficient revealed preference conditions for rationalisability when the choice set
is given by the intersection of a budget set and some discrete set. In this way, the authors
identify a counterpart of the standard GARP condition for situations where (all) goods are
indivisible, which they call the Discrete Axiom of Revealed Preference. eir analysis dif-
fers from ours in two ways. First of all, our focus is on more general discrete choice settings,
i.e. we do not necessarily require that the choice sets are constructed as the intersection of a
discrete set and a linear budget set. Second, we have a different focus in the sense that we put
strong emphasis on the additional properties that are imposed on the utility functions, like
monotonicity and concavity. Nevertheless, there are also some clear connections between
our results and the ĕndings from Forges and Iehlé (2014). For example, if we restrict our
setting to their framework, then the Discrete Axiom of Revealed Preference can be shown
to be equivalent to our Weakly Monotone Axiom of Revealed Preference.3
A second setting where discrete choice sets in combination with revealed preferences
are pertinent is for experimental data. Indeed, revealed preference theory is remarkably
well suited to analyse the rationality of subjects in experimental settings. Its main advan-
tage lies in the fact that experiments can be speciĕcally designed to allow for very powerful
tests (e.g. by letting prices vary and keeping budgets constant across different choice prob-
lems). e usual procedure for such revealed preference experiments is to let the subjects
of the experiment solve a number of different exercises. For each exercise, the subject is
endowed with a budget (expressed as a number of tokens) and is informed on a vector of
prices. Next, the subjects are instructed to allocate their budget over a set of goods sub-
ject to the budget constraint deĕned by the income and the prices. See, for example, Cox
(1997), Andreoni andMiller (2002), Février andVisser (2004), Fisman, Kariv, andMarkovits
3See Section 2.3 for a formal deĕnition.
2.1. INTRODUCTION 51
(2007), Huck and Rasul (2008), Bruyneel, Cherchye, and De Rock (2012b) and Cherchye,
Demuynck, and De Rock (2013a) for similar experimental designs. However, this exper-
imental design may pose two potential problems. First of all, it requires that the subjects
understand the concepts of money, prices and income and that they are able to compute the
total expenditure and compare it with the total available budget. is requirement is not
always satisĕed, especially when the subjects under consideration are children (as in Chap-
ter 1). Second, revealed preference theory usually requires that the entire available budget
must be exhausted (i.e. the total expenditure should be equal to the available budget). In
settings where there are only two goods, this requirement can be met by representing choice
problems graphically as a 2–dimensional budget line. is setting can even be extended
to include choices under uncertainty (Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007)). en, bud-
get exhaustion can easily be imposed by restricting the choices to lie on the budget line.
However, if there are more than two goods, graphical illustrations are no longer feasible (or
much more difficult to represent). As such, the requirement that the entire budget must be
exhaustedmight require a lot of ĕne–tuning on the part of the subject (SeeMattei (2000) for
a clear illustration of this problem). In these settings, subjects are usually given calculators
(or other computing devices) to check whether there are any tokens le to spend. Never-
theless, this ĕne–tuning might still impose a considerable burden on the subjects. In fact,
this burden might become large enough such that it actually interferes with the optimality
of the choices. Indeed, if there are many goods, then the opportunity cost (i.e. additional
time) that is needed to ĕne–tune the choices may become quite large. is, in turn, might
lead to situations where the subjects choose to lower the time spent on ĕne–tuning at the
expense of choosing a less–optimal bundle.
An elegant solution to the two aforementioned problems is to design the experiment
in such a way that the subjects choose from a ĕnite set of distinct bundles. Restricting the
choice sets to be ĕnite makes the choices of the respondents much easier: they only have to
pick one bundle from a ĕnite collection of feasible options. e ĕrst experimental study that
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uses this option is by Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) who investigated the rationality
of choice behaviour by children and young adults. eir experimental design has been repli-
cated by several others (see for instance Burghart, Glimcher, and Lazzaro (2012) and List
and Millimet (2008)). Another study that uses experimental data was discussed in Chapter
1. We will also use these data sets in our empirical illustration.
A third relevant case where choice sets are ĕnite is when choices are made by picking
a single item from a ĕnite set of distinct alternatives (e.g. the choice between different cars
from a catalogue). In these settings, it is useful to think of the different alternatives as repre-
senting different bundles of characteristics (e.g. the price, the top speed, the fuel efficiency,
etc.). Usually, these kind of discrete choice models are analysed by econometric methods
which are based on limited dependent variables models (see for instance Train (2009) for
a thorough overview or Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) for a seminal contribution).
Given this, our results can actually be seen as a ĕrst step towards an analysis of such discrete
choice characteristics models by nonparametric revealed preference techniques.4 Related to
this, we also like to point to the large choice theoretic (and behavioural) literature that mod-
els the choice behaviour over arbitrary (discrete) sets of alternatives, which need not nec-
essarily be representable as bundles of goods or characteristics. e main rationalisability
concept in this setting is due to Richter (1966), who provided a choice theoretic analogue to
the ‘consumption based revealed preference literature’ founded by Samuelson (1938, 1948)
and Houthakker (1950). By developing a ‘consumption based’ revealed preference theory
for ĕnite choice sets, we are in a certain sense building a bridge between these two largely
separate literatures, thereby opening the door for empirical applications of various other
choice theoretic models.
Contributions Our paper has several contributions. First of all, from a theoretical per-
spective, we derive a number of revealed preference conditions that can be applied to settings
4e revealed preference conditions of the characteristics model in a continuous choice space were analysed by
Blow, Browning, and Crawford (2008).
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where choices are made from ĕnite sets of distinct consumption bundles. Towards this end,
we distinguish between four cases: rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility function,
rationalisabililty by a weakly monotone and concave utility function, rationalisability by a
strongly monotone utility function and rationalisability by a strongly monotone and con-
cave utility function. Here, rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility function is the
weakest concept while rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave utility function
is the strongest. For each of the four rationalisability concepts we obtain a different set of
revealed preference conditions. Interestingly, these different revealed preference conditions
do not coincide. As such, it is for example possible to ĕnd a data set that is rationalisable
by a weakly monotone utility function but not by a concave and strongly monotone utility
function. is result is interesting because such distinctions can not be made when choices
are obtained from linear budget sets. Indeed, a well known result in revealed preference
theory (Afriat’s theorem) tells us that in such cases, rationalisability by a weakly monotone
utility function is equivalent to rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave util-
ity function. is means that when choice sets are linear, all four rationalisability concepts
coincide (see Section 2.2 for more details).
Second, we provide a number of conditions on the ĕnite choice sets for which it is al-
lowed to neglect the fact that choices are made from ĕnite choice sets. In other words, we
present a collection of assumptions such that the standard revealed preference condition
(i.e. GARP) is still valid for consistency with utility maximising behaviour. ese conditions
can be used to design experimental settings for which the results can still be analysed using
the standard revealed preference conditions. For example, we show that the experimental
design of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) satisĕes the conditions such that GARP char-
acterises the data sets that are consistent with utility maximisation by a strongly monotone
(and concave) utility function. However, we also show that it is not possible to strengthen
this to utility maximisation with a weaklymonotone (and concave) utility function. In other
words, it possible that the data set violates GARP, but the behaviour was nevertheless gen-
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erated by some weakly monotone utility function (e.g. a Leontief utility function).
Finally, we illustrate the relevance of our results by analysing two experimental data sets
that contain choices made by children and young adults. e ĕrst data set is from the pre-
viously mentioned experiment of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001). e second is from
Bruyneel, Cherchye, Cosaert, De Rock, andDewitte (2012a) (Chapter 1 in this dissertation).
For both data sets, we ĕnd that imposing weakmonotonicity instead of strongmonotonicity
(and concavity) on the utility functions improves empirical ĕt in terms of higher predictive
success, a measure which was recently introduced by Beatty and Crawford (2011).
In Section 2.2, we give a brief summary of the most important results in revealed pref-
erence theory. is discussion will be useful to position our results within the revealed
preference literature. Section 2.3 contains the main theoretical results of this paper. It de-
velops the revealed preference conditions for the ĕnite choice set framework. In Section
2.4, we present some conditions for which the usual revealed preference conditions coin-
cide with our revealed preference conditions. Section 2.5 contains an empirical illustration
of our results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix 2.A.
2.2 Revealed preference theory for linear budget sets
In this section, we present the basic revealed preference theory. is will be useful for com-
parison with the results that will be established in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
To start, consider a ĕnite collection of sets fBtgt2T , where T is a ĕnite set of observations,
T = f1; 2; : : : ; jT jg. In this section, we assume that the choice sets take on the form of a
linear budget set,
Bt = fq 2 Rn+jptq  mtg;
In words, the choice set Bt contains all bundles q 2 Rn+ that can be bought with a certain
incomemt > 0 at prices pt 2 Rn++. In the next sections, we will consider the setting where
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each budget setBt consists of a ĕnite number of distinct bundles.
A data set S = fBt;qtgt2T then consists of a ĕnite number of budget sets and for each
budget setBt a bundle qt from this set, i.e. qt 2 Bt. e idea is that qt is the bundle which
is chosen from the budget set Bt. Usually, it is assumed that qt lies on the boundary of
Bt, i.e. ptqt = mt. In most experimental settings, this condition is additionally imposed.
Given this, data sets are also frequently written as fpt;qtgt2T where the underlying budget
set is implicitly deĕned by:
Bt = fq 2 Rn+jptq  ptqtg:
e following deĕnes the standard rationality concept in revealed preference theory.
Deĕnition 2.1 (Rationalisability). A data set S = fBt;qtgt2T is rationalisable by the
utility function u : Rn+ ! R if for all t 2 T ,
qt 2 arg max
q2Bt
u(q):
In words, a data set S is rationalisable by the utility function u if for each observation
t 2 T , the chosen bundle qt maximises the utility function u(:) over the budget setBt.
For two vectors q and q0, we write q  q0 if every element of the vector q is as least
as large as the corresponding element of the vector q0. We denote q > q0 if q  q0 and
q 6= q0 and we write q  q0 if every element of q is strictly larger than the corresponding
element of q0. A utility function u(:) : Rn+ ! R is weakly monotone if q  q0 implies
u(q)  u(q0) and q  q0 implies u(q) > u(q0). A utility function u : Rn+ ! R is
strongly monotone if q  q0 implies u(q)  u(q0) and q > q0 implies u(q) > u(q0). e
utility function u : Rn+ ! R is locally non–satiated if for every open neighbourhoodN of
q there is a bundle q0 2 N \ Rn+ such that u(q0) > u(q). Strong monotonicity is stronger
than weak monotonicity (as it rules out situations like Leontief utility functions) which, in
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turn, is stronger than local non–satiation. e utility function u : Rn+ ! R is concave if for
all q and q0 2 Rn+ and all  2 [0; 1], u(q+ (1  )q0)  u(q) + (1  )u(q0).
Given these properties on the utility function, it is possible to deĕne different rational-
isability concepts, e.g. rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave utility function,
or rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility function. As will be demonstrated in e-
orem 2.2 below, if budget sets are linear, then all these rationalisability concepts coincide.
However, as we will demonstrate in the following sections, this equivalence breaks down
when choice sets are ĕnite.
eorem 2.2 (Afriat’s theorem). Consider a data set S = fBt;qtgt2T where each set Bt
(t 2 T ) is a linear budget set. en the following conditions are equivalent:
1. e data set S is rationalisable by a locally non–satiated utility function.
2. e data set S satisĕes GARP,
3. For all t 2 T , there exist numbers t and t > 0 such that for all t; v 2 T ,
t   v  vpv(qt   qv):
4. e data setS is rationalisable by a concave, (continuous) and strongly monotone utility
function.
e above theorem shows that rationalisability by a locally non–satiated utility func-
tion is equivalent to GARP. Next, the equivalence between the second and fourth condition
states that GARP is also equivalent to rationalisability by a concave, strongly monotone and
continuous utility function. e equivalence between the ĕrst and fourth condition actually
shows that it is impossible to reject concavity and strong monotonicity of the utility func-
tion without rejecting utility maximisation by a locally non–satiated (and, hence, weakly
monotone) utility function. In other words, if budget sets are linear, then all the different
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rationalisability concepts which are nested between the properties of ‘local non–satiation’
and ‘strict monotonicity and concavity’ coincide. In the next section, we will show that this
property no longer holds if the choice sets are ĕnite. In other words, the equivalence be-
tween the ĕrst and fourth condition turns out to be a consequence from the fact that choice
sets take the shape of linear budget sets. e linear inequalities in the third condition are the
so called Afriat inequalities. ese have a nice interpretation when the underlying rational-
isation is concave. Indeed, if, for example, S = fBt;qtgt2T is rationalisable by a concave
and strongly monotone utility function u(:) and if we take the simplifying assumption that
u(:) is differentiable, then concavity of u(:) implies that for all t and v,
u(qt)  u(qv)  rqu(qv)(qt   qv): (2.1)
Here rqu(qv) is the gradient of u(:) at the bundle qv . Strict monotonicity requires that
rqu(qv) 0. Next, the ĕrst order conditions for the utility maximisation problem imply
that,
rqu(qv)  vpv; (2.2)
where v is the strictly positive Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the budget constraint.
Notice that we can replace the inequality sign with an equality sign for strictly positive quan-
tities. If we substitute equality (2.2) into inequality (2.1) and if we set t = u(qt) and
v = u(qv), we effectively obtain the Afriat inequalities. e Afriat inequalities form a set
of linear inequalities. As such, they provide a second set of conditions by which it can be
veriĕed whether a data set is rationalisable.
2.3 Revealed preference theory for ĕnite choice sets
In the previous section we considered the case where each choice setBt takes on the form of
a linear budget set. However, as explained in the introduction, inmany contexts, individuals
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choose by picking one out of a ĕnite number of distinct consumption bundles. To model
this setting, we assume from now on that each choice set Bt consists of a ĕnite number of
distinct bundlesBt = fb1t ; : : : ;bKtt g 2
QKt
i=1 Rn+. HereKt = jBtj, which may depend on
the observation t 2 T .
As in the previous section, we denote byqt the observed choice from the setBt, i.e.qt 2
fb1t ; : : : ;bKtt g andwe denote a data setS as fBt;qtgt2T . e concept of rationalisability in
this setting is identical to the deĕnition of the previous section: the data setS = fBt;qtgt2T
is rationalisable by the utility function u(:) if for all t 2 T ,
qt 2 arg max
q2Bt
u(q):
In the linear budget case, consumers maximise utility over all bundles in the linear bud-
get set, which is deĕned by a price vector and a budget. is is reĘected in the construction
of the revealed preference relations. If, for instance, qv is on the boundary of the budget set
associated with qt (i.e. ptqv = ptqt), we note that u(qt)  u(qv). If qv is in the interior
of this budget set (i.e. ptqv < ptqt), this condition can be strengthened to u(qt) > u(qv)
because, by local non–satiation, there must be a bundle eqt in a small neighbourhood of qv
such that u(qt)  u(eqt) > u(qv). In the case of ĕnite choice sets, on the other hand,
rationalisability by a locally non–satiated utility function is no longer useful. e reason is
that choice sets do not contain open subsets. For this reason, we will restrict ourselves to
the two most natural strengthenings of local non–satiation, namely weak and strong mono-
tonicity. ese assumptions allow us to construct similar revealed preference relations in
a discrete choice setting. Aer all, the standard GARP is sufficient (but not necessary) for
rationalisability of choices from ĕnite choice sets.
As indicated in the previous section, when choices are made from ĕnite sets, the differ-
ent rationalisability concepts no longer coincide. We will make a distinction between four
different notions of rationalisability: (i) rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility func-
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tion, (ii) rationalisability by a strongly monotone utility function, (iii) rationalisability by a
weakly monotone and concave utility function and (iv) rationalisability by a strongly mono-
tone and concave utility function. e gap between rationalisability by a weakly monotone
utility function on the one hand and rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave
utility function on the other hand is of particular interest. e other rationalisability con-
cepts are nested between these characterisations, imposing either strong monotonicity (ii)
or concavity (iii), hence providing us with a tool to analyse the different assumptions on
preferences in more detail.
In principle, it is possible to obtain for all four rationalisability concepts, revealed prefer-
ence restrictions both in terms of GARP-like conditions and in terms of ‘Afriat-like’ inequal-
ities. However, we will mainly focus on GARP-like conditions for the ĕrst two rationalis-
ability concepts (the cases without concavity) and Afriat-like conditions for the rationalis-
ability concepts with concavity. e reason for doing this is twofold. First, from a theoretical
viewpoint, it turns out that the conditions that we present are the most intuitive for the ra-
tionalisability concept under consideration. e other revealed preference conditions are
much more difficult to interpret. Second, from an empirical viewpoint, it turns out that the
omitted revealed preference conditions are computationally much more difficult to verify
and therefore less useful in practice.
For the remainder of this section, we ĕrst present rationalisability by a weakly (strongly)
monotone utility function. Rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility function is the
least restrictive rationalisability concept. Next, we focus on rationalisability by a strongly
(weakly) monotone and concave utility function. Rationalisability by a strongly monotone
and concave utility function imposes the strongest restrictions, i.e. the data must be ratio-
nalisable by a well-behaved utility function.
Weakly (strongly) monotone rationalisability Let us start with rationalisability where
the underlying utility function is not required to be concave. For a particular budget setBt,
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consider its comprehensive hull,
C(Bt) = fq 2 Rn+j9j  Kt : q  bjtg
e set C(Bt) contains all bundles which are dominated by some bundle in Bt. Of course,
if a consumer has a monotone utility function, then the chosen bundle qt must be at least
as good as every bundle in C(Bt). Given this, the main idea is to reformulate the basic
revealed preference relations (used in the deĕnition of GARP) using the sets C(Bt) as the
new budget sets.
Deĕnition 2.3. A data set S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes theWeakly (resp. Strongly) Mono-
tone Axiom of Revealed Preference if there exist binary relations R and R0 such that for
all t; v 2 T ,
1. If there exists a bundle qv 2 C(Bt) then qtR0qv .
2. If there exist observations a, b and s such that qtR0qa, qaR0qb, ..., qsR0qv , then
qtRqv .
3. If qtRqv then for all bkv 2 Bv it is not the case that bkv  qt (resp. bkv > qt).
We say that qt is directly revealed preferred to qv , qtR0qv if qv 2 C(Bt) (or equiva-
lently, if there exists a bundle bjt 2 Bt such that bjt  qv). As usual the indirect revealed
preference relation R is deĕned as the transitive closure of the direct revealed preference
relation. en, we say that the data set S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes the Weakly Monotone
Axiom of Revealed Preference (WMARP) if qtRqv implies that for all bkv 2 Bv it is not
the case that bkv  qt. On the other hand, the data set S = fBt;qtgt2T is said to satisfy
the Strongly Monotone Axiom of Revealed Preference (SMARP) if qtRqv implies that for
all bkv 2 Bv it is not the case that bkv > qt.
Given these deĕnitions of WMARP and SMARP, we can state our ĕrst result. All the
proofs of the theorems can be found in Appendix 2.A.
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eorem2.4. Consider a data setS = fBt;qtgt2T . en the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
• e data set S is rationalisable by a weakly (resp. strongly) monotone (and continuous)
utility function.
• e data set S satisĕes the Weakly (resp. Strongly) Monotone Axiom of Revealed
Preference WMARP (resp. SMARP).
Both conditions WMARP and SMARP can easily be veriĕed by using a simple adap-
tation of the algorithm presented by Varian (1982) which is the standard method to verify
GARP.
e deĕnitions of SMARP and WMARP were obtained by adapting the deĕnition of
GARP to the budget sets C(Bt). However, it is also possible to give conditions which are
more similar to the Afriat type inequalities (See also the proof of eorem 2.4 in Appendix
2.A for more details). In particular, let ei be the n dimensional unit vector which has its
i–th coordinate equal to one and which has all other coordinates equal to zero. Next let
av;t = min
kKv

max
i
ei(qt   bkv)

It can easily be shown that av;t  0 if and only if qt 2 C(Bv). It turns out that the data set
fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes WMARP if and only if there exist numbers t and t > 0 such that
for all t; v;
t   v  vav;t:
ese inequalities are similar to the standardAfriat inequalitieswhere the expressionpv(qt 
qv) is replaced by av;t. Similar to the term pv(qt   qv), we have that av;t is less than or
equal to zero if and only if qt is in the budget set (C(Bv)) of observation v.
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Strongly (weakly) monotone and concave rationalisability In this paragraph, we focus
on our rationalisability concepts that involve concave utility functions. Concavity implies
that there exists a supporting hyperplane associatedwith the indifference curve through each
chosen bundle. When budget sets are linear, on the one hand, the lower half-space deĕned
by this supporting hyperplane contains all ‘revealed worse’ bundles (i.e., all bundles in the
budget set). When choice sets are ĕnite, on the other hand, the slope of the indifference
curve through each point in the choice set is unknown. e construction of one hyperplane
through the chosen bundle is no longer sufficient to guarantee that the chosen bundle is
‘revealed preferred’ over all bundles in the comprehensive hull of the choice set. We therefore
consider the convex indifference curve through each alternative bkt from the choice set Bt.
As the utility function is concave, there should be a supporting hyperplane associated with
this indifference curve through bkt . Let us indicate its slope by pkt (= rqu(bkt )). We have
that pkt  0 if the utility function is strongly monotone (and pkt > 0 if the utility function
is weakly monotone). Each bundle bkt is then the utility maximising alternative over all
bundles q for which pktbkt  pkt q. It follows that the data set fpjt ;bjtgt2T;jKt should
satisfy GARP.
In terms of Afriat inequalities, this means that there should exist numbers jt and pjt
such that for all t; v 2 T and all k  Kt; j  Kv :5
kt   jv  pjv(bkt   bjv): (2.3)
We still need to link these inequalities to the actual observed choices. Recall that the number
kt can be interpreted as the utility level corresponding to the bundle bkt . en, given that
qt = b
k
t was chosen while another bundle b
j
t was also feasible at t 2 T , it must be that
kt = u(b
k
t ) = u(qt)  u(bjt ) = jt . Hence, we also require that for all observations t 2 T
and all j  Kt, if qt = bkt , then kt  jt . is implies that the actually chosen bundle qt
5We can omit the variables v as the vectors pjv are only deĕned up to scale.
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is not below the supporting hyperplanes associated with alternatives bjt .
Deĕnition 2.5. A data set S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes the Strongly (resp. Weakly) Mono-
tone and Concave Axiom of Revealed Preference if for all t 2 T and bkt 2 Bt there exist
numbers kt and vectors pkt  0 (resp. pkt > 0) such that for all t; v 2 T :
kt   jv  pjv(bkt   bjv) and,
if qt = bkt then, kt  jt for all j  Kt:
Consistency with WMCARP (SMCARP) turns out to be a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for rationalisability by a concave utility function.
eorem2.6. Consider a data setS = fBt;qtgt2T . en the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
• e data set S is rationalisable by a strongly (resp. weakly) monotone (continuous) and
concave utility function.
• e data set S satisĕes the Strongly (resp. Weakly) Monotone and Concave Axiom of
Revealed Preference SMCARP (resp. WMCARP).
Although the ĕrst set of inequalities can be interpreted as Afriat inequalities, they de-
viate from the usual Afriat inequalities as given in eorem 2.2 in three important ways.
First, for WMCARP and SMCARP, we are faced with a total of (
P
tKt)
2 linear inequalities
rather thanT 2 inequalities for the usual Afriat inequalities. e reason is that forWMCARP
(SMCARP) we have a price vector for every available bundle and not just for every chosen
bundle. Second, for the Afriat inequalities ineorem 2.6, the price vectors pkt are variables.
is is due to the fact that we do not observe the slope of the indifference curve through the
bundles bkt . Finally, the conditions WMCARP and SMCARP contain an additional set of
restrictions: the utility associated with a chosen bundle must be at least as high as the utility
associated with other alternatives in the same choice set.
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Both SMCARP and WMCARP are expressed as a set of linear inequalities.6 As such,
they can easily be veriĕed using linear programming methods. However, the conditions
WMCARP and SMCARP can also be stated in revealed preference terms. Indeed, given
our discussion above, we have that the vectors pjv actually correspond to the prices at which
the bundle bjv would have been chosen (from a linear budget set). As such, we need that
fpjv;bjvgjKv;v2T must satisfy GARP. To take into account the second set of restrictions,
this GARP condition should be complemented with the condition that no bundle bjt 2 Bt
is strictly (indirectly) revealed preferred to the chosen bundle qt. However, as the vectors
pjv are not observable, verifying the GARP condition is much more difficult than simply
verifying the above set of linear inequalities.7 at is the main reason why we choose to
state it in this form.
2.4 GARP for ĕnite choice sets
In the previous section, we characterised the different rationalisability concepts that can be
applied when choice sets are ĕnite. In this section, we present a number of sufficient con-
ditions on the ĕnite budget sets fBtgt2T such that GARP is still a necessary and sufficient
condition for rationalisability. ere are several reasons why this might be interesting.
First, despite the fact that our results in the previous section may provide a beneĕt for
researchers whowish to distinguish between the different rationalisability concepts, it might
equally well generate undesirable richness for researchers who are simply interested in the
question whether subjects are rational or not. In this perspective, the conditions on the
budget sets could be used to design an experiment with ĕnite choice sets for which the usual
GARP condition can still be applied to analyse the observed choice behaviour. Second,
6e condition that pjv > 0 can be met by requiring that the sum of the elements in pjv should be strictly
positive.
7If prices are unobserved, GARP can be tested using integer programmingmethods, see, for example, Cherchye,
De Rock, and Vermeulen (2011a) and Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and De Witte (2013b) for applications of
such integer programming approach.
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the standard GARP test is very well known and very easy to implement (and it is readily
available in different programming languages). A researcher may therefore prefer to stick
to this readily available test to verify rationalisability. ird, the standard GARP test relies
on the use of price vectors. is facilitates the interpretation of deviations from rationality
in terms of monetary loss (see, for example, Echenique, Lee, and Shum (2011) and Choi,
Kariv, Müller, and Silverman (2014)). Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it might also
be interesting to look at the conditions (on the budget sets) such that the different revealed
preference characterisations from the previous section coincide with the usual GARP con-
dition. In this way, we obtain a set of conditions for which the discrete choice setting is
empirically indistinguishable from the linear budget setting.
In order to apply GARP, we need to introduce price vectors. e most straightforward
way to do this is to assume that all bundles in the ĕnite budget set Bt lie on some common
budget hyperplane. In such case, there should exist vectors pt 2 Rn++ and numbers mt
such that for all t 2 T and j 2 Kt, ptbjt = mt. In a more general framework, one could
also allow for choice sets where one or several options are dominated by some other option.
However, in such setting, dominated alternatives should never be chosen because they imply
a violation of monotonicity. As such, we maintain the assumption that the above equality is
satisĕed for all bundles bjt 2 Bt.
We consider two further conditions that may be satisĕed for such budget sets.
Assumption 2.7. For all t; v 2 T and all bkv 2 Bv :
1. ifmt  ptbkv , then there exists a bundle bjt 2 Bt such that, bjt  bkv :
2. ifmt > ptbkv , then there exists a bundle b
j
t 2 Bt such that, bjt > bkv :
Assumption 2.8. For all t; v 2 T and all bkv 2 Bv :
1. ifmt  ptbkv , then there exists a bundle bjt 2 Bt such that, bjt  bkv .
2. ifmt > ptbkv , then there exists a bundle b
j
t 2 Bt such that, bjt  bkv .
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e ĕrst condition of Assumptions 2.7 and 2.8 requires that if bkv is in the ‘linearised’
budget set of observation t, then it should also be in the setC(Bt). is condition guarantees
that the revealed preference relation for the GARP condition coincides with the revealed
preference relation for the WMARP and SMARP conditions. e second condition of both
assumptions requires that if bkv is in the interior of the ‘linearised’ budget set of observation
t, then it should be strictly dominated by some bundle inBt.
e following shows that under Assumption 2.7, GARP and SMARP coincide and that
under Assumption 2.8 GARP is equivalent to WMARP.
eorem 2.9. If Assumption 2.7 (resp. 2.8) is satisĕed, then a data set S satisĕes GARP if and
only if it satisĕes SMARP (resp. WMARP).
Assumption 2.7 guarantees that SMARP implies GARP. However, (by eorem 2.2)
GARP implies rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave utility function, hence
it also implies SMCARP. is, in turn, is stronger than SMARP. As such, Assumption 2.7
actually shows that GARP, SMARP and SMCARP will be indistinguishable. Similarly, we
see that under Assumption 2.8, WMARP implies GARP. is, in turn, implies consistency
with SMARP, SMCARP and WMCARP and all three are stronger than WMARP. In other
words, under Assumption 2.8, all revealed preference tests, WMARP, SMARP, WMCARP
and SMCARP, coincide. eorem 2.9 also shows that it is the linearity of the budget sets,
rather than the cardinality, that is responsible for the different rationalisability concepts to
coincide under GARP.8
We present some illustrations (Figures 2.1 to 2.3) of the relevance of Assumptions 2.7
and 2.8. Each of the examples contains two choice setsB1 = fb11;b21g andB2 = fb12;b22g
with two alternatives per choice set. We assume that b11 is chosen from B1 (q1= b11) and
b22 is chosen fromB2 (q2= b22).
en we consider three scenarios. In the ĕrst scenario, depicted in Figure 2.1, Assump-
8We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out for us.
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tion 2.8 holds. We already discussed that whenAssumption 2.8 holds, it is no longer possible
to distinguish between WMARP, GARP and all rationality tests nested between WMARP
and GARP. In the le panel of Figure 2.1, the choices can be rationalised. e dashed line
presents an indifference curve (from a strongly monotone and concave utility function) that
rationalises the data. Obviously, the data is also consistent with all weaker rationality tests.
In the right panel, the choices cannot be rationalised. It is not possible to ĕnd even a weakly
monotone and non-concave utility function that rationalises the observations.
.
good 2
good 1
b21
b22
b11
b12
good 2
good 1
b11
b12
b21
b22
Figure 2.1: Illustration of choice sets that satisfy Assumption 2.8
In the second scenario, depicted in Figure 2.2, the choice sets satisfy Assumption 2.7
but violate Assumption 2.8. In this setting, one can distinguish between rationalisability
with a weakly monotone and concave utility function (WMCARP) on the one hand and a
weakly monotone and non-concave utility function (WMARP) on the other hand. While
the choices in the right panel can be rationalised by a weakly monotone and concave utility
function, the choices in the le panel can only be rationalised by a weakly monotone and
non-concave utility function. In other words, the data in the le panel satisfy WMARP but
not WMCARP.
Finally, Assumption 2.7 is violated in Figure 2.3. is makes that we can, in princi-
ple, make a distinction between rationalisability by a strongly monotone and concave utility
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.
good 2
good 1
b11
b21
b12
b22
good 2
good 1
b11 b
2
1
b12
b22
Figure 2.2: Illustration of choice sets that satisfy Assumption 2.7
function (SMCARP) on the one hand and a strongly monotone and non-concave utility
function (SMARP) on the other hand. e le panel in Figure 2.3 depicts choices which
satisfy SMARP but violate SMCARP. e choices in the right panel satisfy SMCARP.
.
good 2
good 1
b11
b21
b12
b22
good 2
good 1
b11
b21
b12
b22
Figure 2.3: Illustration of choice sets that violate Assumption 2.7
ese examples also indicate how to design experiments that allow maximum differen-
tiation between subjects who satisfy WMARP, WMCARP, SMARP and SMCARP. Clearly,
a setting in which choice sets violate Assumption 2.7 (Figure 2.3) has more potential for
differentiation.
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Figure 2.4: Experimental design of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001)
In order to see the practical relevance of the different assumptions, we take a closer look
at the experimental design of Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) which will also be fur-
ther analysed in the next section. Figure 2.4 presents the 11 different budget sets where
each choice set consists of different bundles on the same budget line. It is easy to verify that
these budget sets satisfy Assumption 2.7. As such, GARP will be equivalent to SMARP and
SMCARP. is also means that it is impossible to distinguish between rationalisability by
a strongly monotone utility function and rationalisability by a strongly monotone and con-
cave utility function. On the other hand, the choice sets do not satisfy Assumption 2.8. As
such, GARP will (in general) not be identical toWMARP and therefore, it might give us the
opportunity to distinguish between rationalisability by a weakly monotone utility function
and rationalisability by a weakly monotone and concave utility function. is feature will
be demonstrated in the next section.
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2.5 Illustration
We illustrate the usefulness of our results on the basis of two experimental data sets which
use ĕnite choice sets. e ĕrst is the data set from Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001),
which deals with choices made by children and young adults. e second is the data set
from Bruyneel, Cherchye, Cosaert, De Rock, and Dewitte (2012a), which also deals with
choices made by children. As mentioned in the introduction, letting children choose from
linear budget sets is indeed problematic, because of difficulties that theymay have in dealing
with concepts like budgets and prices.
We ĕrst give a brief description of the two data sets (more information can be found in the
respective papers). Next, we present the different measures by which we will compare the
different tests: pass rate, power, predictive success and goodness–of–ĕt. Finally, we present
and discuss our ĕndings.
Brief dataset description eexperiment fromHarbaugh, Krause, andBerry (2001) (HKB
from now on) contains information on 128 subjects (31 second grade students, 42 sixth
grade students and 55 college undergraduates). Each subject had to choose from 11 differ-
ent choice sets (jT j = 11). Each choice set contained different bundles of chips and juice
(the choice sets are illustrated in Figure 2.4).
e second experiment, fromBruyneel, Cherchye, Cosaert, DeRock, andDewitte (2012a)
(BCCDD fromnowon), contains information about choice behaviour from100 children (39
kindergarten respondents of about 5 years old, 31 third graders of about 8 years old and 30
sixth graders of about 11 years old). Each child was invited to solve nine successive choice
problems (jT j = 9). Each choice set contained 7 distinct consumption bundles of three
goods: grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits. e budget sets were chosen such that each
bundle within the same budget lay, approximately, on the same hyperplane. e structure
of these different hyperplanes can be found in Chapter 1.
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Evidently, these experimental set-ups are highly artiĕcial. However, both studies tried
to increase the external validity of their results in a number of ways. First of all, during
the experiments, the commodities were either physically presented on plates (BCCDD) or
at least present in the room (HKB). Second, in BCCDD, children were invited to taste the
grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits before the experiment started so the subjects had an
ideal about their valuation of the different goods. In order for the revealed preference tests
to be valid, we must also assume that the preferences of the subjects are stable across the
different choice problems. is assumption of stable preferences may be problematic, par-
ticularly when it is imposed over longer periods. However, note that the time span of both
experiments was rather short. Moreover, in order to exclude saturation effects, it was em-
phasised in both experiments that each choice is independent and equally important, and
that subjects would only consume one of their choices at the end of the experiment (by ran-
domly picking one of the chosen bundles as payoff). Although we acknowledge that the
assumption of stable preferences is strong, we believe that preferences can be relatively sta-
ble in the setting under consideration. Nevertheless, it would be a bold claim to say that our
results have strong external validity.
Although the data sets in HKB and BCCDD seem similar, there are also some important
differences, which makes it interesting to compare the results between the two experiments.
First of all, BCCDD let the subjects choose between different combinations of three com-
modities whereas HKB focus on combinations of two goods only. Given this, the choice
problem in the BCCDD experiment is cognitively more challenging. Second, the respon-
dents in BCCDD are on average younger than the respondents in HKB which may imply
that they are less rational. Finally, the choice sets imposed by HKB satisfy Assumption 2.7
(but violate Assumption 2.8) while the choice sets imposed by BCCDDviolate both assump-
tions. We therefore know that for HKB SMARP and SMCARP coincide with the standard
revealed preference condition (GARP). However, this is not necessarily the case for the data
from BCCDD. As such, by using both data sets, we also provide a clear empirical illustration
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of our ĕndings in Section 2.4.
Pass rate, power, predictive success and goodness–of–ĕt In order to assess the empirical
performance of the different revealed preference tests, we rely on three measures: the pass
rate, the power and the predictive success. Next, we also look at the Houtman-Maks–index
as a measure of goodness–of–ĕt.
Pass rate. e pass rate gives the percentage of all subjects that pass a certain revealed pref-
erence test. A higher pass rate implies that more subjects have made choices that can be
rationalised. However, it is important to take into account the nestedness of the different
tests. In particular, every data set that satisĕes SMCARPwill also satisfy SMARP,WMCARP
and WMARP, every data set that satisĕes SMARP will also satisfy WMARP and every data
set that satisĕesWMCARPwill also satisfyWMARP.e reason for this is simply that every
data set which is rationalisable by a certain utility function, will also be rationalisable by a
utility function with weaker properties.
Power. Since the main aim of revealed preference theory is to provide an accurate descrip-
tion of real consumer behaviour, it is oen favourable to look at more restrictive models.
e strictness of a revealed preference test is usually measured by the ‘power’ of the revealed
preference test. Basically, the power of a revealed preference test measures the probability
that the null hypothesis of utility maximising behaviour is rejected when the alternative hy-
pothesis of random behaviour holds. In the General Introduction, I have argued that there
are several methods to ‘simulate’ random behaviour.
e ĕrst method is the ‘bootstrap’ procedure which was illustrated in the previous chap-
ter. e bootstrap power index samples data sets from the empirical distribution of observed
choices. e selected bundles are not exactly random bundles, because they correspond to
an actually chosen bundle by some respondent. Nonetheless, the bundles of different re-
spondents (who are characterised by different preferences) are randomly combined to con-
struct the new data sets.
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e second method is set out in Bronars (1987). For linear budget sets, the Bronars
power measure is computed by constructing a high number of random data sets by drawing
from a uniform distribution on the budget hyperplane. Sampling bundles from the uniform
distribution is an implementation of an idea put forward by Becker (1962) that says that ir-
rational behaviour involves random choices. As argued by Andreoni, Gillen, and Harbaugh
(2011), the Bronars power measure might be attractive because the alternative hypothesis of
random behaviour can be seen as a minimally informative prior. In our ĕnite choice setting,
we follow amodiĕed version of the Bronars procedure. First, we generate 1000 random data
sets. Each random data set is constructed by drawing, from each choice set Bt (t 2 T ), a
bundle qt at random (using a uniform distribution on fb1t ; : : : ;bKtt g). is gives us 1000
random data sets fBt;qtgt2T . Finally, power is computed as the percentage of these ran-
dom data sets that fail the revealed preference test under consideration.
Predictive success. Using a similar reasoning as for the pass rates, it is easy to see that for two
nested models, the power index corresponding to the more restrictive model will be higher
than the power for the more general model: if a random data set violates the weaker test,
then it will also violate the more restrictive test. is implies, for example, that the power
index forWMARPwill be lowest among all revealed preference tests. In order to avoid these
conĘicting ĕndings (high pass rates together with low power or low pass rates together with
high power), we use a measure that combines both pass rate and power into a single metric:
the measure of predictive success. e properties of this measure were originally proposed
by Selten (1991) in Selten’s eorem. Beatty and Crawford (2011) applied the predictive
successmeasure to a revealed preference setting and simpliĕed the proof of Selten’seorem.
Predictive success is easily computed as the difference between the pass rate and one minus
the power:
predictive success = pass rate   [1  power]:
e predictive success measure is increasing in both the pass rate and the power. As such,
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higher predictive success implies that a model is more successful at describing observed be-
haviour compared to random behaviour. e interpretation of the predictive success mea-
sure is quite intuitive. In the best case scenario, both pass rate and power are equal to one,
which gives us a predictive success of one. In such case, all observed data sets pass the
revealed preference test while all random data sets are rejected by the test. In this sense,
the revealed preference test is perfectly able to distinguish between actual and random be-
haviour. In the worst case scenario, both pass rate and power are equal to zero, which gives
us a predictive success of minus one. In this case, all observed data sets are rejected by the
revealed preference test while all random data sets pass the test. In other words, the model
explains random behaviour perfectly but not the actual behaviour. In intermediate cases,
the measure of predictive success is found somewhere between minus one and plus one. A
predictive success above zero points to a test which describes the observed data sets better
than pure random behaviour. A negative predictive success indicates a setting where the re-
vealed preference test under consideration explains better random behaviour than observed
behaviour. A predictive success of zero implies that the test explains random behaviour as
well as the observed behaviour (i.e. the test is unable to discriminate between random and
observed behaviour).
Goodness–of–ĕt. e revealed preference tests (WMARP, SMARP, WMCARP and SM-
CARP) tell us whether or not a data set is consistent with utility maximising behaviour for
various conditions on the underlying utility function. However, as convincingly argued by
Varian (1990), in many cases, nearly optimising behaviour is just as good as optimising be-
haviour. As such, it would be useful to have some indication that says how close a given data
set is to being rationalisable if it violates the revealed preference conditions. Usually, nearly
optimising behaviour is measured by using a goodness–of–ĕt measure. e most popu-
lar goodness–of–ĕt measure in the revealed preference literature is without doubt Afriat
(1973)’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index discussed in the General Introduction.
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Given that we have no linear budget sets, it is not possible to apply the Critical Cost
Efficiency Index in our setting. Moreover, the focus of this chapter is on the comparison
of various characterisations. We therefore need a robust measure which has a similar in-
terpretation across the different characterisations. An interesting measure in this respect is
the Houtman-Maks index (HM–index) (Houtman and Maks (see 1985)). e HM–index
gives the size of the largest subset of observations (i.e. the largest subset of T ) which is
still consistent with the revealed preference conditions under consideration. For example,
the HM–measure for GARP looks at the largest subset of T , say A, such that fBt;qtgt2A
still satisĕes GARP. e HM–measure is difficult to compute. In particular, the problem is
known to be NP–hard (Houtman and Maks, 1985; Dean and Martin, 2008). However, by
reformulating the conditions in terms of a binary programming problem, one can effectively
compute this measure for the ĕnite choice set case.9 Although binary programming meth-
ods are known to have exponential worst time complexity, they can be solved relatively fast
for small to moderately sized problems.
e interpretation of the HM–measure is that subjects sometimes make mistakes when
choosing their optimal bundle (i.e. for some observations t 2 T , subjects fail to choose the
best bundle). An alternative viewpoint could be that individuals always choose the optimal
bundle, but that they sometimes fail to take into account all available options when mak-
ing a choice. In this case, a more natural goodness–of–ĕt measure would be to look at the
size of the largest subsets of options such that the observed choices are still consistent with
the revealed preference test. A so called ‘alternative–based’ HM–index.10 Formally, this in-
dex computes the largest number n =
P
t jB0tj where B0t  Bt (8t 2 T ) and such that
fB0t;qtgt2T satisĕes the relevant revealed preference test.
9e detailed binary programming problems can be found in the working paper version of this paper (Cosaert
and Demuynck, 2013).
10We thank an anonymous referee for proposing this alternative goodness-of-ĕt measure.
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Harbaugh et al. pass rate Bronars Bootstrap
power pred succ power pred succ
GARP 0.547 0.995 0.542 0.987 0.534
[0.457;0.635] [0.452;0.630] [0.444;0.622]
WMARP 0.828 0.898 0.726 0.812 0.640
[0.751;0.889] [0.649; 0.787] [0.563; 0.701]
WMCARP 0.719 0.989 0.708 0.975 0.694
[0.632;0.795] [0.621;0.784] [0.607;0.770]
Bruyneel et al.
GARP 0.40 0.969 0.369 0.915 0.315
[0.303;0.503] [0.271;0.472] [0.218;0.418]
WMARP 0.71 0.705 0.415 0.594 0.304
[0.611;0.796] [0.316;0.501] [0.205;0.390]
WMCARP 0.55 0.879 0.429 0.794 0.344
[0.447;0.650] [0.326;0.529] [0.241;0.444]
SMARP 0.43 0.928 0.358 0.868 0.298
[0.331;0.533] [0.259;0.461] [0.199;0.401]
SMCARP 0.40 0.933 0.333 0.888 0.288
[0.303;0.503] [0.236;0.436] [0.191;0.391]
Table 2.1: Pass rates, power and predictive success
Results e ĕrst column of Table 2.1 presents pass rates associated with the observed data
and the corresponding 95% conĕdence intervals. Further, the table also reports the Bronars
and bootstrap power and the predictive success for the different revealed preference tests.
Given that the data sets fromHKB satisfy Assumption 2.7, we have that GARP is equivalent
to SMARP and SMCARP. As such, we only report the results for GARP.
In order to compare the different revealed preference tests, one might be tempted to
look directly at the difference in pass rates between the revealed preference tests. However,
as the tests are nested, this might lead to wrong conclusions. For example, the pass rate
for WMARP will always be higher than the pass rate of all other tests, but this does not
necessarily mean that WMARP is also the best model to explain the observed choices. A
better option is to compare the predictive success of the different tests. Table 2.2 provides
results on several likelihood ratio tests for the null hypothesis of equal predictive success
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Bronars H0 H1 2 p-value
Harbaugh et al.
WMARP=WMCARP WMARP 6=WMCARP: 0:494 0:482
WMARP= GARP WMARP 6= GARP: 34:655 0:000
WMCARP= GARP WMCARP 6= GARP: 108:915 0:000
Bruyneel et al.
WMARP= SMARP WMARP 6= SMARP: 1:7753 0:182
WMARP= SMCARP WMARP 6= SMCARP: 3:5516 0:059
WMARP=WMCARP WMARP 6=WMCARP: 0:1394 0:709
SMARP= SMCARP SMARP 6= SMCARP: 5:8139 0:016
WMCARP= SMCARP WMCARP 6= SMCARP: 12:458 0:000
WMCARP= SMARP WMCARP 6= SMARP: 3:7606 0:052
Bootstrap H0 H1 2 p-value
Harbaugh et al.
WMARP=WMCARP WMARP 6=WMCARP: 2:987 0:084
WMARP= GARP WMARP 6= GARP: 8:792 0:003
WMCARP= GARP WMCARP 6= GARP: 79:69 0:000
Bruyneel et al.
WMARP= SMARP WMARP 6= SMARP: 0:018 0:893
WMARP= SMCARP WMARP 6= SMCARP: 0:122 0:727
WMARP=WMCARP WMARP 6=WMCARP: 1:056 0:304
SMARP= SMCARP SMARP 6= SMCARP: 0:443 0:506
WMCARP= SMCARP WMCARP 6= SMCARP: 3:174 0:075
WMCARP= SMARP WMCARP 6= SMARP: 1:566 0:211
Table 2.2: Likelihood ratio tests for equality of predictive success
(see Appendix 2.B for more details on the construction of this likelihood ratio test).
Let us ĕrst have a look at the results from the experiment of HKB. We see that the pass
rates of both WMARP (82%) and WMCARP (71%) are substantially higher than the pass
rates of the GARP (SMARP, SMCARP) test (54%). Furthermore, these higher pass rates are
not entirely offset by a lower Bronars power. As such, we see that the highest predictive suc-
cess is for WMARP (0.726) and WMCARP (0.708). To conĕrm that the predictive success
of WMARP andWMCARP is indeed higher than the predictive success of GARP (SMARP,
SMCARP) (0.542), we can look at the results of the likelihood ratio test in Table 2.2. e re-
sults clearly suggest that bothWMARP (p-value< 0.001) andWMCARP (p-value< 0.001)
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have a signiĕcantly higher predictive success than GARP (SMARP, SMCARP) (although we
cannot reject the hypothesis that WMARP and WMCARP have equal predictive success).
e power and predictive success values based on the bootstrap approach conĕrm these
ĕndings.
Let us now look at the results for the experiment of BCCDD. ese data sets violate
Assumption 2.7. We already argued that these cases are extremely interesting. Beside dis-
criminating between rationalisability by a weakly and strongly monotone utility function,
we are also able to discriminate between situations where the data set is rationalisable by a
(strongly or weakly) monotone utility function on the one hand and situations where the
data set is rationalisable by a (strongly or weakly) monotone and concave utility function
on the other hand. Also notice that in this setting, GARP does not necessarily correspond
to any ‘nice’ rationalisability concept (although it is still a sufficient condition for rational-
isability by a strictly monotone and concave utility function). Nevertheless, Table 2.1 also
gives results for GARP as it is frequently used in the literature. Similar to the experiment of
HKB, we see that the pass rates for WMARP (71%) and WMCARP (55%) are higher than
for SMARP (43%) and SMCARP (40%), which is the lowest. Notice that the 43% pass rate
corresponds to the (overall) pass rate found in Chapter 1. is is no surprise because the
rationality test in Chapter 1 veriĕed consistency with a strongly monotone utility function,
which corresponds to SMARP. en, if we also take into account the Bronars power, we
see that WMCARP has the highest predictive success (0.429) of all models and is closely
followed by WMARP (0.415). ese numbers are higher than the predictive success of the
other two models (0.358 for SMARP and 0.333 for SMCARP). We then look at the likeli-
hood ratio tests for the equality of the various predictive success values. It turns out that the
predictive success associatedwith SMCARP is signiĕcantly lower than the predictive success
associated with WMARP (p-value= 0.059), WMCARP (p-value< 0.001) and SMARP (p-
value < 0.02). Furthermore, the test also suggests that the predictive success of WMCARP
is higher than that of SMARP (p-value = 0.052). Following the bootstrap approach, the
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differences are less outspoken. Only the positive difference between the predictive success
scores of WMCARP and SMCARP is (border line) statistically signiĕcant.
Previously, we argued that BCCDD present a more complex decision problem. is is
conĕrmed by the pass rates which are lower for the BCCDD data set than for the HKB data.
However, we see that for both data sets, WMCARP is among the best performingmodels (in
terms of higher predictive success) while SMCARP has the lowest predictive success. is
indicates that our ĕnding is robust with respect to the complexity of the decision process.
e use of both data sets also illustrates the empirical meaning of Assumption 2.7. Because
Assumption 2.7 holds for the HKB data sets, pass rates, power estimates and predictive suc-
cess values coincide for SMARP, SMCARP and GARP. In this sense it is no longer possible
to distinguish between strong monotonicity with and without concavity. is also implies
that a (linear) GARP test can still be applied to the HKB data, providing a strongly mono-
tone rationalisation of the data. Only in the HKB setting, the (linear) GARP corresponds to
a meaningful rationalisability concept.
Data set by observation HM by alternative HM
WMARP SMCARP WMARP SMCARP
Harbaugh et al. mean 10.758 10.266 49.617 48.938
median 11 11 50 50
std dev 0.649 1.046 1.323 1.999
min 6 5 38 35
max 11 11 50 50
Bruyneel et al. mean 8.57 7.86 61.88 60.17
median 9 8 63 62
std dev 0.769 1.181 2.152 4.008
min 6 5 54 45
max 9 9 63 63
Table 2.3: HM-measure per observation versus HM-measure per alternative
Let us now have a look at the goodness–of–ĕt of the different tests in terms of the
HM–measure. Table 2.3 compares the results obtained from the HM–measure by obser-
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vation with the results obtained from the HM–measure by alternative. On the one hand,
the results show that the by alternative measure is somewhat more reĕned. Observe for
instance the lowest values of the usual HM–measure for the BCCDD data. To rationalise
all data sets by a weakly monotone utility function, the HM–measure must be equal to (or
lower than) 6. In other words, at least 3 observations must excluded. To rationalise all data
sets by a strongly monotone and concave utility function, the HM–measure must be equal
to (or lower than) 5. Only one additional observation must be excluded. However, when
focusing on the ‘by alternative’ HM–measure, we see that 9 bundles must be removed for
all data sets to satisfy WMARP, whereas up to 18 bundles must be removed for all data sets
to be consistent with SMCARP. On the other hand, both measures are clearly related. e
correlation between the two measures is above 89% for both data sets. Our general conclu-
sions with respect to goodness–of–ĕt remain unaffected, regardless of the goodness–of–ĕt
measure used. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 give the distribution of the ‘by observation’ HM–index for
the different revealed preference tests for the two experiments. e black histogram gives
the distribution of the HM–measure for the randomly generated data sets which were also
used for computing the Bronars power measures. As such, it gives the distribution of the
HM–measure for the hypothesis of random behaviour. e gray histogram, on the other
hand, gives the distribution of the HM–measure for the actual data sets. As can be seen, the
distributions of the real data sets have much more mass at higher values of the HM–index
compared to the distribution generated by the randomdata sets (a Chi-square test rejects the
equality of the HM-distributions for the actual and random data at all levels of signiĕcance).
is conĕrms our earlier ĕndings that the pass rates of the simulated data sets are consis-
tently below the pass rates of observed data sets. is again suggests that the hypothesis of
random behaviour is rejected for all models under consideration. As expected, the distribu-
tion of the HM–measure for the weakest test (WMARP) is most skewed to the right, but so
is the distribution of the HM–measure whenWMARP is applied to the randomly generated
data sets.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of HM–index for random and actual data for the data sets of Har-
baugh et al.
What do we learn from all this? Our illustration has both a methodological and an em-
pirical contribution. From a methodological point of view, we believe that it demonstrates
the usefulness of our revealed preference characterisations to deal with choice models when
choice sets are ĕnite. It also shows how to use pass rates, power, predictive success and good-
ness–of–ĕt (HM–measure) to compare the empirical performance of the different revealed
preference tests.
Next at the empirical level, we found that all four tests performed considerably better
than a model which is based on pure random behaviour. Moreover, we have shown how
various rationalisability concepts may lead to very different pass rates, power estimates and
predictive success values. Both Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001) and Bruyneel, Cher-
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of HM–index for random and actual data for the data sets of
Bruyneel et al.
chye, Cosaert, De Rock, andDewitte (2012a) tested the rationality of children’s consumption
decisions based on a test equivalent to SMARP. HBK found that 55 per cent of the children
behaved in a rational way and BCCDD found that only 43 per cent of the children were
rational. We have shown how these pass rates can be improved up to 83 per cent and 71
per cent, respectively, by just dropping the strong monotonicity assumption (i.e. applying
WMARP (or WMCARP) instead of SMARP)11. is shows that care should be taken with
respect to the assumptions that are imposed on the underlying utility functions (i.e. strong
vs weak monotonicity).
11e empirical relevance of the distinction between weak and strong monotonicity stems primarily from the
large number of weakly dominated bundles across different choice sets.
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2.6 Conclusion
We developed a revealed preference analysis for situations where choices are made from a
ĕnite collection of bundles. is setting occurs in various real life and experimental settings.
First of all, we have shown that when choices are made from ĕnite choice sets, then
different rationalisability concepts will have different revealed preference restrictions. is
makes it possible to test for various conditions on the utility function, like strongmonotonic-
ity or concavity. Next, we have put forward a number of conditions for which our revealed
preference conditions still coincide with the usual GARP condition. is result may be rele-
vant for experimental researchers who do not wish to let their results depend on the speciĕc
conditions that are imposed on the utility function.
Finally, we applied our results using two experimental data sets that collect choices by
children and young adults. We have shown that strong monotonicity may not be the best
assumption to describe the observed choice behaviour.
We see several avenues for follow up research.
First of all, to focus our discussion, we have concentrated on testing rationalisability
for basic conditions on the utility function, i.e. monotonicity and concavity. However, it
is possible to obtain revealed preference conditions for even more stringent conditions on
the utility function, like homotheticity or additivity (see Varian (1983) for such revealed
preference conditions in the case of linear budget sets). A natural follow up research would
be to derive the revealed preference conditions for such kind of utility functions when the
choice sets are ĕnite.
A second interesting subject for follow up research is the recovery or identiĕcation of
the underlying preferences (or utility function) and to forecast behaviour in new choice sit-
uations (see Varian (1982) for recovery in the linear budget set setting). As for the setting
considered in the paper, recovery could proceed using the revealed preference relation as
obtained from the deĕnitions of WMARP and SMARP or the ‘utility’ values of jt as ob-
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tained from the deĕnitions of WMCARP and SMCARP.
A third avenue for follow up research is to investigate how our results can be useful
for analysing (non-experimental) real life data. We have argued that ĕnite choice sets oc-
cur naturally when the goods under consideration can only be bought in discrete amounts.
Moreover, particular decisions (e.g. car purchase) can be represented as picking a single
item from a set of alternatives with various characteristics. However, dealing with real life
data involves both data measurement problems and unobserved preference heterogeneity.
Extending our results to these settings will require methodological extensions which may
build on recent work of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003, 2008), Blundell, Kris-
tensen, and Matzkin (2014), Hoderlein (2011), Blundell, Horowitz, and Parey (2013), and
Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) who explicitly take into account individual heterogeneity for
revealed preference tests with linear budget sets. Extending their insights to choice settings
with ĕnite budget sets would be very useful from a practical point of view as it would pave
the way for convincing applications on the basis of real life data.
2.A Proofs
2.A.1 Proof ofeorem 2.4
Let us focus on weak monotonicity before presenting the strong monotonicity case. First,
assume that S = fBt;qtgt2T is rationalisable by a weakly monotone utility function. We
proceed by verifying that the data set satisĕes WMARP.
Assume that bkt  qv . en obviously, by weak monotonicity, u(bkt )  u(qv). Next,
as qt was chosen from Bt, we also have that u(qt)  u(bkt ). erefore, u(qt)  u(qv)
and therefore we have that qtR0qv implies u(qt)  u(qv). By transitivity, we also have
that qtRqv implies u(qt)  u(qv). Now, let qtRqv (i.e. u(qt)  u(qv)) and assume,
towards a contradiction, that bkv  qt. en as qv was chosen from Bv , we have that
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u(qv)  u(bkv). Next, from bkv  qt and weak monotonicity of the utility function, we
have that u(bkv) > u(qt). A such, u(qv) > u(qt). is contradicts with the assumption
that u(qt)  u(qv).
Now, assume that S satisĕes WMARP. We need to show that it is also rationalisable by
a weakly monotone utility function. Consider the n–dimensional unit vectors,
e1 = (1; 0; : : : ; 0);
e2 = (0; 1; : : : ; 0);
: : :
en = (0; 0; : : : ; 1);
Next, deĕne the functions at : Rn+ ! R in the following way:
at(q) = min
kKt

max
i
ei(q  bkt )

Note that the minimisation part of this function exploits feasibility: it minimises the max-
imum difference over the set of consumption bundles bkt that were feasible when qt was
chosen. is function satisĕes the property that at(q)  0 if and only if there is a k  Kt
such that q  bkt and at(q) < 0 if and only if there is a k  Kt such that q bkt .
e function at is weakly monotone. Indeed if q0  ()q, then
max
i
ei(q
0   bkt )  (>)max
i
ei(q  bkt )
for all i = 1; : : : ; n and therefore, at(q0)  (>)at(q). Next, at(q) is also continuous as
it is given by the maximum of the minimum of continuous functions. We also have that
for all t 2 T , at(qt) = 0. Indeed, at(qt)  0 because qt  qt. Now, if on the contrary
at(qt) < 0 this would mean that there is a k  Kt such that qt  bkt , which would
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contradict WMARP.
Let at;v = at(qv). We use the following deĕnition of Cyclical Consistency.
Deĕnition 2.10 (CC). Consider a set of numbers S = fat;vgt;v2T . e set S is said to be
cyclically consistent (CC) if there exists a binary relationW such that:
1. if at;v  0, then tWv,
2. if tWv and vWw, then tWw,
3. if tWv then it is not the case that av;t < 0.
Lemma 2.11. e data set S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes WMARP if and only if fat;vgt;v2T
satisĕes CC.
Proof. Assume that S satisĕes WMARP and let R be the indirect revealed preference rela-
tion. Assume thatW is the relation as in the deĕnition of CC. Let us ĕrst show that all three
conditions of CC are satisĕed if we take tWv if and only if qtRqv .
For the ĕrst, let at;v  0. is means that at(qv)  0 or equivalently qv  bkt for some
k  Kt. However, this implies that qtR0qv and, therefore, tWv. Hence, Condition 1 in
CC is satisĕed.
e second condition in the deĕnition of CC follows immediately from the transitivity
of the indirect revealed preference relation.
For the third condition let tWv which implies qtRqv . is implies that for no k  Kv ,
bkv  qt. Assume on the contrary that av;t < 0. is implies that there is a k  Kv such
that ei(qt   bkv) < 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n. However, this implies that qt  bkv which
contradicts with the requirement of WMARP.
e proof that CC implies WMARP can be shown along the same lines.
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Now, by a theorem of Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004) we have that CC is equivalent to the
existence of numbers t such that,
t   v  vav;t:
Consider the function
u(q) = min
t
t + tat(q)
is function is continuous (as it is the minimum of continuous functions), it is weakly
monotone (because at(:) is weakly monotone for all t 2 T ) and we have that for all t 2 T ,
u(qt) = t. In order to see this, notice that u(qt)  t + tat(qt) = t. Now, if on the
contrary u(qt) < t, then there must be an observation v 2 T such that v+vav;t < t,
a contradiction.
Now, let us show that u rationalises the data set. Assume, towards a contradiction that
u(bkt ) > u(qt) for some k  Kt. en
u(bkt ) = min
v
uv + vav(b
k
t );
 ut + tat(bkt );
 ut:
e last inequality comes from the fact that bkt  bkt , hence, at(bkt )  0. Let us now turn
to the strong monotonicity case. Assume that the data set S = fBt;qtgt2T is rationalisable
by a strongly monotone utility function u. Let us show that S satisĕes SMARP. Similar to
the weakmonotonicity case, we can show that qtRqv implies u(qt)  u(qv). Now, assume
that qtRqv , which implies u(qt)  u(qv). If on the contrary bjv > qt for some j  Kv ,
then by strong monotonicity, u(bjv) > u(qt) and therefore, u(qv)  u(bjv) > u(qt),
which gives us a contradiction.
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To see the reverse, let S = fBt;qtgt2T satisfy SMARP. Consider the vectors ei such
that
e1 = (1; "; : : : ; ");
e2 = ("; 1; : : : ; ");
: : :
en = ("; "; : : : ; 1);
Here " is a small but positive number.
Deĕne the function at such that:
at(q) = min
kKt

max
i
ei(q  bkt )

:
Now, it is easy to see that if there is a k  Kt such that q  bkt , then at(q)  0. Also
if there is a v 2 T such that qv 6 bkt for all k  Kt, we can set " small enough such
that at(qv) > 0. In other words, we can make " small enough such that for all v 2 T ,
at(qv)  0 if and only if qv  bkt for some k  Kt. Also, notice that at(qt) = 0 as
otherwise qt < bkt for some k  Kt, which contradicts SMARP. Also, the function at is
easily seen to be strongly monotone and continuous.
Lemma 2.12. e set fat;vgt;v is cyclically consistent if and only if fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes
SMARP.
Proof. Let fBt;qtgt2T satisfy SMARP and let R be the revealed preference relation. De-
ĕne the relation W such that tWv if and only if qtRqv . Let us show that W satisĕes the
deĕnition of CC. First, let at;v  0. is means that there is a k  Kt such that qv  bkt .
However, this implies that qtRqv and therefore tWv as was to be shown. e second con-
dition follows from transitivity of the relation R. For the third condition, let tWv which
2.A. PROOFS 89
implies qtRqv . Now, if on the contrary av;t < 0, we know that there is a k  Kv such that
qt  bkv . Now, if qt = bkv , we have that av(qt) = 0, which is a contradiction. As such, it
follows that qt < bkv . However, this contradicts with SMARP.
e remaining part of the proof is similar to that of the weakly monotone case.
2.A.2 Proof ofeorem 2.6
Weonly prove theeorem for the stronglymonotone case. e proof for the weaklymono-
tone case is very similar. e ĕrst part of the proof is established in the text. It is shown
that the ĕrst condition implies the second. For the reverse, let us assume that the data set
S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes SMCARP. Next, deĕne the function
u(q) = min
t2T;kKt
kt + p
k
t (q  bkt ):
is function is continuous, concave and strongly monotone. Let us show that it ratio-
nalises the data. First of all, we show that u(bkt ) = kt . e inequality u(bkt )  kt follows
simply from the deĕnition of u. Now, if on the contrary u(bkt ) < kt , then there must exist
an observation v 2 T and j  Kv such that jv + pjv(bkt   bjv) < kt . is contradicts
SMCARP.
Now in order to show that u(:) rationalises the data set S = fBt;qtgt2T assume, to-
wards a contradiction, that there is a t 2 T and k  Kt such that u(bkt ) > u(qt). en if
qt = b
j
t it follows that kt > 
j
t . However, this contradicts with the second condition of
SMCARP.
2.A.3 Proof ofeorem 2.9
We only prove the theorem for Assumption 2.7. e proof corresponding to Assumption
2.8 is very similar.
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Assume that the data set S = fBt;qtgt2T satisĕes Assumption 2.7. Let us show that
if S satisĕes GARP, then S also satisĕes SMARP. Let R0 and R represent the direct and
(indirect) revealed preference relations as given in the deĕnition of GARP. We show that
these relations also satisfy all conditions in the deĕnition of SMARP. First, if bkt  qv for
some t 2 T and k  Kt, we have thatmt = ptbkt  ptqv and therefore qtR0qv . Now, for
the closing condition, assume on the contrary that qtRqv and bjv > qt for some v 2 T and
j  Kv . But then, pvqv = pvbjv > pvqt which violates GARP, a contradiction. Conclude
that S satisĕes SMARP.
For the other implication, assume that S satisĕes SMARP and let R0 and R represent
the direct and (indirect) revealed preference relations that satisfy the deĕnition of SMARP.
We show that these relations also satisfy the deĕnition of GARP. For the ĕrst condition,
assume that ptqt  ptqv . However, by Assumption 2.7, this implies that bkt  qv for
some k  Kt. As such, qtR0qv as was to be shown. For the closing condition, let qtRqv
and assume on the contrary that pvqv > pvqt. From Assumption 2.7 this implies that
bjv > qt for some j  Kv . However, this contradicts SMARP. As such, GARP must be
satisĕed.
2.B Likelihood ratio test for equal predictive success
To test the null hypothesis of equal predictive success across different characterisations, we
make use of a likelihood ratio test that imposes linear restrictions on the proportion of a
multinomial variable.
We distinguish between cases where the two revealed preference tests are nested and
when they are not nested.
Likelihood ratio test for nested cases Assume that we want to test the equality of the
predictive success between two nested models, for example WMARP and SMARP. First we
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transform the data into a multinomial variable.
• x1 is the number of subjects that satisfy SMARP.
• x2 is the number of subjects that satisfy WMARP but not SMARP.
• x3 is the number of subjects that satisfy neither SMARP nor WMARP.
Let pi be the probabilities of the respective outcomes. If the predictive success of SMARP
is equal to the one of WMARP, then p1   (1   powerSMARP ) = (p1 + p2)   (1  
powerWMARP ). Rewriting this gives p2 = powerSMARP   powerWMARP . Let A =
powerSMARP   powerWMARP . en the restricted loglikelihood estimator solves:
max
p1;p2;p3
X
i
xi ln(pi) s.t.
X
i
pi = 1; p2 = A:
is gives the following maximum likelihood estimates:
~p1 =
x1(1 A)
x1 + x3
;
~p2 = A;
~p3 = 1 A  x1(1 A)
x1 + x3
=
x3(1 A)
x1 + x3
:
On the other hand, themaximum likelihood estimators for the unrestrictedmodel are equal
to p^i = xiP
i xi
. Given this we have that the test statistic:
 2 ln
 X
i
xi ln(~pi)
!
+ 2 ln
 X
i
xi ln(p^i)
!
is asymptotically Chi–squared distributed with one degree of freedom in case the null hy-
pothesis (p2 = A) holds.
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Likelihood ratio test for nonnested cases Let us now consider nonnested tests that com-
pare, for example, the predictive success between SMARP and WMCARP. We consider the
following multinomial variable:
• x1 is the number of subjects that satisfy both SMARP and WMCARP,
• x2 is the number of subjects that satisfy SMARP but not WMCARP,
• x3 is the number of subjects that satisfy WMCARP but not SMARP,
• x4 is the number of subjects that satisfy neither SMARP nor WMCARP.
Again letting pi be the real proportions of the respective probabilities, we have that
the null hypothesis of equal predictive success is equal to the condition that p1 + p2  
(1   powerSMARP ) = p1 + p3   (1   powerWMCARP )). Let A = powerSMARP  
powerWMCARP . en the hypothesis is equal to the condition that p3 = A + p2. e
restricted loglikelihood estimator solves:
max
p1;p2;p3;p4
X
i
xi ln(pi) s.t.
X
i
pi = 1; p3 = A+ p2:
Aer some calculations, we ĕnd that ~p2 should solve the following quadratic equation:
~p22( 2(x1+x2+x3+x4))+~p2((1 3A)x2+(1 A)x3 2A(x4+x1))+A(1 A)x2 = 0:
is equation has one positive root. en ~p3 = ~p2 +A, ~p1 = x1(1  2~p2  A)=(x4 + x1),
~p3 = ~p2 +A and ~p4 = 1  ~p1   ~p2   ~p3. As before, we can use these values to evaluate the
likelihood ratio test.
Part III
Psychological realism in economic
modelling: identiĕcation of
preferences for others’
consumption and preferences for
value
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In this part, I focus on the recovery of marginal willingness to pay for others’ consump-
tion, and marginal willingness to pay for value. is requires an extension of the standard
revealed preference approach. Aer all, the standard revealed preference tests of consistency
with the neo-classical utility maximisation hypothesis are based on a narrow deĕnition of
consumers’ preferences. Consumers are assumed to be purely self-interested, and only con-
cerned with the quantities consumed.
I incorporate psychological realism in the revealed preference approach by modifying
the arguments of the underlying utility functions. In Chapter 3, I let others’ consumption
enter the utility function of economic agents. Positive preferences for others’ consumption
may be driven by altruism (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Cox et al.
(2008)), inequality-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)),
concerns for efficiency and the pay-offs of the least well off (Charness and Rabin (2002)
and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)) and reciprocity (Charness and Rabin (2002)). In this
chapter, I speciĕcally focus on collective consumption decisions made by children. When
children make joint consumption choices, violations of rationality may be explained by de-
viations from the assumption of purely self-interested preferences. For this reason, I depart
from the purely egoistic model of collective consumption to quantify externalities in con-
sumption.
In Chapter 4, I let the utility function of consumers depend on their vector of expen-
ditures. is allows us to capture so called diamond effects (Ng (1987)) which occur when
some commodities are valued speciĕcally for their value. Letting preferences depend on
market prices seems to contradict the basic assumption of preference stationarity which is
required for revealed preference analysis. However, I will show that expenditures can be
incorporated as arguments of the utility function, while the utility function itself remains
homogeneous. I ĕnd that the alternative revealed preference conditions are still refutable,
and that it is possible to capture the fraction of the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay
that stems from her preferences for the value associated with some good.
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Both chapters ĕt in Rabin (2013)’s PEEM research approach. ese Portable Extensions
of Existing Models allow for comparisons between some original model (in our case: egois-
tic and unitary models of rationality) on the one hand and alternative speciĕcations corre-
sponding to different behavioural assumptions on the other hand. In practice, this implies
the introduction of an additional set of parameters which capture both the original model
and its alternative speciĕcations for given values of the parameters. Moreover, the param-
eters in this part have a convenient interpretation as they capture preferences for others’
consumption and preferences for value in (monetary) terms of willingness to pay. Hence,
these methods provide useful tools for identiĕcation in empirical analysis.
It is worth noting, however, that the focus of Chapters 3 and 4 is somewhat different. In
Chapter 3 I focus on the interpersonal heterogeneity in preferences for others’ consumption.
I identify one ‘selĕshness’ parameter per individual/dyad. In Chapter 4 I focus on hetero-
geneity in preferences for value associated with different commodities. e commodities
under consideration are very diverse. erefore, I identify one ‘diamondness’ parameter
per commodity.
Chapter 3
Measuring thewillingness topay for
others’ consumption1
3.1 Introduction
is study is motivated by Rabin (2013)’s ‘PEEM’ (Portable Extensions of Existing Mod-
els) research program, which aims at developing tractable reĕnements of existing economic
models that integrate psychological insights. e program encourages the design of new
models that encompass a basic, pre-existing model at one particular parameter value, while
other values for the same parameter imply modiĕcations of the basic model. Rabin rec-
ommends the modelling of social preferences as a prime PEEMish application area. e
literature has produced a mass of experimental evidence that rejects the standard model of
purely selĕsh behaviour. However, Rabin argues that the replacing models with social pref-
erences typically fail to derive plausible economic implications beyond speciĕc laboratory
environments. is indicates a need for analytical tools to handle non-selĕsh preferences in
more general settings.
In the current paper, we apply Rabin’s PEEM program to a speciĕc type of social pref-
1is chapter is based on joint workwith Sabrina Bruyneel (KULeuven), Laurens Cherchye (KULeuven), Bram
De Rock (ULB) and Siegfried Dewitte (KU Leuven). I refer to the working paper version of Bruyneel et al. (2014).
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erences (other types of social preferences are discussed in the concluding section). We con-
sider the role of positive externalities in group consumption behaviour. In the case of group
consumption, positive externalities imply that individuals are not purely selĕsh, but will-
ing to pay for others’ consumption. We introduce a methodology that allows us to measure
this revealed willingness-to-pay in monetary terms. In line with our above motivation, this
methodology associates a parameter value of unity with the standardmodel of purely selĕsh
consumers, but also includes a whole range of other models (with varying externalities) for
lower parameter values.
We apply ourmethodology to analyse the consumption choicesmade by dyads (i.e. two-
person groups) of children in a tailored experiment. As we discuss in detail in Subsection
3.3, there is quite some debate in the literature on how (non-)selĕsh behaviour corresponds
to speciĕc child characteristics (in particular age). In our application, we ĕrst investigate to
what extent children’s consumption decisions are effectively characterised by externalities.
Subsequently, we examine how age, gender and friendship between dyad members relate to
revealed non-selĕshness, so adding useful empirical input to the existing debate. At a more
general level, this application shows the practical usefulness of our method to analyse the
presence and determinants of non-selĕsh consumer behaviour.
e remainder of this introductory section speciĕes our research question. We also in-
troduce the basic framework of our measurement methodology, andmotivate our empirical
application.
Non-selĕsh preferences. Consumer preferences are characterised by externalities when
individual utilities depend not only on the ownmaterial consumption but also on the others’
consumption.2 In the empirical literature there is plenty of evidence that economic agents
oen act non-selĕshly. For example, in social dilemma games, experimenters ĕnd that sub-
2Importantly, preferences with externalities aremore general than caring preferences (in line with Becker (1974,
1981)), where a consumer’s individual utility also depends on the others’ aggregate utilities. Such caring preferences
are a special case of the type of preferences we consider here; see Chiappori (1992) for more discussion.
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jects cooperate even in one-shot games, when the only rational choice under selĕshness is
to defect; in ultimatum games subjects offer a substantial amount of tokens to their counter-
parties; in dictator games the dictators oen share a fraction of their budget. e literature
has suggested many alternative explanations for these phenomena, including altruism (An-
dreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Cox et al. (2008)), inequality-aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)), concerns for efficiency and
the pay-offs of the least well off (Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel
(2004)) and reciprocity (Charness and Rabin (2002)).
In the current paper, our focus is not on explaining the nature of the externalities, but
instead on measuring the degree of externalities in a general setting of group consumption.
To do so, we assume a structural model of rational group behaviour, which allows for con-
sumption externalities and enables us to quantify the monetary value of externalities as in-
dividuals’ willingness-to-pay for others’ consumption. In particular, we can check how large
this willingness-to-pay needs to be in order to rationalise the observed group consumption
decisions. is methodology has several useful applications. For example, it can be used to
quantify the extent to which models with selĕsh consumers are ‘wrong’ and so may lead to
biased conclusions. Also, as we will illustrate in our own application, it allows us to relate
the degree of externalities to speciĕc consumer characteristics, so identifying which type of
consumers is generally more or less selĕsh.
Measuring externalities. We assume the cooperative model as our structural model of
group consumption (with and without selĕsh preferences). is consumption model was
originally proposed by Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988, 1992) and is nowa-
days widely used for analysing multi-person consumption behaviour. e model is par-
ticularly well-suited for addressing our research question, because it deĕnes rational group
consumption as a Pareto efficient allocation over group members. Importantly, this is the
sole assumption that is made regarding the intra-group decision process. is reinforces
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the relevance of the empirical ĕndings, as it avoids bias through additional, more debatable
assumptions. In our particular context, a convenient implication of the Pareto efficiency as-
sumption is that it allows us to deĕne personalised prices to quantify consumption external-
ities in monetary terms. Speciĕcally, these personalised prices reveal the willingness-to-pay
of each group member for the own and the others’ consumption.
Technically, to identify these personalised prices we will make use of a revealed pref-
erence methodology.3 is methodology has a number of particularly attractive features
within the present context. Most notably, it is intrinsically nonparametric, which means
that it does not require a prior parametric/functional speciĕcation of the individual prefer-
ences. is minimises the risk that our empirical measurement of preference externalities
(and the conclusions that are drawn from it) is confounded by some non-veriĕable (and,
thus, possibly erroneous) structure that is imposed on the consumption decision process.
Next, from a practical point of view, the methodology evaluates rationality of group be-
haviour through testable conditions that are easily veriĕed on data sets with a limited num-
ber of consumption choices (like in our application). Attractively, this also makes that the
methodology does not need pooling of consumption data associated with different groups
of consumers. e rationality of each group can be evaluated separately, which implies that
we can maximally account for inter-group heterogeneity. us, our use of revealed prefer-
ence methods avoids functional misspeciĕcation and debatable homogeneity assumptions,
which effectively obtains a very ‘pure’ empirical assessment.4
Given our particular research interest, we deĕne a new ‘selĕshness parameter’ that cap-
3See Cherchye et al. (2007, 2011a) for revealed preference methodology to assess consumption decisions in
terms of the cooperative consumption model. ese authors build on early contributions of Samuelson (1938),
Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982), who focused on rational (i.e. utility maximising) individual
behaviour. Sippel (1997) argues that revealed preference methods are particularly useful in combination with ex-
perimental data such as the ones used in our own application. See also Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Bruyneel et al.
(2012a), who use revealed preference methods to assess the rationality of children’s individual consumption deci-
sions.
4Similar motivations underlie the studies of Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Cox et al.
(2008), who also use revealed preference methods to study the altruistic behaviour of individual consumers. e
research questions of these authors are closely related to the one that we consider here. However, a main difference
is that we focus on the measurement of externalities in the context of group consumption decisions, while these
other authors consider the presence of altruism under individual decision making (in a dictator game setting).
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tures the minimal amount of externalities that is required to rationalise the observed con-
sumption as Pareto efficient. Conveniently, the parameter is situated between zero and one
and has a natural degree interpretation. e maximal value of unity means that we can ra-
tionalise behaviour in terms of purely selĕsh consumers (i.e. consumers only care about
the own consumption), while the minimal value of zero indicates that rationalisation is
possible only for consumers that only care for the others’ consumption (and not for the
own consumption). us, higher parameter values generally suggest that behaviour is more
consistent with the standardmodel of selĕsh behaviour, while lower values reĘect a stronger
prevalence of externalities in consumption. By varying the parameter value, we can deĕne a
whole continuum ofmodels characterised by different degrees of consumption externalities.
Children and externalities. We use our methodology to investigate the degree of selĕsh-
ness/externalities of children’s joint consumption behaviour.
First of all, we focus on consumption decisions by children. By studying children of dif-
ferent ages, we can examine how selĕshness evolves with age. It seems reasonable to argue
that the effects of age on pro-social behaviour are more prominent for children than adults.
e cognitive developments in children may well be related to signiĕcant changes in pro-
social behaviour (for an overview of the literature, see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). As
such, one can expect substantial heterogeneity in selĕshness across children of different ages.
is is interesting for illustrative purposes because our methodology can perfectly take this
heterogeneity into account. Similarly, we can assess the impact of friendship by considering
joint consumption decisions of children with various degrees of friendship. We also inves-
tigate whether selĕshness depends on gender. ere is no clear consensus in the literature
on how these different variables relate to selĕsh behaviour. At a more general level, insight
in the selĕshness of children provides useful information for parents, caretakers and teach-
ers. It determines the extent to which caretakers should guide the distribution of resources
among children.
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Second, we analyse collective consumption decisions. In this way, we generalise the re-
sults by Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Cox et al. (2008) who used
revealed preference axioms to investigate individual choices in a modiĕed dictator game.
ese authors invited each individual respondent to allocate money among oneself and a
hypothetical counterparty. In our study, we let the children face a real decision-maker, with
whom to reach consensus on the consumption of the goods. is increases the external va-
lidity of our results. In many settings, children (i.e. siblings, friends, classmates) collectively
decide on which activities to engage in, on how to allocate toys or candy, etc. Otherwise
stated, we investigate externalities in situations where children are not necessarily dictators.
is study also complements the literature on individual rationality in children. Although
there has been some research on the individual choices of children (see e.g. Harbaugh et al.
(2001) and Bruyneel et al. (2012a)) there is little research on collective decision-making.
On the one hand, one could expect low-quality collective decisions when children are not
individually competent. On the other hand, given that there is substantial variation in the
(individual) rationality of children, it is also possible that the children complement each
other, in terms of competent decision-making, when choosing the ‘joint’ bundle. However,
the measurement of decision-making quality depends on the correct speciĕcation of chil-
dren’s (other-regarding) preferences, which is all the more relevant in a collective setting.
Finally, two remarks are in order.
Observational data on joint consumption decisions made by children are typically not
available. We therefore designed a laboratory experiment that is specially tailored to obtain
the data required for our revealed preference methodology. In particular, we ĕrst randomly
assigned the children that participate to our experiment into dyads. Subsequently, we in-
vited these dyads to jointly choose a series of consumption bundles composed of three com-
modities (grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits). Once these bundles had been selected, we
also registered the associated intra-dyad allocations of the quantities, which gives us all the
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necessary information to identify our selĕshness parameter for the consumption choices
that are made.
e interpretation of the selĕshness parameter is important, too. Lowering selĕshness
and hence allowing for externalities is not restricted to implementing ‘caring’ preferences in
the Beckerian sense. It is well known that the so called ‘caring’ model - with total utility of
one individual depending on the egoistic utility of oneself and the egoistic utility of the other
- is empirically equivalent to the egoistic version of the collective model (see e.g. Chiappori
(1992)). However, this caringmodel provides a rather narrow deĕnition of altruism because
it assumes that the marginal rate of substitution between individually consumed goods is
independent of the goods consumed by the other. Especially in a context with children, it
seems hard to defend this assumption. Aer all, it is likely that children directly compare
the quantities consumed per commodity. e current framework allows us to investigate
whether the egoistic model (and hence the empirically equivalent ‘caring’ model with the
restrictive assumption on externalities) satisfactorily describes the children’s decisions. By
decreasing our ‘selĕshness’ parameter, we allow formuchmore general forms of externalities
and interdependent marginal rates of substitution.
e remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 3.2 sets out our revealed pref-
erence methodology to measure the degree of selĕshness/externalities. Section 3.3 presents
our experimental design and the results of our empirical application. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Group consumption with non-selĕsh individuals
To set the stage, we ĕrst present the cooperativemodel under the assumption of selĕsh group
members. en, we introduce the more general model with non-selĕsh consumers (i.e.
consumption externalities). We show that willingness-to-pay for the other’s consumption is
captured by personalised prices, and this enables us to deĕne an intuitive selĕshness param-
eter. We conclude this section by discussing some empirical issues related to the practical
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application of our revealed preference methodology.
Before we can present ourmodels, we ĕrst need to specify the type of data that we have in
mind when applying ourmethodology. Our application in Section 3.3 contains information
ondyads’ consumption behaviour.5 Wehave a separate consumption data set for every single
dyad, which contains the observed consumption choices for a series of decision situations.
Formally, this set takes the form S = f(pt;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg and consists of price
vectors pt 2 Rn++ and quantity vectors qmt 2 Rn+ for every observed decision situation t.
Each vector qmt represents the quantities of all goods allocated to individualm (m = 1; 2).
roughout this section, we assume that budget sets are linear. In Section 3.3 we brieĘy
discuss the implications of these models for a ĕnite choice set setting.
3.2.1 Selĕsh individuals
e speciĕc feature of selĕsh consumer behaviour is that individual utilities are indepen-
dent of others’ consumption. Formally, in our dyad setting each member m has a utility
function Um (qm) that only varies with the own consumption qm. We assume that util-
ity functions are well-behaved (i.e. continuous, monotone and concave). en, we get the
following deĕnition of rational cooperative (i.e. Pareto efficient) consumption behaviour
under selĕshness.
Deĕnition 3.1. Consider a data set S = f(pt;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg. A pair of utility
functions U1 and U2 provides a cooperative rationalisation under selĕshness of S if and
only if, for each observation t = 1; :::; T , there exist Pareto weights 1t ; 2t 2 R++ such that
5We note that it is fairly easy to extend our following methodology towards settings with more than two group
members.
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1tU
1
 
q1t

+ 2tU
2
 
q2t

equals
max
(z1; z2)2(Rn+)
2
1tU
1
 
z1

+ 2tU
2
 
z2

s:t:
p0t
 
z1 + z2
  p0t(q1t + q2t ):
us, Pareto efficiency requires that the dyad’s consumption behaviour can be repre-
sented as if it maximises a weighted sum of the individual utility functions, subject to the
dyad’s budget constraint (with the dyad’s budget equal to p0t(q1t +q2t )). We remark that the
individual Pareto weights 1t ; 2t 2 R++ are allowed to vary across the observations t. e
implication is that the ‘bargaining power’ of a particular individual need not be constant
but can depend on the speciĕc decision situation at hand (deĕned by prices pt and budget
p0t(q
1
t + q
2
t )).
Our revealed preference characterisation of rational cooperative behaviour uses the con-
cept GARP (Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference), which is discussed in Section 2.2.
As shown by Varian (1982), consistency with GARP guarantees the existence of an individ-
ual utility function Um that is consistent with the individual m’s choices captured by the
subset Sm = f(pt;qmt ); t = 1; :::; Tg. at is, every observed choice qmt maximises this
utility functionUm subject to the budget constraint deĕned by the prices pt and the budget
ptq
m
t .
We can then present the revealed preference characterisation of rational cooperative be-
haviour with selĕsh dyad members (see Cherchye et al. (2011a) for a formal proof).
Proposition 3.2. Let S = f(pt;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg be a set of observations. e follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
1. ere exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a cooperative rational-
isation under selĕshness of S.
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2. e subsets S1 = f(pt;q1t ); t= 1; :::; Tg and S2 = f(pt;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg are both
consistent with GARP.
Varian (1982) presented a combinatorial test of GARP. More recently, Cherchye et al.
(2011a) have shown that the GARP conditions in Proposition 3.2 can also be veriĕed by
solving a linear programming problem with binary integer variables. A similar program-
ming problem can also be used to verify the revealed preference conditions in the following
Proposition 3.4. For the sake of compactness, and because the analogy with the set-up in
Cherchye et al. (2011a) is fairly straightforward, we will not explicitly state this problem in
the current paper.
3.2.2 Non-selĕsh individuals
Non-selĕsh consumers also care about the other’s consumption, which we capture by the
utility functionsU1
 
q1;q2

andU2
 
q1;q2

. In our set-up we only consider positive con-
sumption externalities, which means that the functions U1 and U2 are increasing in their
arguments. Given our particular research question, we use a deĕnition of rational coopera-
tive behaviour that allows for different degrees of externalities. In particular, we capture the
degree of selĕshness by means of parameters " and . We will explain the meaning of these
parameters in more detail below.
Deĕnition 3.3. Consider a data set S = f(pt;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg. A pair of utility
functions U1 and U2 provides a cooperative rationalisation under  selĕshness of S if and
only if, for each observation t = 1; :::; T , there exist Pareto weights 1t ; 2t 2 R++ such that
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1tU
1
 
q1t ;q
2
t

+ 2tU
2
 
q1t ;q
2
t

equals6
max
(z1; z2)2(Rn+)
2
1tU
1
 
z1; z2

+ 2tU
2
 
z1; z2

s:t:
" =

1   ;
p0t
 
z1 + z2
  p0t(q1t + q2t );
" 
1t
@U1
@z1j
2t
@U2
@z1j
and " 
2t
@U2
@z2j
1t
@U1
@z2j
with j = 1; : : : ; n: (3.1)
In this deĕnition, the parameter " relates the marginal willingness-to-pay of member
m for his/her own consumption to the one of the other member n (n 6= m) for the same
consumption. It deĕnes a lower bound on the marginal rate of substitution for every good
j between own utility and the utility of the other person. Intuitively, if externalities are
prevalent, the marginal willingness-to-pay for the other’s consumption will be high, which
implies that the data can be rationalised only for a low value of ". Generally, by varying
the value of " we obtain rationalisation conditions for different degrees of selĕshness. We
illustrate this by considering the two polar cases. First, when " = 0, Conditions (3.1) impose
no additional restrictions on the optimisation problem. In other words, externalities may
be very large. Next, for " ! 1 we get exactly the same rationalisation condition as in
Deĕnition 3.1, which implies purely selĕsh dyad members. More generally, greater values
of " correspond to more selĕsh consumer behaviour. Conveniently, by using the parameter
 we can also derive revealed preference conditions for cooperative rational behaviour that
are linear in unknowns, which makes them easy to verify in practice.
To derive a revealed preference test for consistency with Deĕnition 3.3 we ĕrst derive
the ĕrst-order conditions associated with this deĕnition:
6zmj denotes the j-th component of the vector zm.
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1t
@U1
@q1t
+ 2t
@U2
@q1t
 tpt;
2t
@U2
@q2t
+ 1t
@U1
@q2t
 tpt;
We deĕne the personalised prices
p1;2t =
1t
t
@U1
@q2t
;p2;1t =
2t
t
@U2
@q1t
;
p1;1t = pt  
2t
t
@U2
@q1t
 
1
t
t
@U1
@q1t
;
p2;2t = pt  
1t
t
@U1
@q2t
 
2
t
t
@U2
@q2t
:
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the dyad’s optimisation problem in de-
cision situation t (i.e. the marginal value of income). Intuitively, these personalised prices
denote the marginal willingness-to-pay for the own and the other’s consumption, respec-
tively. Next, each dyad member i decides on own consumption and the other’s consump-
tion conditional on his or her budget pi;i0t qit+p
i;j0
t q
j
t and his or her shadow prices pi;it and
pi;jt : It is required that these decisions are rational, i.e. consistent with GARP. Finally, the
shadow prices pi;it and pj;jt are bounded from below by the selĕshness parameter . is
corresponds to Condition (3.1) which restricts the (relative) marginal willingness to pay for
own consumption.
Using these concepts, we can state the next result, which generalises Proposition 3.2.
(Appendix 3.A contains our proof.)
Proposition 3.4. Let S = f(pt;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg be a set of observations. e follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
1. ere exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a cooperative rational-
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isation under  selĕshness of S.
2. For all t = 1; :::; T , there exist price vectors p1;1t ;p1;2t ;p2;1t and p2;2t 2 Rn+ such that
(a) the subsets S1 = f(p1;1t ;p1;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg and
S2 = f(p2;1t ;p2;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg both satisfy GARP;
(b) p1;1t + p2;1t = pt = p1;2t + p2;2t ;
(c) p1;1t  pt and p2;2t  pt:
Condition (a) imposes consistency with GARP on the individual subsets S1 and S2:
Different from Proposition 3.2, these conditions are now expressed in terms of the person-
alised pricespm;mt andpm;nt (withm;n = 1; 2 andm 6= n). Next, Condition (b) states that
these personalised prices must add up (over the dyad members) to the observed prices pt.
is condition follows from our assumption that dyads act cooperatively, which means that
they achieve Pareto efficient allocations. Actually, the adding up condition also implies that
personalised prices can be interpreted as Lindahl prices associated with the Pareto efficient
provision of public goods. is corresponds to the fact that private goods with externalities
effectively get a public good character.
Condition (c) includes our selĕshness parameter . It follows that  measures the frac-
tion of the value of eachmemberm’s consumption bundle that (s)he ‘ĕnances’ him-/herself.
As such, thismeasure has an appealingmonetary interpretation. If  = 1, eachmember fully
pays for her own private consumption, i.e. there are no externalities and behaviour can be
rationalised as purely selĕsh. We then get exactly the conditions for a rationalisation under
selĕshness that we stated in Proposition 3.2. Lower values of  enable stronger externalities.
In the extreme case with  = 0, we allow for the possibility that m’s consumption is fully
ĕnanced by the other member n, which means member m does not contribute to his/her
own consumption at all.
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At this point, it is worth noting that  puts a lower bound on the monetary contribu-
tion of each member for his/her own consumption. is means that when some data set is
rationalisable with  selĕshness, it is also rationalisable for all lower levels of selĕshness.
Finally, note that this selĕshness parameter  is not independent of the observed intra-
dyad allocation, i.e. the sharing of resources. More importantly, amore equal distribution of
resources does not necessarily correspond to a lower degree of selĕshness. is is apparent
in the following example.
Example 3.5. Consider a situation with jT j= 2 observations and jN j= 2 goods, scalar x,
quantity vectors q1 and q2 and the corresponding price vectors p1 and p2 :
q1 =

x 0
0
and q2 =

0 x
0
;
p1 =

2 1
0
and p2 =

1 2
0
:
Moreover, consider an allocation rule  2 [0; 1] such that the intra-dyad allocation of
the goods to dyad member A (qA1 and qA2 ) and dyad member B (qB1 and qB2 ) equals
qA1 =

x 0
0
and qB1 =

(1  )x 0
0
;
qA2 =

0 x
0
and qB2 =

0 (1  )x
0
:
It is easy to see that when  6= 0 then SA = f(pt;qAt ); t = 1; 2g violates GARP. Like-
wise, when  6= 1 then SB = f(pt;qBt ); t = 1; 2g violates GARP. ere is no value of 
which makes the observations consistent with the egoistic model ( = 1) of collective ra-
tionality. However, we can identify the maximum  that rationalises the data7. In order to
rationalise the data when  = 1; we need   0:5: In order to rationalise the data when
 = 0:75; we need   4=7: Finally, to rationalise the data when the goods are distributed
7e exact formula to compute the maximum level of selĕshness for this (simple) example is
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equally ( = 0:5), we ĕnd that   2=3: Equality of the intra-dyad allocation is related to
more selĕsh behaviour in this example. e intuition behind these results is simple. e
dyad in this example spends the total budget on the most expensive good in each observa-
tion. is can only be rational if the preferences of dyad members are very heterogeneous
and bargaining power shis substantially. Say, for instance, that member A has a strong
preference for good 1, B a strong preference for good 2, and that A has a stronger bargaining
position in observation 1. is explains why the consumption of good 1 in observation 1
is important. Likewise, B has a stronger bargaining position in observation 2. However,
this is not reĘected in the intra-dyad allocation of goods when  is large, unless member B
has strong preferences for the consumption of good 2 by member A. As a result, the more
unequal the intra-dyad allocation (i.e. the larger j  0:5j) the lower the maximum possible
level of selĕshness.
3.2.3 Empirical concerns
Practical applications of revealed preference conditions like the ones in Propositions 3.2
and 3.4 typically raise two empirical concerns: the possibility of optimisation error (i.e. be-
haviour may be close to but not exactly optimising) and the issue of discriminatory power
(i.e. the empirical stringency of the optimisation conditions). We next discuss each of these
issues in more detail, and indicate how we will deal with them in our empirical application
in Section 3.3.
Optimisation error. Our revealed preference conditions are based on the assumption of
‘exactly’ optimising behaviour. Obviously, this may oen seem like an overly restrictive
 = min(
p12
p22 + (1  )p12
;
p12
(1  )p22 + p12
)
= min(
1
2 + (1  ) ;
1
(1  )2 +  ):
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assumption, which holds all the more true for our following application to consumption
decisions of children. Irrespective of their degree of selĕshness, individuals are not always
able, or willing, to behave as fully rational (i.e. utility maximising) homines economici.
However, it may well be that their decisions are close to being rational (while not exactly
rational). Putting it differently, it is oen realistic to allow for a certain (small) degree of op-
timisation error. Our application in Section 3.3 will use an extension of our methodology
that accounts for such optimisation error.
Following Afriat (1972) and Varian (1990), we account for ‘nearly’ optimising behaviour
by applying Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index. My General Introduction contains a dis-
cussion of this index and the corresponding GARP characterisation (Deĕnition 0.2).
As explained in detail by Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman (2014), this index (denoted
e) actually captures howmuch the individual’s budget needs to be reduced in order to make
the observed choices consistent with GARP. Or conversely, the fraction 1  emeasures the
fraction of the budget that has been wasted due to irrational consumption decisions.
Pass rate, power andpredictive success. Wehave presented a continuumofmodelswhere
lower values of  allow for more consumption externalities. us, by construction we will
have that lower -values lead to less restrictive consumption models, which makes it eas-
ier to pass the corresponding revealed preference conditions. To account for this trade-off
between economic realism (i.e. permit deviations frompurely selĕsh behaviour) and restric-
tiveness, a fair comparison of models with different -values should simultaneously account
for both their empirical ĕt (i.e. whether or not the data satisfy the associated rationalisation
conditions) and their discriminatory power (i.e. the extent to which these rationalisation
conditions can effectively identify irrational behaviour). Ideally, a behavioural model com-
bines a good empirical ĕt with high discriminatory power. To capture this idea, our empiri-
cal analysis in Section 3.3 will assess alternative models in terms of their ‘predictive success’,
which combines empirical ĕt and discriminatory power in a single metric.
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For a particular behavioural model (deĕned by a speciĕc optimisation parameter e and
selĕshness parameter ), we compute the fraction of observed data sets that satisfy the cor-
responding rationalisation conditions. We call this fraction our pass rate. Its interpretation
is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
To measure the discriminatory power of a behavioural model, we make use of Bronars
(1987)’s power index. e computation is similar to the approach discussed inChapter 2, but
there is an additional step. In the ĕrst stage, we draw bundles from the uniform distribution
of bundles in the respective choice sets. In the second stage, we divide the goods among the
dyadmembers by using (random) shares that vary across the goods. Finally, we obtain a new
data set containing T simulated choices (and the corresponding intra-dyad allocation). We
repeat this procedure 5000 times, which thus deĕnes 5000 sets of T ‘irrational’ consumption
choices. Bronars’ power index equals oneminus the fraction of these simulated data sets that
pass the rationalisation conditions under evaluation.
Ourmeasure of predictive success simultaneously includes pass rate and power. As such,
it takes into account both the potential of a model to describe the observed behaviour (cap-
tured by the pass rate) as well as the potential to detect irrational behaviour (captured by
Bronars’ power index).
Predictive success = Pass rate - [1 - Power].
Similar to before, a value close to one indicates a model with approximately perfect discrim-
inatory power and ĕt, i.e. the best possible scenario. is means that (almost) all data pass
the rationality test, even though the test effectively detects (almost) any deviating (i.e. irra-
tional) behaviour. By contrast, a value close to minus one implies a model with almost no
discriminatory power and a very bad ĕt, i.e. the worst possible scenario. Finally, a value of
zero corresponds to a model with a pass rate for the observed behaviour that exactly equals
the expected pass rate if behaviour were irrational. Essentially, this means that the rational-
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ity test does not allow for distinguishing observed behaviour from irrational behaviour.
3.3 Joint decisions of children
Before we present our empirical results, we ĕrst explain our experimental design. In doing
so, we will alsomotivate the empirical questions that we consider further on, with references
to the relevant literature. Subsequently, we discuss the main results of our empirical anal-
ysis. In particular, we ĕnd strong evidence that children’s joint consumption behaviour is
systematically characterised by consumption externalities (i.e. non-selĕsh behaviour). In-
terestingly, we also observe that these externalities bear particular relations to age, gender
and the degree of friendship.
3.3.1 Experimental design
Respondents. We collected our data at four different schools. e selection of classes and
schools in the sample is presented in Table 3.1. Our sample contains a total of 100 children,
who belong to 3 different age categories: 42 from kindergarten, 24 from third grade and 34
from sixth grade.
kindergarten third grade sixth grade
School I 1 class (8) 1 class (8) 1 class (6)
School II 1 class (7) 1 class (4) 1 class (11)
School III 1 class (6) 0 classes 0 classes
Table 3.1: Information on schools and classes (number of dyads per class)
Table 3.2 gives summary information for our sample in terms of gender composition and
the degree of friendship (explained below). In what follows, we discuss the construction of
our sample in more detail, and use this to position our following empirical analysis in the
existing literature.
First of all, our sample allows us to link selĕshness to children’s age. ere is some ev-
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idence that people in early childhood (children aged less than 5) are less altruistic (see, for
example, Eisenberg et al. (2007) for a literature review on the development of prosocial be-
haviour) and more likely to be driven by self-interest (see, for example, Damon (1980) on
positive-justice). However, this does not automatically imply a stable and decreasing rela-
tionship between age and selĕshness. On the one hand, Côté et al. (2002) found support
for inter-individual stability in prosocial behaviour. Similarly, Gummerum et al. (2008) did
not ĕnd signiĕcant age effects on individual allocations in a dictator game. On the other
hand, there is also evidence that young school children sometimes act less selĕshly. See, for
example, Murnighan and Saxon (1998) and Harbaugh et al. (2003), who found that younger
children are more likely to accept smaller offers in ultimatum games, or Damon (1980),
who found that children from 5 to 7 years of age frequently selected equal rewards in order
to avoid conĘict. By the age of 5, children tend to have egalitarian preferences and select
outcomes that distribute pay-offs equally.
In this respect, a particularly interesting study is the one of Fehr et al. (2013). ese
authors argue that, even though altruism generally increases with age, preferences for egal-
itarianism seem to peak around the age of eight years (which corresponds to our group of
third graders). Beyond this age, the increasing inĘuence of efficiency-considerations and
strategic behaviour may countervail fairness-considerations. In a similar vein, it is claimed
that the positive effects of amore prosocial orientation are offset by increasing levels of com-
petitiveness as children grow older. Kagan and Madsen (1972) and Toda et al. (1978), for
instance, have shown that the level of competition between children increases as a function
of age.
Summarising, wemay safely conclude that the literature does not show a clear consensus
on the relationship between age and selĕsh preferences. is directly provides a particular
motivation for our own empirical application. We deliver empirical input to the debate by
considering selĕshness in the speciĕc context of children’s group consumption decisions.
For each separate age category, we randomly organised the children into dyads (i.e. two-
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member groups), which we then invited to make 9 consumption choices. is resulted in
50 dyads and obtained information on 450 (= 50  9) joint decisions. We registered the
gender composition of each dyad. ere are 19 female dyads, 12 male dyads and 19 dyads
consisting of one boy and one girl. Eisenberg et al. (2007) argue that girls are more prosocial
than boys. Moreover, girls tend to be somewhat less competitive. Similar to before, our
analysis will allow us to investigate this further in a speciĕc consumption context.
Finally, we also registered the intensity of the dyad members’ relationship outside the
experiment. In particular, we asked the children to label their relationship with respect to
the other dyad member as ‘(very) strong friendship’ or ‘weak (or no) friendship’. According
to Eisenberg et al. (2007), the literature suggests that children are more likely to share with
friends than with less liked peers (see also Buhrmester et al. (1992) and Pilgrim and Rueda-
Riedle (2002)). We will investigate this effect in a group consumption context. In a sense,
a minimal requirement for our measure of selĕshness to be a sensible one is that it bears a
negative relationship to self-reported friendship.
gender
boy girl
kindergarten 4 / 12 / 2 11 / 13 / 0
grade thirdgrade 4 / 3 / 2 8 / 7 / 0
sixthgrade 7 / 8 / 1 5 / 12 / 1
Table 3.2: Summary statistics on sample composition (x/y/z: x children who indicate (very)
strong friendship with their dyad partner, y children who indicate weak (or no) friendship
with their dyad partner, z children with missing values on the relationship)
Design. e experimental design is almost identical to the set-up described in Section
1.2. In the same way, we presented discrete choice sets (containing 7 different combinations
of grapes, mandarins and letter biscuits) to the respondents. e implicit prices are also
identical to the experiment in Chapter 1 but the implicit budgets are 24 (instead of 12).
e experiment under consideration proceeded in two basic steps. In a ĕrst step, each
dyad of children was asked to select one out of seven possible commodity bundles for the
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given (implicit) price and budget regimes. e children could take as much time as they
wanted to take their joint decisions. In a second step, and in view of our following assess-
ment of externalities, we asked each dyad to deĕne individual shares of the joint consump-
tion bundle that had been chosen, which makes that we perfectly observe the shares of the
(implicit) dyad budget allocated to each individual member.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % Equal
all 50 0.064 0.064 0.001 0.29 56
kindergarten 21 0.099 0.081 0.004 0.29 33.33
third grade 12 0.029 0.018 0.001 0.06 91.67
sixth grade 17 0.046 0.032 0.004 0.122 58.82
weak friendship 30 0.077 0.076 0.001 0.29 46.67
strong friendship 17 0.048 0.034 0.001 0.122 64.71
two girls 19 0.067 0.065 0.001 0.29 52.63
mixed 19 0.063 0.055 0.001 0.18 52.63
two boys 12 0.062 0.078 0.004 0.29 66.67
Table 3.3: Intra-dyad budget sharing: summary statistics for the absolute intra-dyad dif-
ference in allocated budgets. e ĕnal column gives the percentage of dyads in which the
implicit budget is shared equally (with absolute differences less than 5 per cent).
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics on the absolute intra-dyad differences between in-
dividual budget shares, which provides some basic insight into the intra-dyad sharing of
resources. e table also gives the proportion of dyads that apply (close to) equal resource
sharing (i.e. intra-dyad difference between individual resource shares amounts to less than
5 percent of the available budget). We ĕnd that, on average, the resources are shared fairly
equally. e mean absolute intra-dyad difference in shares amounts to 6.4 percent. In-
terestingly, the difference is smallest for dyads containing third graders, while it is largest
for dyads with kindergarten respondents. Similarly, we observe that sharing is more equal
when children have a strong friendship relationship with their partner. Finally, the gender
composition does not seem to have a strong impact on the resource sharing pattern. Im-
portantly, the goal of our empirical analysis goes beyond simply describing the sharing of
resources. We want to investigate if externalities in consumption impact the decision pro-
3.3. JOINT DECISIONS OF CHILDREN 117
cesses that underlie the patterns summarised in Table 3.3. And, if so, we want to quantify
the willingness-to-pay for these externalities, and relate the associated degree of selĕshness
to the children characteristics reported in Table 3.2.
Finally, notice that the choice sets are ĕnite. From Chapter 2, on the one hand, it is clear
that the standard revealed preference test for individual rationality (GARP) is overly strong
when choice sets are ĕnite. In a collective setting, on the other hand, the ĕniteness is partly
neutralised by the fact that dyad members can allocate the chosen quantities continuously
among each other. As such, individual i’s (personalised) budget set is no longer purely ĕnite
even when the dyad-level choice set is ĕnite. Nonetheless, the ĕniteness of the choice sets
may cause speciĕc bundles to be unavailable even if they are located in the lower half-space of
the hyperplane deĕned by the budget pi;i0t qit+p
i;j0
t q
j
t and shadow prices pi;it and pi;jt . e
proposed test in Section 3.2 should therefore be interpreted as a sufficient (but not necessary)
test for rationality8. is also implies that we identify an upper bound on the minimum
requiredmarginal willingness to pay for others’ consumption (or equivalently, a lower bound
on the maximum possible level of selĕshness) in Subsection 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Consumption with or without externalities?
Webegin our analysis by evaluating the empirical performance of the cooperative consump-
tion model that we characterised in Proposition 3.4, for alternative values of the selĕshness
parameter . We recall that this parameter ranges from zero to one, with  = 1 indicating
purely selĕsh behaviour and  = 0 deĕning a least restrictive model that also accounts for
the (opposite) scenario in which dyad members only care about the other’s consumption.
As explained in Section 3.2, our empirical analysis considers the possibility of optimisa-
tion error, which we capture by the parameter e. In what follows, we let this parameter
8As an alternative approach, one could take the ĕniteness in the collective setting into account by building on
Proposition 2 in Cherchye et al. (2007), and by replacing the (collective) budget sets in this proposition with ĕnite
choice sets. is would lead to a necessary (but not sufficient) test for consistency. Moreover, the resulting charac-
terisation would no longer allow us to formulate selĕshness in monetary terms. Shadow prices are not identiĕed.
We therefore believe that the original (sufficient) test is more valuable to address our research question.
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vary between 1 (i.e. no optimisation error) and 0.9 (i.e. an optimisation error of at most
10 percent).9 e corresponding pass rates, power results and predictive success values are
summarised in Tables 3.4 to 3.6.
Let us ĕrst focus on the pass rates in Table 3.4, which shed light on the goodness-of-ĕt of
the differentmodels under study. We ĕnd that the choices of all dyads can be rationalised for
 = 0. is should actually not be too surprising because, as explained before, this deĕnes
a very permissive model of cooperative consumption behaviour. Next, we also observe that,
for any , the pass rate increases (slightly) if we allow for someoptimisation error (i.e. e < 1).
Again, this is as expected as lower values for e generally imply less stringent rationalisation
conditions.
We next consider the permissiveness of the models, by evaluating their discriminatory
power. ese results are given in Table 3.5. We ĕnd that the standardmodel with purely self-
ish consumers and no optimisation error is indeed a very stringent one, as it is characterised
by a discriminatory power of about 0.971. In other words, (simulated) irrational behaviour
passes the associated rationalisation conditions in less than 3 percent of the cases. Gener-
ally, we observe that the rationalisation conditions becomemore permissive if we leavemore
room for consumption externalities (i.e. non-selĕsh behaviour, captured by lower -values).
Interestingly, the effect of lowering e (i.e. more optimisation error) is less pronounced. For
 = 0 our power index is only about 5 percent, which signals a very low probability of
detecting irrational behaviour. Importantly, however, discriminatory power does remain
rather high as long as the degree of non-selĕshness is somewhat restricted. For example,
for   0:75 we ĕnd that random behaviour is still diagnosed as irrational in more than 70
percent of the cases, even if we allow for 10 percent optimisation error.
Our predictive success results are reported in Table 3.6. is table presents summary
scores for the overall performance of the different model speciĕcations that we assess. For
most values of our selĕshness parameter (the only exceptions are  = 0:95 and  = 0), we
9is follows an original suggestion of Varian (1990), who proposed to choose e = 0:9 as a cut-off value.
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ĕnd highest predictive success scores if we allow for some optimisation error (i.e. e < 1).
is suggests that, in general, children’s consumption behaviour is nearly optimising rather
than exactly optimising. More interestingly, the highest predictive success score is realised
for e = 0:90 and  = 0:90, i.e. 10 percent optimisation error and some room for non-
selĕsh behaviour. For our sample, this model speciĕcation has a predictive success of 0.490,
which is substantially above the predictive success of any other speciĕcation under study.
is predictive success score follows from a pass rate of 0.64 (see Table 3.4) and a power
index of 0.850 (see Table 3.5).
At a more general level, we conclude from the results in Table 3.6 that children’s con-
sumption behaviour is systematically characterised by consumption externalities: consump-
tion models that account for (a limited amount of) non-selĕshness have a higher predictive
success than the purely selĕsh model. However, as we discuss next, it will also appear that
children are quite heterogeneous in their degree of non-selĕshness.
pr  = 1 0:95 0:9 0:85 0:8 0:75 0:5 0:25 0
e =
1 0.46 0.5 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.74 0.94 1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.03] [0]
0:99 0.46 0.5 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.76 0.94 1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.03] [0]
0:95 0.5 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.78 0.96 1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.03] [0]
0:9 0.5 0.54 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.86 0.96 1
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03] [0]
Table 3.4: Collective rationality: pass rates, [std.dev]
power  = 1 0:95 0:9 0:85 0:8 0:75 0:5 0:25 0
e =
1 0.971 0.949 0.917 0.875 0.825 0.783 0.599 0.285 0.055
0:99 0.969 0.944 0.909 0.865 0.815 0.774 0.591 0.276 0.048
0:95 0.955 0.925 0.882 0.837 0.786 0.745 0.569 0.246 0.048
0:9 0.936 0.895 0.850 0.795 0.753 0.711 0.542 0.208 0.048
Table 3.5: Collective rationality: power
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pr succes  = 1 0:95 0:9 0:85 0:8 0:75 0:5 0:25 0
e =
1 0.431 0.449 0.437 0.435 0.405 0.363 0.339 0.225 0.055
0:99 0.429 0.444 0.429 0.425 0.395 0.354 0.351 0.216 0.048
0:95 0.455 0.445 0.442 0.417 0.366 0.385 0.349 0.206 0.048
0:9 0.436 0.435 0.490 0.455 0.413 0.431 0.402 0.168 0.048
Table 3.6: Collective rationality: predictive success
3.3.3 Selĕshness and child characteristics
Individual selĕshness. In order to investigate heterogeneity in selĕshness (captured by
) across children in our sample, we no longer consider a common  for both members of
a given dyad, as in our original formulation of Proposition 3.4. Instead, we deĕne a dif-
ferent m for each dyad member m. e corresponding adaptation of the rationalisation
conditions in Proposition 3.4 is immediate.10
For a given data set on dyad consumption choices, we maximise the average  =
(1 + 2)=2 subject to the given rationalisation conditions. Basically, this computes (an
upper bound on) the minimal degree of non-selĕshness (i.e. consumption externalities)
that we need to account for in order to rationalise the observed dyad behaviour in terms
of the cooperative model (under equal weighting of the dyad members). Lower values of
 (and, correspondingly, 1 and 2) indicate that consistency with cooperative group be-
haviour requires greater deviations from purely selĕsh behaviour.
By maximising  = (1 + 2)=2, we can compute a selĕshness parameter m for each
different individualm in our sample. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of this selĕshness
parameter for the 100 individuals in our experiment. We ĕnd that for about 64 percent of
the individualsm the value of m equals unity. For the remaining children, we need to ac-
count for consumption externalities (i.e. non-selĕsh preferences) to rationalise the observed
consumption behaviour. Actually, we observe a positive density even for m as low as 0.2,
which reveals a high degree of non-selĕshness. Generally, the distribution pattern in Figure
10In terms of the cooperative rationalisation concept in Deĕnition 3.3, this boils down to using "m for eachm
(instead of a common ").
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative distribution of the individual selĕshness parameter; whole sample
3.1 reveals considerable inter-individual heterogeneity in the degree of selĕshness.
In Appendix 3.B, we investigate the sensitivity of the distribution of the selĕshness pa-
rameter to different degrees of randomness in the data. We ĕnd that the distribution is
robust to limited levels of noise.
Relation with observed characteristics. We ĕrst consider how friendship relates to indi-
vidual selĕshness. In particular, we distinguish between two types of children: children who
report a (very) strong friendship with their dyad partner, and children who report a weak
(or no) friendship. Our results are displayed in Figure 3.2. e two curves in this ĕgure ex-
hibit a clear ĕrst order stochastic dominance relationship, which indicates that the degree of
selĕshness in behaviour is systematically lower when children make joint consumption de-
cisions with other children who they consider to be strong friends. In this case, children are
willing to contribute more to the other’s material consumption (i.e. consumption external-
ities). is is exactly what can be expected from friends, and falls in line with the literature
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative distribution of the individual selĕshness parameter; strong friend-
ship versus weak friendship
(see, for example, Buhrmester et al. (1992), Pilgrim and Rueda-Riedle (2002) and Eisenberg
et al. (2007)). In a sense, this also indicates that our methodology effectively does produce
a sensible measure of selĕshness.
Next, we turn to the gender effect, for which the relevant results are given in Figure 3.3.
Interestingly, we get a similar dominance relationship as in Figure 3.2. In this particular case,
this provides a clear indication that girls care more for the consumption of others than boys.
As discussed above, this falls in line with reported evidence that girls generally do tend to
act more prosocially (and less competitive).
Finally, we consider the age effect, for which there appeared to be no clear consensus
in the literature. e results are summarised in Figure 3.4. A ĕrst observation here is that
the m-scores for kindergarten respondents and third graders are roughly similar. Next, we
also ĕnd that sixth graders are generally more selĕsh than younger children (both kinder-
garten children and third graders), who seem to be characterised by larger consumption
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution of the individual selĕshness parameter; boys versus girls
externalities.
At ĕrst glance, these results may seem to contradict the conclusion of Eisenberg et al.
(2007), which indicates a positive relationship between age and prosocial behaviour. In this
respect, however, we also recall the study by Fehr et al. (2013), who found that preferences for
egalitarianism peak around the age of eight years (i.e. third grade) and decrease beyond this
age (which was also partly reĘected by the average differences in shares). Moreover, we also
argued that incidences of competitiveness between children and strategic behaviour appear
to increase with age (see, for example, Kagan and Madsen (1972) and Toda et al. (1978)).
As such, our results clearly provide further input to this interesting debate, by focusing on
the speciĕc setting of joint consumption decisions. At a more general level, this also nicely
motivates the practical usefulness of our methodology.
Statistical signiĕcance. To verify the statistical meaning of our above conclusions, we car-
ried out Wilcoxon ranksum tests (or Mann-Whitney U tests). (As an additional robustness
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative distribution of the individual selĕshness parameter; kindergarten,
third grade and sixth grade
check, we also conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, of which the results are reported in
Appendix 3.C.) In these exercises, the null hypothesis is that two populations have the same
distribution for our individual selĕshness parameter m. Correspondingly, the alternative
hypothesis is that one of the populations systematically has higher values for the parameter
than the other. e results of our Wilcoxon tests are given in Table 3.7. Interestingly, these
test results do conĕrm that, in general, our above conclusions are statistically robust.
Speciĕcally, for the age effect we ĕnd that kindergarten respondents and third graders
have a lower rank sum than expected under the null hypothesis, whereas sixth graders have a
higher rank sum than expected. Correspondingly, we reject the hypothesis that m is equally
distributed for the two groups (i.e. kindergarten respondents and third graders versus sixth
graders). Next, the values of m are signiĕcantly higher (at the 0.1 level) for children who
make consumption decisionswith strong friends. Finally, we also observe that boys aremore
selĕsh than girls, although the effect here is not strongly signiĕcant.
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Ranksum rank sum expected P-value
age 0 kind.,thirdg. 3014 3333
1 sixthg. 2036 1717
Combined 5050 5050 0.0078
friendship 0 weak 2826 2612.5
1 strong 1639 1858.5
Combined 4465 4465 0.0631
gender 0 girls 2696 2878.5
1 boys 2354 2171.5
Combined 5050 5050 0.1454
Table 3.7: Ranksum tests
3.4 Conclusion
is paper has both amethodological and an empirical contribution. At themethodological
level, we have introduced a revealed preference approach to quantify the willingness-to-
pay for the consumption of others. Within the framework of the cooperative (i.e. Pareto
efficient) consumption model, we measure willingness-to-pay for others’ consumption by
evaluating positive consumption externalities in monetary terms. Interestingly, the method
allows us to deĕne a selĕshness parameter that characterises a continuum of models with
varying degrees of consumption externalities.
Next, at the empirical level, we have shown the practical usefulness of our method by an
application to consumption choices made by dyads of children. We ĕnd that children’s con-
sumption decisions are systematically characterised by externalities (i.e. non-selĕsh). But
we also observe that there is substantial heterogeneity across children, which we related to
differences in age, gender and degree of friendship between dyad members. For our sam-
ple, we found that sixth graders behave more selĕshly than third graders and kindergarten
children, that boys behave more selĕshly than girls (albeit that this effect is not strongly
statistically signiĕcant), and that children act less selĕshly in joint consumption decisions
when they have a strong friendship with the other group members.
We see several avenues for further research. At the methodological level, we can ex-
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tend our revealed preference characterisations to other types of social (or other-regarding)
preferences (see, for example, Sobel (2005) for a recent review). For example, we could
incorporate negative consumption externalities (including envy) in the analysis. Such an
extension would lead to an operational measure that evaluates these negative externalities
in monetary terms, which enables similar empirical applications as the one we presented in
Section 3.3. In a similar vein, we can also use our revealed preference approach to devise
testable implications of more speciĕc types of social preferences (deĕning particular origins
of positive and/or negative externalities). is can be used to investigate whether alternative
models are empirically distinguishable from each other in revealed preference terms. And,
if so, we can relate the applicability of speciĕc models to the (observable) characteristics of
the individuals at hand.
At the empirical level, our application has used data that we collected through a spe-
cially designed consumption experiment. is experiment clearly showed the potential of
our approach to empirically explore relations between non-selĕsh behaviour and individual
characteristics. In this ĕrst study we used only a fairly limited amount of information on
individual characteristics (i.e. age, gender and friendship). Obviously, richer data sets can
obtain a more detailed analysis of the drivers of positive externalities. For example, this may
imply a deeper investigation of the relationship between age and non-selĕshness.
Finally, in this study we used experimental data because our focus was on children’s con-
sumption. However, our revealed preference methodology can also be used in combination
with observational data. For example, an interesting application may identify the degree
of selĕshness in household consumption, and relate inter-household heterogeneity in our
selĕshness parameter to speciĕc household (member) characteristics.11
11Such an application would require observations on the intra-household sharing of consumption. Interestingly,
data sets with detailed information on the intra-household consumption allocation are increasingly available. See
Cherchye et al. (2012) for a recent example. In this respect, we also refer to Cherchye et al. (2009, 2011a) for
empirical studies of household consumption behaviour that make use of revealed preference methods similar to
ours.
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3.A Proof of Proposition 3.4
Necessity. We show that statement 1 implies statement 2, i.e. the existence of a pair of
utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a cooperative rationalisation under  selĕshness
implies that there exist non-negative price vectorsp1;1t ,p2;2t ,p1;2t andp2;1t such that the sub-
sets S1 = f(p1;1t ;p1;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg and S2 = f(p2;1t ;p2;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg
are both consistent with the GARP and such that the conditions on these price vectors hold.
In a ĕrst step, we derive the ĕrst-order conditions associated with the optimisation prob-
lem in Deĕnition 3.3:
1t
@U1
@q1t
+ 2t
@U2
@q1t
 tpt;
2t
@U2
@q2t
+ 1t
@U1
@q2t
 tpt;
with @U
m
@qmt
and @U
n
@qmt
(m;n = 1; 2;m 6= n) the supergradients of the functions U1 and
U2 with respect to qmt , both evaluated at (q1t ;q2t ). At this point, we can deĕne personalised
prices as follows:
p1;2t =
1t
t
@U1
@q2t
;p2;1t =
2t
t
@U2
@q1t
;
p1;1t = pt  
2t
t
@U2
@q1t
;p2;2t = pt  
1t
t
@U1
@q2t
:
is obtains that p1;1t + p2;1t = pt = p1;2t + p2;2t , which gives Condition 2b. Moreover,
the above shows that
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p1;1t 
1t
t
@U1
@q1t
;p2;2t 
2t
t
@U2
@q2t
:
In a second step, we use that the individual utility functions are concave. As such
U1(q1s;q
2
s)  U1(q1t ;q2t ) 
@U1
@q1t
0
(q1s   q1t ) +
@U1
@q2t
0
(q2s   q2t );
U2(q2s;q
1
s)  U2(q2t ;q1t ) 
@U2
@q2t
0
(q2s   q2t ) +
@U2
@q1t
0
(q1s   q1t ):
By taking mt =
t
mt
; and given the deĕnitions of p1;1t , p2;2t , p1;2t and p2;1t , we then
effectively obtain
U1(q1s;q
2
s)  U1(q1t ;q2t )  1tp1;10t (q1s   q1t ) + 1tp1;20t (q2s   q2t );
U2(q2s;q
1
s)  U2(q2t ;q1t )  2tp2;20t (q2s   q2t ) + 2tp2;10t (q1s   q1t ):
Taking Um(qms ;qns ) = Ums results exactly into the Afriat inequalities applied to our
framework. Varian (1982) proved the equivalence between consistency with the Afriat in-
equalities and consistency with the GARP. Hence, we have shown that the data set must
be such that S1 = f(p1;1t ;p1;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t = 1; :::; Tg and S2 = f(p2;1t ;p2;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t
= 1; :::; Tg are both consistent with the GARP.is gives Condition 2a.
In a ĕnal step, we must take into account that the utility functions U1 and U2 were
restricted to satisfy
" 
1t
@U1
@z1j
2t
@U2
@z1j
and " 
2t
@U2
@z2j
1t
@U1
@z2j
with j = 1; : : : ; n:
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Using the above notation, we can rewrite this in terms of personalised prices:
"  p
1;1
t;j
p2;1t;j
and "  p
2;2
t;j
p1;2t;j
:
is gives p1;1t  "p2;1t and p2;2t  "p1;2t . Hence p1;1t  "(pt   p1;1t ) and p2;2t 
"(pt p2;2t ) orp1;1t 
"
1 + "
pt andp2;2t 
"
1 + "
pt:Given the deĕnition of the selĕshness
parameter,  = "
1 + "
; we thus obtain p1;1t  pt and p2;2t  pt. is concludes the
necessity part.
Sufficiency. To show the reverse, we start from the condition that both data sets S1 and
S2 must be consistent with the GARP. From Varian (1982), we know that consistency of
S1 = f(p1;1t ;p1;2t ;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tg and S2 = f(p2;2t ;p2;1t ;q1t ;q2t ); t= 1; :::; Tgwith
GARP is equivalent to the existence of utility numbersumt and Lagrangemultipliers mt such
that form;n = 1; 2 :
ums   umt  mt pm;m0t (qms   qmt ) + mt pm;n0t (qns   qnt ):
By using these Afriat-like inequalities, we can construct utility functionsU1 andU2 that
rationalise the observed data. For any pair of quantity vectors (z1; z2), we can deĕne (for
m = 1; 2)
Um(z1; z2) = min
s2f1;:::;Tg
[Ums + 
m
s [(p
m;10
s z
1 + pm;20s z
2)  (pm;10s q1s + pm;20s q2s)]]:
Let us show that these utility functions effectively provide a cooperative rationalisation
with  selĕshness. First of all, Varian (1982) has proven thatUm(q1t ;q2t ) = Umt . en, for
strictly positive mt , we can simply add up the utility functions of different group members
and obtain the following condition:
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X
m;n=1;2;m6=n
mt U
m(zm; zn) 
X
m;n=1;2;m 6=n
mt [U
m
t + 
m
t [(p
m;m0
t z
m + pm;n0t z
n)
 (pm;m0t qmt + pm;n0t qnt )]]:
For the remainder of the proof, we set mt = 1=mt and thus we have
X
m;n=1;2;m6=n
mt U
m(zm; zn) 
X
m;n=1;2;m 6=n
mt U
m
t + [(p
m;m0
t z
m + pm;n0t z
n)
 (pm;m0t qmt + pm;n0t qnt )]:
Take any (z1; z2) that satisfy p0tz1 + p0tz2  p0tq1t + p0tq2t . en
(p1;10t z
1 + p1;20t z
2)  (p1;10t q1t + p1;20t q2t )
+(p2;20t z
2 + p2;10t z
1)  (p2;20t q2t + p2;10t q1t )
= p0tz
1 + p0tz
2   p0tq1t   p0tq2t
 0:
e equality follows from the fact that p1;1t + p2;1t = pt = p1;2t + p2;2t . Using this
inequality, we ĕnally obtain
X
m;n=1;2;m 6=n
mt U
m(zm; zn) 
X
m;n=1;2;m6=n
mt U
m
t =
X
m;n=1;2;m6=n
mt U(q
m
t ;q
n
t ):
is shows that (q1t ;q2t ) maximises the group’s objective function subject to p0tz1 +
p0tz
2  p0tq1t +p0tq2t . As such we have constructed a pair of utility functions that rationalise
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the data.
To ĕnish the proof we ĕnally need to show that our constructed utility functions also
satisfy
" 
1t
@U1
@z1j
2t
@U2
@z1j
and " 
2t
@U2
@z2j
1t
@U1
@z2j
with j = 1; : : : ; n:
In order to do this, we use that (with m;n = 1; 2;m 6= n) pm;mt  pt;pn;mt 
(1  )pt and " = 
1   which shows that
" =

1   
pm;mt;j
pn;mt;j
:
Above, we have constructed utility functions Um(q1;q2) from the Afriat inequalities.
ese piecewise linear functions are monotonic and concave. Deriving these utility func-
tions with respect to q1 and q2 at (q1t ;q2t ) gives the following inequalities for the supergra-
dients:
@Um
@qmt
 mt pm;mt ;
@Un
@qmt
 nt pn;mt :
Using mt = 1=mt and " 
pm;mt;j
pn;mt;j
,m;n = 1; 2; andm 6= n, we effectively obtain that
"  p
m;m
t;j
pn;mt;j
=
1
mt
@Um
@qmt;j
1
nt
@Un
@qmt;j
=
mt
@Um
@qmt;j
nt
@Un
@qmt;j
=
mt
t
@Um
@qmt;j
nt
t
@Un
@qmt;j
:
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3.B Distribution of individual selĕshness for noisy data
Figure 3.5 presents the distribution of the individual selĕshness parameter for different de-
grees of noise/randomness in the data. Speciĕcally, we have replaced the actual choice (and
allocation) of a dyad in a particular observation with a random choice from a uniform dis-
tribution on the corresponding choice set (as well as a random allocation pattern), with a
probability equal to . Obviously,  = 0 corresponds to the original distribution presented
in Figure 3.1 since no noise is added. On the other hand,  = 1 would correspond to the
distribution of selĕshness under Bronars’ simulation procedure. e results (based on 500
simulations per value of ) suggest that the distribution of the individual selĕshness pa-
rameter is relatively robust up to and including  = 0:2. is indicates that our results are
robust to limited degrees of randomness.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative distribution of the individual selĕshness parameterwith noise; whole
sample with probability  that a choice is replaced with a random bundle
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3.C Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
As a robustness check for our ranksum tests, we also conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
e results are reported in Table 3.8. For each child characteristic (age, gender and friend-
ship) we carry out three different tests (which in Table 3.8 correspond to the three rows for
each child characteristic). e ĕrst test uses the alternative hypothesis that m values are
smaller in group 0 than in group 1. e second uses the (opposite) alternative hypothesis
that m is systematically smaller in group 1 than in group 0. e ĕnal test uses the non-
directional alternative hypothesis.
Interestingly, the results in Table 3.8 generally conĕrm the Wilcoxon test results that we
presented in the main text. First, our Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests again indicate that the dis-
tribution of the m-parameter depends on age. In particular, the null hypothesis that there
is no effect is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that sixth graders aremore selĕsh
than younger children. Next, we ĕnd a weak effect of friendship between dyad members.
Speciĕcally, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that children
who are strong friends with their partner will be less selĕsh in their consumption behaviour.
Finally, and similar to before, the effect of gender is not really signiĕcant.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Smaller group D P-value Corrected
age 0 kind.,thirdg. 0.3084 0.014
1 sixthg. 0.0000 1.000
Combined 0.3084 0.028 0.016
friendship 0 weak 0.0000 1.000
1 strong -0.2210 0.108
Combined 0.2210 0.215 0.157
gender 0 girls 0.1767 0.217
1 boys 0.0000 1.000
Combined 0.1767 0.429 0.348
Table 3.8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
Chapter 4
Revealed preferences for diamond
goods1
4.1 Introduction
Economics researchers are typically confronted with a tradeoff between the (psychological)
realism of their models and the ability of the models to describe and estimate the under-
lying structure of consumers’ decisions (Rabin, 2013). For instance, it is well known that
consumers care not only about the quantity of their purchases but also for the value asso-
ciated with various commodities (Ng, 1987; Mandel, 2009). However, allowing for price-
dependent preferences generally weakens the testable implications of a model (unless addi-
tional assumptions are made on the functional form of utility functions, for instance). Here
we present a model in which consumers are allowed to care about the value of a purchase
(diamond effect). We present a corresponding revealed preference characterisation, which
enables us to test rationality in the presence of diamond effects. We also present a ĕrst (non-
parametric) empirical application of our model with diamond effects.
1I refer to the working paper version of Cosaert (2013).
134
4.1. INTRODUCTION 135
Diamond goods and price-dependent preferences Demand analysis typically treats con-
sumers as ‘rational’ or ‘optimising’ agents who maximise their utility by purchasing the
commodities they like. e rationality assumption enables researchers to estimate welfare-
related measures (such as cost-of-living indices) and demand functions for various com-
modities on the basis of real expenditure data. e assumption that consumers ‘maximise’
their utility is therefore crucial. In most applications, the utility functions are rather strictly
deĕned: it is assumed that consumers care about the quantity of their purchase. However,
Ng (1987, 1993) argues that sometimes a good is purchased for its value rather than for its
intrinsic consumption effect. Jewellery is probably the most intuitive example. A diamond
is not always purchased for its size. Its value may be more important as a means to please a
loved one. Similarly, an art collection is prised for its value rather than the number of pieces
in the collection (Mandel, 2009). More generally, various goods can have some degree of
this so-called diamondness. When individuals treat their friends to dinner, go shopping in
expensive clothing stores, or acquire a collection of wines or cigars, we can reasonably argue
that these people care about the value of their purchase. Testing the nature of commodities
to see whether they can be described as diamond goods is important. Ng (1987) shows that
the rules for optimal taxation of diamond goods are very different from the rules for opti-
mal taxation of standard goods. From a theoretical perspective, taxing these goods increases
government revenues without imposing an overly large burden on consumers. Moreover,
failure to take diamond effects into account can lead to biased results for rationality, welfare,
and demand (Heffetz and Shayo, 2009).
Preferences for value can have different sources. Consumers may have preferences for
value because they believe that value signals quality (the quality effect), because they want
to portray their wealth by purchasing expensive items (the status effect or conspicuous con-
sumption) or because they have an internal desire to possess expensive items (the diamond
effect in the narrow sense, following Ng (1987, 1993)). e distinction between diamond
and status effects is rather formal. Prices affect utility either directly (because consumers
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care about the value of the commodities they possess) or indirectly (when consumers derive
utility from value because value is observable to society). In the latter case, visibility of the
expenditure plays an important role. In this study, we focus on the identiĕcation of pref-
erences for value for different commodities. We do not formally disentangle the different
sources of preferences for value. However, given the speciĕc set-up of the application, we
expect that status effects are important. In the application we use aggregated commodity
groups. While it is hard to imagine that a price change in a whole category of goods affects
a consumer’s quality judgements, it is not unthinkable that the consumer’s utility responds
differently to price changes in more visible (vis-à-vis less visible) product groups provided
that he or she cares about society’s perception. We link our diamondness results to a visibility
index proposed by Heffetz (2011) in order to investigate this argument.
To date, there has been little research that both incorporates price-dependent prefer-
ences in a standard model of consumer behaviour and tests the modiĕedmodel on the basis
of observational data. One reason is that it is difficult to disentangle non-budget-constraint
from budget-constraint price effects. Moreover, the way in which non-budget-constraint
prices impact on decisions is not observed. Heffetz and Shayo (2009), on the one hand,
deal with this issue by setting up an experiment in which distinct prices are presented to
respondents: relative prices that monitor the choice set and visual price stickers that capture
non-budget-constraint price effects. However, in observational data sets, which are typically
used for demand and welfare estimation, this type of information is unavailable. Basmann
et al. (1988), on the other hand, try to elicit Veblen effects (measured as elasticity of the
marginal rate of substitution with respect to total expenditures) from observational data by
estimating a Fechner-urstone direct utility function. is utility function has both quan-
tity and price as arguments, so price-dependent preferences can be incorporated. However,
much structure is imposed on the utility functions. is has two potential drawbacks. First,
if themethod rejects rationality, it is uncertain whether the individual was truly irrational or
whether an incorrect speciĕcation of the utility function was imposed. Second, to estimate
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the utility functions it is assumed that consumers are homogeneous in terms of preferences.
To deal with these problems, we follow a nonparametric (revealed preference) approach.
Revealed preference To obtain a test of rationality without having to specify individual
utility functions, we use the revealed preference approach. Revealed preference models in
the tradition of Samuelson (1938), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982) deĕne
refutable conditions that need to hold in order for a consumer to be rational. e condi-
tions are derived from a ĕnite set of observables: price and quantity information at different
points in time. Under the assumption of preference homogeneity over time, revealed pref-
erence theory allows testing of the transitivity of preference relations without imposing a
functional form on the utility functions. Another attractive feature of this methodology is
that consumption decisions of different agents can be analysed independently, thereby fully
recognising that different agents can have different tastes.
Here we argue that letting preferences depend on both quantity and expenditure does
not automatically preclude a revealed preference test. However, we need to modify the test.
Standard revealed preference conditions are unable to take diamond effects into account. It
is typically assumed that individuals care about quantity (or at least the intrinsic character-
istics of the good2) but not about the total value of a purchase. Failure to model additional
price effects can lead to incorrect conclusions on the rationality of consumers. Consumer
choices that seem irrational according to the standard test may be rationalisable if diamond
effects are taken into account, and vice versa.
Unfortunately, the theory of revealed preference and the conjecture that preferences de-
pend on value or price are difficult to reconcile (Bilancini, 2011; Frank and Nagler, 2012).
Revealed preference theory requires a ĕnite data set of consumption choices under different
price regimes while maintaining a constant preference ordering. If the preference ordering
itself is inĘuenced by prices, revealed preference theory becomes useless because we cannot
2Blow et al. (2008) provide a revealed preference analysis of characteristics models.
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compare different consumption bundles over time.3
For this reason we focus on preferences for value. e preferences that we consider here
are a special case of price-dependent preferences4. Prices enter as a factor of quantities in
a homogeneous utility function. Homogeneity of the utility function implies that welfare
comparisons (over time) are possible, hence that the revealed preference approach is valid.
Moreover, using value as an argument of the utility function imposes meaningful restric-
tions on the observed choices. Aer all, the marginal utility from value is related to the
consumed quantity of the corresponding commodity via ĕrst-order conditions. is allows
us to develop testable revealed preference conditions that take price-dependent preferences
into account, at the expense of losing some generality. ese tests are useful to identify the
degree of diamondness associated with commodities.
Contribution is paper makes theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions
to the existing literature.
First, at a theoretical level we present a model in which consumers are allowed to care
about both the quantity and value associated with commodities. Our model builds on the
framework developed byNg (1993) but generalises by allowing formore than one ‘diamond’
good. Moreover, we introduce a parameter that captures the diamondness of commodities,
3Pollak (1977) provides an insightful overview of the modelling of price-dependent preferences. e author
considers two distinct ways in which price-dependent preferences are analysed: the unconditional approach and
the conditional approach. According to the unconditional approach, economic agents express their preferences
not only over quantities but also over price–quantity pairs (Kalman, 1968; Piccione and Rubinstein, 2008). In this
case, welfare conclusions are still possible (there exists a homogeneous preference ordering deĕned over quantities
and prices) but the model cannot be tested on the basis of data from standard consumption surveys, in which
individuals choose quantities and not price–quantity pairs. Because data on choices over price–quantity pairs (at
any moment in time) are generally unavailable, the conditional approach seems more popular in empirical work.
Following this approach, the preference orderings (deĕned over quantities) are conditional on prices. A popular
functional speciĕcation for the utility function — which accounts for preference-shiing parameters such as price
— is the generalised Fechner-urstone utility function. However, this utility function does not allow for welfare
comparisons between periods in which preference-shiing parameters (i.e. prices) take different values.
4Note that even more generally, prices can also impact on consumption decisions beyond their effects through
budget constraints or preferences. Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and Rees (1988) developed a collective model
of consumption to describe consumption decisions by households. e collective model is theoretically attrac-
tive for studying joint decision-making because it allows different members to have different preferences and lets
intra-group bargaining power vary over time (the collective model and its revealed preference characterisation is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). Interestingly, variation in bargaining power may be driven by variation in
the market prices of commodities.
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which is the marginal willingness to pay for value. Capturing the diamondness of a com-
modity in a single parameter is in accordance with research by Rabin (2013), who supports a
PEEM (portable extension of existingmodels) approach, whereby one parameter is added to
existing economic models to incorporate insights from the behavioural literature. By letting
the diamondness of a commodity vary between 0 and 1, we canmove from amodel with tra-
ditional preferences (consumers only care about quantity) to the model of Ng (1987), which
treats a commodity as a pure diamond good (consumers only care about the value associated
with the pure diamond good). If the diamondness lies strictly between 0 and 1, the marginal
willingness to pay for additional units of consumption stems from both the intrinsic utility
associated with the good and its value.
Second, at a methodological level we present the corresponding revealed preference
characterisation. e papers byNg (1987, 1993) are purely theoretical. e author described
a model according to which consumers care about the value of one good and derived rules
for optimal taxation (of the diamond good). In this chapter, we also focus on the imple-
mentation and testing of a model with diamond goods. We show that, conditional on some
level of diamondness, rationality can still be tested in a meaningful way. Moreover, the dif-
ferent characterisations are generally non-nested. In other words, increasing diamondness
associated with one or multiple goods does not automatically relax the revealed preference
conditions. is implies that we can construct ‘bounds’ on the diamondness associated with
various commodities.
Finally, at an empirical level we apply our revealed preference tests for rationality to a
data sample from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ĕrst empirical revealed preference test of diamond effects.
In Section 4.2, we deĕne rationality and preferences for value and introduce our dia-
mondness parameter. In Section 4.3, we present the revealed preference characterisations
that allow us to test rationality for different speciĕcations of the diamondness vector. ese
characterisations contain conditions that can be implemented using (mixed integer) lin-
140 4.2. THEORY
ear programming techniques. We also discuss the non-nestedness of our characterisations.
is section ends with a discussion of standard measures of empirical performance in the
revealed preference literature. In Section 4.4, we brieĘy discuss our sample taken from the
RLMS. Section 4.5 presents rationality results under different speciĕcations of the diamond-
ness vector. We also show that the appropriate degree of diamondness depends on the in-
dividual and the product at hand. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 eory
We present a model in which consumers derive utility from both the goods they consume
and the expenditure on these commodities. We follow a so called unconditional approach, in
which preferences are homogeneous over time (i.e. the preference parameters are indepen-
dent of prices) although prices are allowed to enter the utility function. We let prices enter
the utility function in a speciĕc way, namely as a factor of quantities. en themarginal util-
ity from value is directly related to the observed quantities via ĕrst-order conditions. is
makes that the revealed preference approach is valid and that it provides us with refutable
conditions.
Ng (1987) introduced a model in which one good is assumed to be a (pure) diamond
good, that is, the market value of this commodity enters the consumer utility function. In
a later paper, Ng (1993) also allowed for mixed diamond goods, whereby both the market
value and the intrinsic consumption component of one (mixed) diamond good enter the
utility function. Unfortunately, in the framework of Ng (1987, 1993) there is only one pure
ormixed diamond good, and other goods are standard goods. Here we present a framework
in which, in principle, all goods can be characterised by some degree of diamondness, and
diamondness (expressed on a continuum between 0 and 1) can be measured in monetary
terms.
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4.2.1 Modelling diamondness
To construct a testable model with diamond effects, we build on the model of Ng (1993),
which is itself a generalisation of the original Ng (1987) framework. emodel of Ng (1993)
assumes that utility can be derived from both the quantity and market price value of one
commodity. We extend this framework to assess preferences for value associated with mul-
tiple goods, and we introduce a parameter to capture the relative importance of themarginal
willingness to pay for value.
Suppose that we have a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg consisting of jT j observations.
For each observation t, this data set contains information on the observed quantity vectorQt
2 RjN j+ as chosen by consumers and the corresponding price vectorPt 2 RjN j++. LetMt 2
RjN j+ represent the vector of expenditures on jN j commodities in period t (i.e. Mt consists
of elementsMnt = Pnt Qnt ). We assume that utility functions take the formU(Q;M), which
means that consumers can derive utility from quantity on the one hand and from the value
of a purchase on the other hand:
max
Q
U(Q;M)
s:t:
t : P
0
tQ  yt
8n 2 N : Mn = Pnt Qn:
We obtain testable implications by deriving the ĕrst-order conditions associated with
the above problem:
8n 2 N : @U(Qt;Mt)
@Qn
+
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn
Pnt = tP
n
t : (4.1)
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is expression clearly shows that the total marginal utility from an additional unit of
good n is composed of the marginal utility associated with the good itself, @U(Qt;Mt)@Qn , and
the marginal utility associated with the value of this good, @U(Qt;Mt)@Mn . e second term
follows directly from the diamond effect. We deĕne diamondness as themarginal willingness
to pay for value. To this end, we divide the marginal utility from additional expenditure,
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn , by the marginal utility from one unit of income, t. In this way, we obtain a
measure for the diamond effect in monetary terms:
n =
1
t
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn
:
We assume that diamondness n is time-invariant. Although this assumption is not
necessary for the derivation of revealed preference conditions, it is convenient because it
allows us to identify one diamondness parameter per commodity. is avoids a grid search
on multiple diamondness parameters for the same commodity. Moreover, even with ĕxed
diamondness, the model generalises the standard utility maximisation framework (note in
this respect that the standard model has diamondness ĕxed equal to 0) without being overly
permissive. One way to think about this assumption is to assert that diamondness is speciĕc
to a commodity, irrespective of the quantity consumed.5
Interestingly, we let the diamondness parameter n be commodity-speciĕc. We allow
for the fact that certain commodities are more likely to trigger diamond effects than others.
e diamondness parameter is bounded between 0 and 1. is stems from the assumptions
that neither the marginal utility from quantity nor the marginal utility from value can be
negative. ese assumptions, in combination with Condition (4.1) and the deĕnition of the
5At this point, it is worth noting that  is not identiĕed for the generic Cobb Douglas function. In other words,
the outcome of the maximisation of a generic Cobb Douglas utility function is independent of . For this reason,
different diamondness values are empirically indistinguishable in the Cobb Douglas framework. e reason is that
the maximisation of the Cobb Douglas utility function on the one hand and the constant  assumption on the
other hand both imply that the expenditures are proportional to income. For more general speciĕcations - such as
Constant Elasticity of Substitution - this non-identiĕcation result no longer holds. In particular, the maximisation
of a generic CES utility function implies that expenditures are a function of preference parameters, income and
prices, while the constant  assumption implies that expenditures are a function of preference parameters and
income alone.
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diamondness parameter, automatically imply that n 2 [0; 1]:
Suppose ĕrst that n = 1, in other words, the marginal utility from an additional unit of
income stems purely from the diamond effect. In this case, good n is a pure diamond good
(Ng, 1987). Consumers derive utility only from expenditure on this good and not from its
quantity. Second, suppose that n = 0, in other words, additional expenditure on good n
has no direct impact on the utility of the consumer. In this case, good n is a standard good,
in the sense that additional income only impacts utility because the consumer can purchase
larger amounts of good n. Finally, we allow the diamondness weight n to take any value
between 0 and 1, n 2 [0; 1], which accounts for the possibility that goods are purchased
both for their intrinsic value and for their monetary value.
Interestingly, the proposed model encompasses the neoclassical consumption model
when n = 0 for all n 2 N . It can easily be veriĕed that the second term in Condition
(4.1) (i.e. the diamond effect) would drop out for all commodities. e proposed model
therefore ĕts within the PEEM framework of Rabin (2013). Indeed, our model extends the
neoclassical counterpart only insofar as the newly proposed diamondness vector deviates
from 0. At the other extreme, our model encompasses the situation in which all commodi-
ties are purchased only for their value, when n = 1 for all n 2 N . In this case, it is always
possible to construct a (consistent) preference ordering such that utility increases with total
expenditure.
Assume now that  2 RjN j[0;1] is a vector containing the jN j diamondness parameters.
Utility-maximising behaviour conditional on the diamondness vector is described in Prob-
lem 4.1.
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Problem 4.1. Optimisation problemOPT   :
max
Q
U(Q;M)
s:t:
t : P
0
tQ  yt
8n 2 N :
8><>: M
n = Pnt Q
n
n = 1t
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn :
9>=>;
Revealed preference theory then proceeds by looking for some utility function U such
that the observed consumption pattern solves Problem 4.1. Deĕnition 4.2 links rationalis-
ability with    diamondness to consistency with the above program.
Deĕnition 4.2. Consider a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg. We say that S is rationalisable
with    diamondness if there exists a utility function U deĕned over quantity vector Q
and expenditure vectorM such that fQt;8t 2 Tg solves optimisation Problem 4.1.
Before presenting a nonparametric methodology to test consistency with Deĕnition 4.2,
let us brieĘy discuss the implications of the introduction of diamond effects for the Slutsky
matrix. Towards this end, suppose that we observe, or can estimate, the uncompensated
demand for all goods conditional on . Let fn(P;y; ) be the uncompensated demand for
good n, conditional on price vector P, income level y and diamondness vector . Note
furthermore that  is constant and independent of pricesP or expenditures y in the current
study6.
en the Envelopeeorem implies that
6When diamondness depends on prices and/or expenditures, n(P; y), the derivation of the Slutsky matrix
is in line with the corresponding derivation for a collective model of consumption (see Browning and Chiappori
(1998)). However, the condition will be more intricate than the so called SR1 condition for collective rationality
because 1) a price change might impact on the diamondness ofN commodities and 2) the derivative of the expen-
diture function no longer corresponds to the Hicksian demand. e latter implies that only a transformation of
the matrix containing (price and income) derivatives of the uncompensated demand functions is symmetric and
negative semi-deĕnite.
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@E(P; u; )
@P i
= (1  i)hi(P;u; ): (4.2)
in whichE(P; u; ) represents the expenditure function conditional on price vectorP,
utility level u and diamondness vector . e compensated (Hicksian) demand for good n
is given by hn(P;u; ). Condition (4.2) deviates from the classical result that @E(P;u)@P i =
hi(P;u). Aer all, the increase in expenditures necessary to obtain the same level of utility
aer a price increase is offset by the fact that higher prices increase utility (if i > 0). It can
be shown that
@2E(P; u; )
@P i@P j
= (1  i)@h
i(P;u; )
@P j
= (1  i)

@f i(P;E(P; u; ); )
@P j
+ (1  j)@f
i(P;E(P; u; ); )
@y
f j(P;E(P; u; ); )

:
Finally one can see that the uncompensated demands f stem from a rational consumer
if and only if the matrix is negative semi-deĕnite and symmetric, with
ij = (1  i) ij
 ij =
@f i
@P j
+ (1  j)@f
i
@y
f j
Notice that these conditions coincide with the conventional Slutsky conditions when n = 0
for all goods n. Testing these conditions requires the estimation of demand functions f
which pool the observed demand of different consumers. Our nonparametric test, which
we present in the next section, requires only a ĕnite set of consumption choices and avoids
the pooling of different, potentially heterogeneous, consumers.
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4.3 Methodology
In the previous section we formulated a generalisation of the original models by Ng (1987,
1993). We also introduced a parameter to capture the diamond effect. In this section, we
ĕrst show how nonparametric (revealed preference) conditions can be derived to test the
rationalisability concepts. e revealed preference approach is particularly attractive in the
current setting. It avoids putting additional structure on the utility functionU(). is guar-
antees that recovery of the diamondness vector is independent of the functional form of a
utility function. Moreover, it rules out issues related to unobserved heterogeneity across
consumers, because each consumer is analysed separately. Next, we show that different
speciĕcations of the diamondness vector are generally non-nested. Finally, we discuss stan-
dard revealed preference measures that allow us to test the empirical performance of our
proposed method.
Revealed preference methodology To set the stage, we ĕrst present the revealed prefer-
ence test for consistency with a standard utility function of the form U(Q). is standard
revealed preference test was developed by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982).
Speciĕcally, the data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg is said to be rationalisable if there exists a
utility function U(Q) such that
Qt = argmax
Q
U(Q) s.t. P0tQ  P0tQt
No further functional form restrictions are imposed onU(). Afriat’seorem, a central
result in the revealed preference literature, then provides a rationality test.
Proposition 4.3. Consider a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg. e following conditions are
equivalent:
1. e data set S is rationalisable.
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2. For all decision situations t 2 T and for all commodities n 2 N; there exist utility
numbers ut; and (Lagrange) multipliers t 2 R++ such that for all t; v 2 T :
ut   uv  vP0v(Qt  Qv)
3. For all decision situations t 2 T and for all commodities n 2 N :
S = fPt;Qtj8t 2 Tg satisĕes theGARP
Statement 2 contains the so called Afriat inequalities. Observed behaviour can be ra-
tionalised by the standard utility maximisation model if and only if the data are consistent
with the Afriat inequalities. Moreover, these conditions are also equivalent to stating that
S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg is consistent with the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP).
In this section, we propose modiĕed revealed preference conditions that can be used to
test consistency with Deĕnition 4.2.
4.3.1 Revealing preferences for diamond goods
We develop a test for rationalisability for a given vector of diamondness weights . We in-
vestigate whether it is possible to construct a well-behaved utility function U , with both
values M and quantities Q as arguments, such that the observed consumption pattern
fQt;8t 2 Tg solves Problem 4.1. We start from the concavity of the utility function. For
all t and v, we must have that
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U(Qt;Mt)  U(Qv;Mv) 
jN jX
n=1
@U(Qv;Mv)
@Qn
(Qnt  Qnv )
+
jN jX
n=1
@U(Qv;Mv)
@Mn
(Pnt Q
n
t   Pnv Qnv ): (4.3)
e ĕrst-order conditions without restrictions on the diamondness vector were pre-
sented in Condition (4.1). ey imply that
tP
n
t =
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Qn
+
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn
Pnt : (4.4)
We can formulate the marginal utilities in monetary terms by dividing both terms by t.
is gives shadow prices pnt andPnt such that
Pnt = p
n
t +P
n
t  Pnt
pnt =
1
t
@U(Q;M)
@Qnt
andPnt =
1
t
@U(Qt;Mt)
@Mn
:
We also set ut = U(Qt;Mt) and uv = U(Qv;Mv). Finally, our deĕnition of n im-
plies thatPnt = n. By combining the above restrictions, we obtain the necessary conditions
for rationalisability with    diamondness. In Appendix 4.A, we show that these condi-
tions are also sufficient. In fact, the concavity conditions (4.3) ensure that the ĕrst-order
conditions (4.4) are both necessary and sufficient for optimality. We can now formulate
Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. Consider a data set S = fPt;Qt j8t 2 Tg. e following conditions are
equivalent:
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1. e data set S is rationalisable with    diamondness.
2. For all decision situations t 2 T and all commodities n 2 N , there exist utility num-
bers ut, (Lagrange) multipliers t 2 R++, and shadow prices pt 2 RjN j+ and Pt
2 RjN j+ such that for all t; v 2 T ,
ut   uv  v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qnt  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (Pnt Qnt   Pnv Qnv )
8n 2 N :
8><>:P
n
v = p
n
v +P
n
v  Pnv
Pnv = 
n:
9>=>;
3. For all decision situations t 2 T and for all commodities n 2 N , there exist shadow
prices pt 2 RjN j+ andPt 2 RjN j+ such that for all t; v 2 T ,
S = fpt;Pt;Qt;Mtj8t 2 Tg satisĕes theGARP
8n 2 N :
8><>:P
n
v = p
n
v +P
n
v  Pnv
Pnv = 
n:
9>=>;
Statement 1 gives the deĕnition of rationality when the magnitude of the diamond effect
is given by . Statement 2 presents inequalities that allow us to test the presumption of
rationalisability with    diamondness. e conditions are similar in nature to the well-
known Afriat inequalities. However, there are two main differences. First, prices are not
observed. We use shadow prices pnv and Pnv to capture the marginal willingness to pay for
quantity and value, respectively. Second, there is an additional set of jT j  jN j conditions,
which state that the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of some
good and the marginal willingness to pay for value associated with this good (multiplied by
the market price) should equal the respective market price. Statement 3 provides us with an
alternative test of rationalisability based on the GARP conditions.
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Statements 2 and 3 are easily implementable. Notice ĕrst that both pnv andPnv are deter-
mined as soon as n is speciĕed. Conditional on the vector , the conditions in Statement
2 are linear in ut; uv and v . erefore, we can use simple linear programming techniques
to implement this test. Statement 3 contains the alternative GARP formulation, which is
particularly convenient. When n is speciĕed, on one hand, Statement 3 simply requires
veriĕcation of a set of combinatorial restrictions. It is no longer necessary to formulate (and
solve) a programming problem. On the other hand, Statement 3 enables us to check ratio-
nalisability even if  is unspeciĕed before the analysis. is enables us to endogenise the
diamondness parameter n (as well as shadow prices pnv and Pnv ), and consequently pro-
vides bounds on the feasible set of diamondness values. A GARP-based test with unknown
diamondness vector can be implemented using a linear programming problem with integer
variables.
As a side note, we point out that this framework is also useful for analysis of bad com-
modities. e standard neoclassical model stipulates that consumers should not spend their
budget on a bad commodity, which reduces their (intrinsic) utility. However, when prefer-
ences depend on value, rational consumers can purchase additional units of a bad commod-
ity, as long as the marginal utility from its value exceeds the (negative) intrinsic marginal
utility. Testing whether a commodity n is bad is now easy. We can simply modify the re-
quirement
pnv < 0
in the revealed preference characterisation in Proposition 4.4. e (negative) marginal
utility due to quantity is then offset by the (positive)marginal utility fromvalue ifPnt > 1. In
order to investigate bads, one could allow that the marginal utility from quantity is negative
such that n is no longer bounded from above (by 1).
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4.3.2 Independence
One of our main contributions is a rationality test when consumers have preferences for
value. As argued above, we can test for rationality conditional on a diamondness vector ,
or recover the set of diamondness weights that allows rationalisation of (the largest fraction
of) the data. At this point, it is worth noting that the different rationality tests (corresponding
to different speciĕcations of diamondness) are generally non-nested.
Indeed, it is possible that a data set violates the predictions of the classical model while
it is rationalisable with strictly positive diamondness for particular commodities. Likewise,
a data set can be consistent with the classical model while it is not rationalisable for some
strictly positive speciĕcation of n. is suggests that we can construct meaningful bounds
on the diamondness. ere is one exception, however. e speciĕcation in which all goods
are treated as ‘pure’ diamond goods cannot reject rationality (i.e. setting all diamondness
parameters to  = 1 can always trivially rationalise the data). An empirical solution to
this problem (discriminatory power) is discussed in Section 4.5. Intuitively, discriminatory
power captures the strength of a test, that is, its capacity to reject rationality when confronted
with random choice behaviour.
To demonstrate the non-nestedness between different speciĕcations, we use two exam-
ples. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide graphical illustrations of two different data sets.
Consider ĕrst a data set with jT j = 2 observations, jN j = 2 goods, and price vectors
P1 = [2; 1]
0 and P2 = [1=2; 1]0 and quantity vectorsQ1 = [3; 2]0 andQ2 = [2; 3]0 for the
ĕrst and second observation, respectively. e le graph in Figure 4.1 presents the corre-
sponding budget constraints in terms of quantities. Aer all, consumers who have standard
preferences only care for consumed quantities. Given this assumption, however, the choices
in this ĕrst example are clearly irrational. e consumer preferred bundleQ1 over bundle
Q2 in the ĕrst observation while he preferredQ2 overQ1 in the second observation. e
right graph in Figure 4.1 differs from the le in that good 1 is presented as a (pure) diamond
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good, i.e. with 1 = 1: As such, consumers care for the quantity associated with good 2
and the value associated with good 1. e budget constraints are re-deĕned accordingly.
e budget constraint of observation 1 tilts outward because the quantities of good 1 are
multiplied by the high price of good 1 in observation 1. Similarly, the budget constraint of
observation 2 tilts inward because the quantities of good 1 are multiplied by the low price
of good 1 in observation 2. Given this alternative assumption driven by the diamondness of
good 1, the consumer still preferred bundleQ1 over bundleQ2, but the reverse no longer
holds. e choices are perfectly rationalisable when good 1 is a diamond good7.
.
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Figure 4.1: Non-nestedness example with 2 goods (le graph: all standard goods, right
graph: diamond good 1)
For the reverse, consider a data set with jT j = 2 observations, jN j = 3 goods, and price
vectors P1 = [1; 2; 3]0 and P2 = [4; 3; 2]0 and quantity vectorsQ1 = [1; 9; 10]0 andQ2 =
[9; 3; 0]0 for the ĕrst and second observation, respectively. BundleQ1 was chosen from the
budget set bounded by hyperplane h1 : y1 =P01Q1 andQ2 was chosen from the budget set
bounded by hyperplane h2 : y2 = P02Q2. Notice that all bundles on and below the hyper-
plane associated with a particular observation were, in principle, affordable. e le graph
in Figure 4.2 presents the budget constraints in terms of quantities. We can infer from the
7Algebraically, one can verify that [P01Q1 = 8] > [P01Q2 = 7]) u1 > u2 and [P02Q2 = 4] > [P02Q1 =
3:5] ) u2 > u1 lead to a contradiction, while the combination of [P01Q1 = 8] > [M12 + P 21Q22 = 3:5] )
u1 > u2 and [P02Q2 = 4] < [M11 + P 22Q21 = 8]; u2 > u1 is feasible.
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le graph that the choices are rational (given the traditional assumption of preferences for
quantity). e consumer preferred bundleQ1 over bundleQ2 in the ĕrst observation (Q2
was below the budget hyperplane of observation 1 and hence affordable), while the reverse
does not hold. e right graph in Figure 4.2 differs from the le in that good 2 is presented
as a (pure) diamond good, i.e. with 2 = 1: As such, consumers care for the quantity asso-
ciated with goods 1 and 3 and the value associated with good 2. e budget constraints are
re-deĕned accordingly. Speciĕcally, the budget hyperplanes tilt outward because the prices
of good 2 are taken up as arguments of the utility function. Given this alternative assump-
tion driven by the diamondness of good 2, however, we ĕnd that the choices are no longer
consistent. e consumer preferred bundleQ1 over bundleQ2 in the ĕrst observation and
bundleQ2 over bundleQ1 in the second observation (Q1 from hyperplane h1 was below
hyperplane h2 and hence affordable). As a result the theory of rational consumption rejects
that good 2 is a (pure) diamond good (with 2 = 1)8.
.
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Figure 4.2: Non-nestedness example with 3 goods (le graph: all standard goods, right
graph: diamond good 2)
8Algebraically, one can verify that the combination of [P01Q1 = 49] > [P01Q2 = 15] ) u1 > u2 and
[P02Q2 = 45] < [P
0
2Q1 = 51] ; u2 > u1 is feasible, while [P01Q1 = 49] > [P 11Q12 +M22 + P 31Q32 =
18]) u1 > u2 and [P02Q2 = 45] > [P 12Q11 +M21 + P 32Q31 = 42]) u2 > u1 lead to a contradiction.
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4.3.3 Measures of empirical performance
We conclude this section with an overview of empirical performance measures which will
allow us to assess various speciĕcations of the diamondness vector: pass rates, power and
predictive success. On the basis of these measures, we will be able to critically examine our
revealed preference characterisations when brought to the data.
As indicated earlier, pass rates give the fraction of data sets that are consistent with the
corresponding revealed preference conditions.
Given that it is our purpose to compare the empirical performance of speciĕcations
which impose various degrees of diamondness, we also need a measure for the strength
of our tests. It is easy to show why such measure is necessary. A characterisation where all
diamondness parameters are set to 1 would impose no meaningful restrictions. e under-
lying explanation is that, in such case, a preference ordering U(Q;M) can be constructed
which is increasing with total expenditures
nP
Mn and which trivially rationalises the ob-
served expenditures9. Furthermore, even if some goods were modelled as standard goods,
the strength of our test could be inĘuenced by the choice of the parameters. In order to con-
trol for this, we compute the ‘power’, d, associated with different speciĕcations of the model
(for a review of power measures, see Andreoni et al. (2011)). For robustness, we use two
different power measures: the bootstrap power index and Bronars (1987)’ power index, re-
spectively. e bootstrap power method simulates random data by drawing budget shares
from the distribution of observed budget shares in the sample. Bronars’ approach simu-
lates random data by drawing shares from a uniform distribution on the budget hyperplane.
However, in order to take the large number of zero expenditures in the data into account,
we modify Bronars’ approach following Cherchye et al. (2009), who apply Bronars’ proce-
dure to a similar sample from the RLMS. Speciĕcally, we impose that each simulated budget
share should not exceed the relative number of zero expenditures in the data. In this way,
9In this respect, Bilancini (2011) and Frank and Nagler (2012) also noted that any pattern of choices can be
rationalised by a (non-restricted) utility function of the form U(Q;P).
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we control for commodity groups which are not frequently purchased. Finally, the random
shares are multiplied with the consumer’s income and divided by the corresponding prices
to obtain new (random) commodity bundles. Power is one minus the pass rate of random
data sets.
In the end, we want to decide on which speciĕcation is most attractive in terms of em-
pirical performance. erefore, we apply the measure of predictive success, p, proposed
by Selten (1991) and discussed in more detail by Beatty and Crawford (2011). An elegant
feature of this measure is that it combines pass rates (r) and discriminatory power (d). Pre-
dictive success (p) is deĕned as:
p = r   (1  d)
Higher predictive success indicates that the model is better able to distinguish between
observed behaviour (which is supposed to be rational according to the model) and random,
simulated behaviour (which is supposed to violate the conditions of the model). e more
positive predictive success scores are hence desirable.
4.4 Data
We apply our revealed preference tests to consumer data from the RLMS from 1994 to 2006,
with the exception of 1997 and 1999. ese 11 waves correspond to the second collection
phase of the RLMS data (Phase II). We assume that the preferences of each respondent are
sufficiently stable over time to construct the revealed preference conditions.
We restrict our attention to data sets for single individuals who do not receive any un-
employment beneĕts. Furthermore, we only consider individuals who report expenditure
for the 11 waves. Finally, we focus on individuals whowere house and car owners during the
full observation period. is yields a sample of 82 individuals. By conditioning on house
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and car ownership, we can exclude ‘large’ decisions on durable goods from the analysis.10
e reason is straightforward: we want to make a clear distinction between decisions driven
by the diamond effect on one hand and intertemporal portfolio decisions on the other hand.
Since the focus of this paper is on the former, we only consider nondurable commodities.
e nondurable commodities that we consider here are bread, potatoes, vegetables, fruit,
meat, dairy products, alcohol, tobacco, food outside the home, clothes, car fuel, wood fuel,
gas fuel, and luxury products. is grouping follows Cherchye et al. (2009), who conducted
a similar revealed preference application to the RLMS data.
e prices of these aggregates are weighted (geometric) means of the prices associated
with various detailed subgroups of goods. For instance, the price of alcohol is a weighted
mean of the prices of vodka, liquor, and beer. We therefore have that the aggregate price Pnv
for some commodity group n in period v is equal to
Pnv =
kY
(pkv)
wk ;
where index k denotes subgroups of products that belong to the aggregate commodityn, and
the weightswk are determined by the average expenditure share of k relative to expenditure
on commodity n. By construction, these weights sum to one.
e aggregation of prices pkv in Pnv (and quantities qkv in Qnv ) is not uncontroversial.
Changes in the aggregates may reĘect changes in the composition and/or quality of the ag-
gregates. e relationship between the aggregate prices and quantities may therefore stem
from the aggregation rather than the diamond effect. Consider for instance an aggregate
commodityQnv comprising a good qlv and a good qhv :
Qnv =
plvq
l
v + p
h
vq
h
v
Pnv
=
plvq
l
v + p
h
vq
h
v
(plv)
w(phv )
1 w : (4.5)
10We thus implicitly assume that decisions on these nondurable commodities and large decisions on durables are
weakly separable. Although this assumption is contestable, it is quite common in applied static demand analysis.
Moreover, interpersonal variation in durable decisions is not an issue because we analyse each agent separately.
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From Condition (4.5) we can show that Qnv increases with plv if the budget share of l is
greater thanw, and thatQnv increases with phv if the budget share of h is greater than 1 w.11
is implies that our results may be sensitive to the aggregation method under considera-
tion. To deal with this issue, we rely on the Hicks Composite Commodityeorem12, which
was ĕrst discussed by Leontief (1936) and Hicks (1946) and further developed by Gorman
(1953). e theorem states that commodities Qnv and aggregate prices Pnv can be treated
in the same way as goods qlv and qhv and unobserved prices plv and phv , provided that the
relative prices phv=plv remain stable across observations v (i.e., phv=plv = ). In Appendix
4.B we show that the Hickseorem still holds in a setting with diamond goods. Moreover,
our data show strong correlations between the prices of various subgroups that belong to
the same aggregate.13
For the revealed preference analysis, we restrict our attention to real prices. We divide
all nominal prices by the average price level in each period. In this way, our approach is con-
sistent with the relative price hypothesis, which postulates that preferences are independent
of the nominal units in which prices are measured (see Pollak (1977)). e relative price
hypothesis avoids that homogeneous changes in prices over time (changes in the price of all
goods, e.g. due to inĘation) impact on the diamondness results.
To limit the number of parameters to be estimated in the empirical application, we let
diamondness vary across seven commodity groups: food at home (bread, potatoes, vegeta-
bles, fruit, meat, dairy products), alcohol, tobacco, food outside the home, clothing, fuel,
and luxuries. Moreover, food at home and fuel can be distinguished from alcohol, tobacco,
food outside the home, clothing, and luxuries on the basis of a visibility ranking created by
11A similar issue arises when the aggregate Qnv consists of a low-quality good qlv and a high-quality good qhv .
When a consumer spends signiĕcantly more money on the high-quality good, Qnv increases with phv . is is a
quality effect rather than a diamond effect.
12At this point, it is worth noting that we also used an alternative aggregation method. Speciĕcally, we also al-
lowed theweightswkv to vary across observations v (followingCherchye et al. (2009)). We found that bothmethods
give similar results. However, ĕxing the weightswk is necessary for Hicks’ Composite Commodityeorem to be
relevant in our setting.
13Lewbel (1996) used a parametric framework to show that correct aggregation is possible even under weaker
conditions. Speciĕcally, the generalised aggregation theorem of Lewbel (1996) only requires that the evolution of
relative prices (i.e., phv=plv = v) in an aggregate n is independent of the aggregate price level Pnv .
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Heffetz (2011). To create this ranking, Heffetz (2011) used information from 480 interviews
on the visibility of various commodities. emain question in their survey was whether re-
spondents would notice if another household spent more than average on some commodity
(e.g., jewellery and watches). Respondents were also asked how much time it would take
to notice this greater-than-average spending pattern. In this way, the commodities (not
brands) that are most visible to society were expected to obtain a high rank.
Tobacco (ranked 1st), clothing (ranked 3rd), jewellery (ranked 5th), food outside the
home (ranked 7th), and alcohol (ranked 8th) are all among the top 10 most visible com-
modities according to the Heffetz (2011) ranking. erefore, we assign these commodities
to the visible category. Food at home (ranked 14th) and gasoline (ranked 21st) were ranked
considerably lower. ese commodities are assigned to the invisible category.
In the empirical application, we start from a setting in which all goods (both visible
and invisible) are assumed to be standard goods, that is, utility is only derived from the
quantities consumed. We investigate whether the behaviour of agents is rational according
to the standard GARP test. In the next step, we examine whether (and to what extent) the
behaviour of agents can be described by amodel that allows for strictly positive diamondness
weights. e method also allows us to elicit preferences for value associated with different
goods, that is, we allow for heterogeneity across different commodities. Although we do
not disentangle direct and indirect preferences for value (i.e., conspicuous consumption),
information on the visibility of commodities provides us with an interesting interpretation
of the results.
4.5 Application
We ĕrst test rationality conditional on various speciĕcations of the diamondness of com-
modities. We compare speciĕcations on the basis of (average) pass rates, power, and pre-
dictive success. We also interpret the results using the visibility index of Heffetz (2011). We
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expect that stronger preferences for value will correspond to more visible commodities.
Second, we compute predictive success at the individual level. is gives insight into
interpersonal heterogeneity in preferences for value. We assess different speciĕcations of
diamondness on the basis of the distribution of predictive success (across the sample).
In a ĕnal step, we investigate the marginal willingness to pay for value associated with
each commodity separately. is gives insight into heterogeneity in diamondness across
commodities. Speciĕcally, it is possible to bound the marginal willingness to pay for value
using our revealed preference approach.
4.5.1 Testing for rationality with ĕxed diamondness
Empirical performance Table 4.1 presents the pass rates (average ĕt of the data) and
power estimates associated with different speciĕcations of the model. e rows represent
different degrees of diamondness associated with food at home and fuel, and the columns
represent different degrees of diamondness associated with alcohol, tobacco, food outside
the home, clothing, and luxury commodities. Amore detailed decomposition per commod-
ity is provided in Section 4.5.2. Recall that when one particular n equals 0, the respective
commodity is valued for its intrinsic consumption component only. By contrast, when n
equals 1, the commodity is speciĕcally prised for its value.
e top le result in Table 4.1 corresponds to the neoclassical utilitymaximisationmodel
(testable with GARP). e behaviour of approximately 56% of the consumers can be ratio-
nalised by a well-behaved utility function of the form U(Q). e bottom right result corre-
sponds to the model in which all commodities are prised for their value. Not surprisingly,
this revealed preference model imposes no testable restrictions, as a result of which all the
data sets are rationalised. e other results are more interesting. By varying the relevant
parameters, very different pass rates and (bootstrap) power estimates are obtained.
e predictive success results in Table 4.2 summarise our ĕndings in Table 4.1. We inves-
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diamondness visible goods
0 0:25 0:5 0:75 1
diamondness
less vis goods
0 0.561 0.573 0.610 0.634 0.634
[0.451;0.671] [0.464;0.682] [0.502;0.718] [0.528;0.74] [0.528;0.74]
(0.481) (0.474) (0.466) (0.460) (0.460)
0:25 0.549 0.585 0.610 0.659 0.671
[0.439;0.659] [0.476;0.694] [0.502;0.718] [0.554;0.764] [0.567;0.775]
(0.408) (0.399) (0.387) (0.379) (0.380)
0:5 0.671 0.720 0.707 0.732 0.793
[0.567;0.775] [0.622;0.819] [0.606;0.808] [0.634;0.83] [0.704;0.882]
(0.326) (0.310) (0.293) (0.280) (0.279)
0:75 0.732 0.780 0.829 0.866 0.890
[0.634;0.83] [0.689;0.871] [0.746;0.912] [0.791;0.941] [0.821;0.959]
(0.230) (0.210) (0.186) (0.164) (0.161)
1 0.841 0.890 0.890 0.927 1
[0.760;0.922] [0.821;0.959] [0.821;0.959] [0.870;0.984] [1;1]
(0.145) (0.113) (0.076) (0.039) (0)
Table 4.1: Mean pass rates, [95 per cent conĕdence bounds] and (power estimates). less
visible goods=fuel and food at home, visible goods=food away from home, clothes, luxuries,
tobacco and alcohol
tigate which speciĕcations are empirically supported. e predictive success of the standard
model amounts to 0.042. Increasing the diamondness associated with visible consumption
generally improves the predictive success results, whereas increasing the diamondness as-
sociated with less visible consumption lowers the predictive success scores. In particular,
the highest predictive success is obtained when visible commodities have almost full di-
amondness (i.e., for  ranging from 0.75 to 1) and the less visible commodities have no
diamondness. e corresponding predictive success more than doubles the GARP result.
We ĕnally investigate whether the differences in predictive success are statistically sig-
niĕcant. To this end, we apply a procedure described by Demuynck (2014) that allows us
to construct 95% conĕdence bounds around mean predictive success scores. Demuynck
(2014) showed how conĕdence bounds can be computed on the basis of mean pass rates,
mean power, and individual pass and power results across the sample. On one hand, the
predictive success of neither the standard model nor the speciĕcations giving higher dia-
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diamondness visible goods
0 0:25 0:5 0:75 1
diamondness less visible goods
0 0.042 0.047 0.076 0.094 0.094
[ 0:022; 0:106] [ 0:015; 0:110] [0.015;0.137] [0.033;0.155] [0.033;0.154]
0:25  0:043  0:016  0:003 0.038 0.051
[ 0:102; 0:016] [ 0:073; 0:042] [ 0:059; 0:054] [ 0:017; 0:093] [ 0:004; 0:106]
0:5  0:003 0.030 0.001 0.012 0.072
[ 0:067; 0:061] [ 0:031; 0:090] [ 0:059; 0:061] [ 0:046; 0:070] [0.018;0.126]
0:75  0:039  0:010 0.015 0.030 0.051
[ 0:101; 0:024] [ 0:070; 0:050] [ 0:040; 0:070] [ 0:019; 0:080] [0.009;0.094]
1  0:014 0.003  0:034  0:034 0
[ 0:065; 0:037] [ 0:040; 0:046] [ 0:076; 0:008] [ 0:068; 0:001] [0;0]
Table 4.2: Predictive success (less visible goods=fuel and food at home, visible goods=food
away from home, clothes, luxuries, tobacco and alcohol)
mondness to less visible goods is statistically different from 0. On the other hand, the mean
predictive success associated with speciĕcations that attribute higher diamondness to visible
goods is statistically different from 0. Intuitively, this means that the modiĕed model can
describe the observed decisions while it rejects most of the random behaviour.
In Appendix 4.C we report power estimates and predictive success results when random
bundles are simulated using the Bronars (1987) approach. ese results mainly conĕrm
our earlier ĕndings. Once more, the diamondness weights increase with the Heffetz (2011)
visibility score. is indicates that consumer preferences for value stem from conspicuous
consumption incentives.
Distribution of predictive success Until now, we have investigated the mean predictive
success for the sample. We compared different speciĕcations on the basis of average predic-
tive success. It is also insightful to take the distribution of predictive success for the sample
into account. Aer all, we can reasonably argue that consumers are heterogeneous in terms
of their preferences for value.
In Figure 4.3 we set out the distribution of predictive success when all goods are standard
goods (GARP) and when the visible goods are treated as diamond goods (see supra).
First of all, the mass of individuals whose choices can be described successfully (i.e. with
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Figure 4.3: Predictive success distribution: standard GARP versus model with visible goods
as diamond goods.
a predictive success > 0) is larger than the mass of individuals who are characterised by
negative predictive success, for both models. Second, and more interestingly, the predictive
success distribution based on the diamondness model has more mass at positive predictive
success values. In numbers, the 40th percentile of the predictive success distribution under
diamondness is still positive (0.119, meaning that at least 60 per cent of the sample can be de-
scribed quite reasonably) while the 40th percentile of the distribution under GARP is clearly
negative (-0.217). For the sample under consideration, the introduction of diamondness to
the visible goods improves the (distribution of) predictive success. e only exception is at
the very top of the distribution, where GARP seems to provide slightly more precise results
for a very small fraction of the sample.
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4.5.2 Identiĕcation of diamondness
We now go one step further by splitting the visible subgroup into alcohol, tobacco, food
away from home, clothing, and luxuries. We analyse if, and to what extent, the number of
consumers who behave rationally evolves as a function of diamondness for each product.
is also allows us to investigate the heterogeneity in preferences for value across the sam-
ple. Indeed, we will be able to ‘track’ who can (no longer) be rationalised under different
speciĕcations of the diamondness vector.
We focus on the visible subgroup for two reasons. First, in the previous subsections
we could reject the hypothesis that consumers have strong preferences for value associated
with commodities in the less visible subgroup. Second, the power estimates in Table 4.1
conĕrm that discriminatory power is more or less constant for various assumptions on the
diamondness of visible goods. When analysing visible goods, we can therefore restrict our
attention to pass rates.
We set the diamondness of less visible goods to  = 0 (which is empirically supported
by the results in Table 4.2) or  = 0:25 (for robustness). Table 4.3 describes the change in
the number of rational consumers when the diamondness per commodity is increased from
0 to 1 (in steps of 0.1). Figure 4.4 sets out the relationship between the number of ratio-
nal consumers and the diamondness per commodity graphically. e diamondness of each
good is varied unilaterally (denoted by ‘alcohol’, ‘tobacco’, ‘restaurant’, ‘clothing’ and ‘luxu-
ries’). For completeness, we also consider the number of rational consumers as a function
of the diamondness of all visible goods (denoted by ‘all visible’).
For the ĕrst graph, the diamondness of less visible goods is set to 0. We ĕnd that the
number of rational consumers improves by 3, 2 and 1, respectively, when the diamondness
of alcohol, restaurants and clothing is set to 1. For the second graph, the diamondness of
less visible goods is set to 0.25. We ĕnd that the number of rational consumers improves
by 4, 3, 3 and 3, respectively, when the diamondness of clothing, alcohol, restaurant visits
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Figure 4.4: Pass rates in function of diamondness
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and luxuries is set to 1. is indicates that for our sample alcohol consumption, restaurant
expenditures and clothing are themore outspoken diamond goods. We do not ĕnd evidence
that the consumers in our sample have preferences for value associated with tobacco.
Finally, we consider all visible goods jointly. From Table 4.1 it is clear that 46 consumers
are rational (56.1%) when  = 0, whereas 52 consumers are rational (63.4%) when  = 1,
conditional on all others goods being standard goods. e results in Table 4.3 and Figure
4.4 allow us to investigate this evolution more thoroughly. Speciĕcally, we ĕnd that pass
rates are not monotonically increasing in the diamondness of one commodity (or one group
of commodities). is corresponds to our earlier non-nestedness result: it is possible that
decisions are rationalisable given lower diamondness values and not rationalisable for higher
diamondness values. For example, at  = 0:169, the number of individuals that pass the test
decreases. Indeed, we can identify a respondent whosemarginal willingness to pay for value
lies in [0; 0:169] [ [0:603; 1]. Similar observations at  = 0:571 and  = 0:768 correspond
to respondents whose marginal willingness to pay for value is bounded from above by 0.571
and 0.768, respectively.
 more  less visible goods = 0  less visible goods = 0.25
vis goods (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1
0.2 -1 0 +1 0 0 0 0 -1 +1 0 +1 +2
0.3 -1 0 +2 0 0 +1 -1 -2 +2 0 +2 +4
0.4 -1 0 +2 0 0 +2 +1 -1 +2 0 +2 +4
0.5 +1 0 +2 0 0 +4 +2 -1 +2 0 +2 +5
0.6 +1 0 +2 -1 0 +3 +3 -1 +2 +2 +2 +8
0.7 +2 0 +2 +1 0 +5 +3 -1 +2 +2 +2 +8
0.8 +2 0 +2 0 0 +5 +3 -1 +2 +2 +2 +9
0.9 +2 0 +3 0 0 +5 +3 -1 +2 +4 +2 +10
1 +2 0 +3 +1 0 +6 +3 -1 +3 +4 +3 +10
Table 4.3: Increase in the number of rational consumers in function of diamondness of visi-
ble commodities (columns 1-5: alcohol, tobacco, restaurant, clothing and luxuries, column
6: all visible goods jointly)
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4.6 Conclusion
We incorporated preferences for value in the revealed preference framework. We deĕned
diamondness as the marginal willingness to pay for the value associated with commodities.
Strictly positive diamondness implies that consumers derive utility from the value of goods,
not just from the quantity consumed.
We ĕrst generalised the model of Ng (1993) by allowing for more than one diamond
good. Moreover, we let the degree of diamondness vary on a scale from 0 to 1. Interest-
ingly, the newly proposed diamondness parameter measures the diamond effect in mone-
tary terms. By extending the neoclassicalmodel of rationality with one (set of) parameter(s),
our approach ĕts the PEEM research agenda supported by Rabin (2013).
Next, we constructed revealed preference conditions that can be used to verify assump-
tions on the diamondness of commodities. An attractive feature of the revealed preference
methodology is that it imposes minimal restrictions on the form of utility functions. More-
over, each agent can be analysed separately so that debatable preference homogeneity as-
sumptions can be avoided. We showed that the revealed preference approach produces
refutable conditions even if preferences depend on value. In this respect, we also argued that
the different characterisations (corresponding to different assumptions for the diamondness
vector) are generally non-nested. e method can produce meaningful bounds on the dia-
mondness associated with particular commodities for particular consumers.
Finally, we applied our nonparametric test of preferences for value to a data sample from
the RLMS. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ĕrst application of revealed preference
that speciĕcally incorporates preferences for value. We found that the predictive success of a
standard GARP test is signiĕcantly less than that of alternative speciĕcations that set strictly
positive marginal willingness to pay for value. To interpret our results, we investigated the
relationship betweenmarginal willingness to pay for value and the visibility of a commodity
to society. On the one hand, the hypothesis that less visible commodities have strong dia-
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mondness was rejected. It is unlikely that individuals have preferences for value associated
with food consumed at home and fuel. is might explain why Heffetz and Shayo (2009),
who focused on food, did not ĕnd signiĕcant non-budget-constraint price effects in their
experiment. On the other hand, our results suggest that consumers have strong preferences
for value associated with more visible commodities, such as clothing. Following the argu-
ment of Ng (1987), special taxation rules may be appropriate. Furthermore, we foundmuch
variation in the rationality results across the sample. is clearly shows that choices and
preferences are very diverse, and that homogeneity assumptions on preferences for value
are probably unrealistic. Finally, we set out rationality results for all respondents as a func-
tion of the diamondness of alcohol, tobacco, food away from home, clothing, and luxuries.
We found that pass rates generally increase with the diamondness of all visible commodities
apart from tobacco. For particular individuals, we could also establish meaningful bounds
on their marginal willingness to pay for value.
e main contribution of the current study is that it captures the extent to which value-
dependent preferences (diamondness deĕned in a broad sense) are important. e question
remains whether the diamond effect (in line withNg (1987)) and the closely related status ef-
fect (conspicuous consumption) are distinguishable from exogenous quality changes within
aggregates and from exogenous quality changes across aggregates. e answer to the ĕrst
question depends on whether Hicks’ Aggregation eorem holds. e results are robust to
exogenous (within-aggregate) changes in quality or composition as long as the relative prices
within the aggregates are sufficiently stable over time. e answer to the second question de-
pends on the type of application under consideration. In experiments, it is possible to set up
choice problems in which quality and status effects are distinguishable. Such setting could
allow researchers to elicit the precise motivations underlying the preferences for value. In
observational budget surveys, it seems difficult to discriminate between pure diamond ef-
fects and quality changes. In this respect, however, it is worth noting that consumption
changes as a result of aggregate quality changes (e.g. “I buy more food because the quality
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of food has gone up”) are less likely. Finally, to examine the robustness and external validity
of our ĕndings, it would be interesting to see applications of the model to larger samples,
and to collective settings in which various other factors (such as the affection between two
partners) impact on the consumption of diamond goods.
4.A Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. In this appendix, we present the proof of Proposition 4.4.
• We ĕrst prove that Condition 1 implies Condition 2. Consider the following (neces-
sary) ĕrst-order condition for the optimisation ofOPT    :
@U=@Qnt + @U=@M
n
t  Pnt  tPnt ;
where @U=@Qnt and @U=@(Pnt Qnt ) are subderivatives of the (concave) utility func-
tion with respect to Qnt and Pnt Qnt ; respectively. e inequalities are replaced with
equalities if the quantitiesQnt are strictly positive.
Moreover, concavity of the utility function gives:
ut   uv 
jN jX
n=1
@U=@Qnv  (Qnt  Qnv ) +
jN jX
n=1
@U=@Mnv  (Pnt Qnt   Pnv Qnv ); (4.6)
Finally, we replace pnv =
@U=@Qnv
v
and Pnv = 1  
pnv
Pnv
such that Pnv 
@U=@Mnv
v
:
For strictly positive quantitiesQn, we have thatPnv =
@U=@Mnv
v
. Consistency with
Condition (4.6) thus requires consistency with Condition (4.7).
ut   uv  v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qnt  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (Pnt Qnt   Pnv Qnv ); (4.7)
4.A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.4 169
Pnv = p
n
v +P
n
v  Pnv 8n 2 N ;
is concludes the necessity part.
• We then prove that Condition 2 implies Condition 1 (based on Varian (1982)).
We start from the observation that
U(Q;M)  Uv + v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (PnQn   Pnv Qnv );
In a following step, we select the minimum of all overestimates:
U(Q;M) = min
v
(Uv + v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (PnQn   Pnv Qnv ));
is formulation should be such that any (Q;M) for which P0tQt  P0tQ; implies
that U(Qt;Mt)  U(Q;M):
First, it is important to understand that U(Qv;Mv) = Uv for v = 1; :::; T: Indeed,
for some t, we have that
U(Qv;Mv) = Ut + t
jN jX
n=1
pnt  (Qnv  Qnt ) + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Pnv Qnv   Pnt Qnt )
 Uv + v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qnv  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (Pnv Qnv   Pnv Qnv )
= Uv
If this inequality were strict, we would have that
Uv   Ut > t
jN jX
n=1
pnt  (Qnv  Qnt ) + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Pnv Qnv   Pnt Qnt )
which contradicts the Afriat inequalities. Hence U(Qv;Mv) = Uv:
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Second, any (Q;M) for whichP0tQt  P0tQmust be consistent with
U(Q;M) = min
v
(Uv + v
jN jX
n=1
pnv  (Qn  Qnv ) + v
jN jX
n=1
Pnv  (Pnt Qn   Pnv Qnv ))
 Ut + t
jN jX
n=1
pnt  (Qn  Qnt ) + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Pnt Qn   Pnt Qnt )
 Ut = U(Qt;Mt)
e ĕrst inequality follows from the deĕnition of U(Q;M); the second inequality
follows from
Ut + t
jN jX
n=1
pnt  (Qn  Qnt ) + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Pnt Qn   Pnt Qnt )
= Ut + t
jN jX
n=1
(Pnt  Pnt  Pnt )  (Qn  Qnt ) + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Pnt Qn   Pnt Qnt )
= Ut + t
jN jX
n=1
Pnt  (Qn  Qnt )
 Ut
is concludes the sufficiency part.
4.B Hicks’CompositeCommodityeorem in thediamond
setting
In this proof, we show that Hicks’ Composite Commodity eorem also applies in a set-
ting with diamond goods. Otherwise stated, the testable conditions in Proposition 4.4 give
the same results, regardless of whether the restrictions are applied to the aggregates with
unit values or to the subgroups with speciĕc prices, provided that there is no relative price
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variation within the aggregates.
Proof. We start from aggregate prices which are constructed in the following way
Pnv = (p
l
v)
w(phv )
1 w
and from the assumption that there is no (relative) price variation within subgroups of
products, i.e. p
h
v
plv
= :
• First, we show that this information enables us to express Qv , plv and phv in terms of
constants l = w 1 and h = w; which are invariant across periods v.
Qv = 
lqlv + 
hqhv
plv = 
lPv
phv = 
hPv
In order to see this, we use that p
h
v
plv
=  and Pnv = (plv)w(phv )1 w :
Qv =
plvq
l
v + p
h
vq
h
v
Pnv
=
plvq
l
v + p
h
vq
h
v
(plv)
w(phv )
1 w =
plvq
l
v + p
l
vq
h
v
(plv)
w(plv)
1 w
=
plv(q
l
v + q
h
v )
plv(
1 w)
=
qlv + q
h
v
1 w
= w 1qlv + 
wqhv = 
lqlv + 
hqhv
Pv = (p
l
v)
w(phv )
1 w = (plv)
w(plv)
1 w = 1 wplv
) plv = lPv
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Pv = (p
l
v)
w(phv )
1 w = (
phv

)w(phv )
1 w =  wphv
) phv = hPv
• Next, reformulate the ĕrst-order conditions for all subgroups k 2 fh; lg that belong
to the aggregate n :
pknv = p
kn
v +P
kn
v  pknv
, knPnv = pknv +Pknv  knPnv
, Pnv =
pknv
kn
+Pknv  Pnv
Hence, we can conclude that, for ĕxed n = ln = hn such thatPnv = Plnv = Phnv :
phnv
hn
=
plnv
ln
We can simply redeĕne pnv =
phnv
hn
=
plnv
ln
.
• Finally, we can show the equivalence between the inequalities in Proposition 4.4 (State-
ment 2) applied to the subproducts on the one hand and the inequalities in Proposi-
tion 4.4 (Statement 2) applied to the aggregates on the other hand.
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ut   uv  vph1v (qh1t   qh1v ) + vph2v (qh2t   qh2v )
+vp
l1
v (q
l1
t   ql1v ) + vpl2v (ql2t   ql2v )
+vP
1
v(p
h1
t q
h1
t   ph1v qh1v ) + vP2v(ph2t qh2t   ph2v qh2v )
+vP
1
v(p
l1
t q
l1
t   pl1v ql1v ) + vP2v(pl2t ql2t   pl2v ql2v )
, ut   uv  vp1v(h1qh1t   h1qh1v ) + vp2v(h2qh2t   h2qh2v )
+vp
1
v(
l1ql1t   l1ql1v ) + vp2v(l2ql2t   l2ql2v )
+vP
1
v(P
1
t 
h1qh1t   P 1v h1qh1v ) + vP2v(P 2t h2qh2t   P 2v h2qh2v )
+vP
1
v(P
1
t 
l1ql1t   P 1v l1ql1v ) + vP2v(P 2t l2ql2t   P 2v l2ql2v )
, ut   uv  vp1v(h1qh1t + l1ql1t   h1qh1v   l1ql1v )
+vp
2
v(
h2qh2t + 
l2ql2t   h2qh2v   l2ql2v )
+vP
1
v(P
1
t 
h1qh1t + P
1
t 
l1ql1t   P 1v h1qh1v   P 1v l1ql1v )
+vP
2
v(P
2
t 
h2qh2t + P
2
t 
l2ql2t   P 2v h2qh2v   P 2v l2ql2v )
, ut   uv  vp1v(Q1t  Q1v) + vp2v(Q2t  Q2v)
+vP
1
v(P
1
t Q
1
t   P 1t Q1v) + vP2v(P 2t Q2t   P 2vQ2v)
4.C Predictive success based on Bronars’ method
For robustness, we report power and predictive successmeasures based on Bronars’ method.
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diamondness visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
diamondness
less visible goods
0 0.561 0.573 0.610 0.634 0.634
(0.452) (0.445) (0.442) (0.440) (0.443)
0.25 0.549 0.585 0.610 0.659 0.671
(0.379) (0.366) (0.358) (0.354) (0.357)
0.5 0.671 0.720 0.707 0.732 0.793
(0.303) (0.287) (0.272) (0.264) (0.262)
0.75 0.732 0.780 0.829 0.866 0.890
(0.219) (0.191) (0.166) (0.150) (0.147)
1 0.841 0.890 0.890 0.927 1
(0.160) (0.126) (0.080) (0.037) (0)
Table 4.4: Pass rates (and Bronars’ power estimates) (less visible goods=fuel and food at
home, visible goods=food away from home, clothes, luxuries, tobacco and alcohol)
Most of our earlier conclusions remain valid. First of all, the predictive success scores
generally increase in function of the diamondness for visible goods.
None of the predictive success scores are statistically different from 0 at the 5 per cent
level. At the 10 per cent level, however, we ĕnd that (only) some characterisations, which
attribute high diamondness to the visible goods, have a predictive success score that is sta-
tistically different from 0.
diamondness visible goods
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
diamondness
less visible goods
0 0.013 0.018 0.052 0.075 0.077
[-0.050;0.076] [-0.043;0.078] [-0.008;0.112] [0.015;0.134] [0.016;0.137]
0.25 -0.073 -0.048 -0.033 0.012 0.027
[-0.131;-0.014] [-0.105;0.009] [-0.089;0.024] [-0.044;0.068] [-0.028;0.083]
0.5 -0.026 0.007 -0.020 -0.005 0.055
[-0.089;0.036] [-0.052;0.065] [-0.079;0.038] [-0.062;0.053] [0.002;0.108]
0.75 -0.050 -0.029 -0.005 0.016 0.037
[-0.112;0.013] [-0.087;0.030] [-0.059;0.049] [-0.034;0.065] [-0.007;0.080]
1 0.001 0.016 -0.029 -0.036 0
[-0.049;0.051] [-0.025;0.057] [-0.071;0.012] [-0.070;-0.001] [0;0]
Table 4.5: Predictive success based on Bronars’ method (less visible goods=fuel and food at
home, visible goods=food away from home, clothes, luxuries, tobacco and alcohol)
Part IV
Bounds on the distribution of
welfare and demand in a
heterogeneous population
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In this part, I combine elementary revealed preference principles and nonparametric
estimation techniques to obtain nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money
metric utility over a population of heterogeneous households. emethod can also produce
bounds on demand predictions in counterfactual price-income regimes.
I build on the contributions of Blundell et al. (2003, 2007, 2008). ese authors have
shown how to use the revealed preference axioms, in combination with kernel estimates of
Engel functions, to bound welfare and demand for a representative consumer. eir contri-
butions addressed Problems 1 and 2 frommy General Introduction. First of all, the method
can be applied to cross-sectional data sets. is considerably enlarges the scope of revealed
preference. Second, it produces reasonably tight bounds on welfare estimates and demand
correspondences.
However, the approach presented in this part focuses on the entire distribution of wel-
fare and demand, rather than the welfare and demand corresponding to a representative
agent. ere is plenty of evidence that preferences and tastes are heterogeneous across con-
sumers. is requires us to incorporate very general forms of unobserved heterogeneity.
Aer all, Lewbel (2001) has pointed out that imposing additive error terms comes very close
to the representative agent assumption. To include very general forms of unobserved het-
erogeneity, I build on the stochastic revealed preference approach developed by McFadden
and Richter (1971) and Falmagne (1978).
Chapter 5
Nonparametric bounds for ahetero-
geneous population1
5.1 Introduction
We present a framework to construct nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the
money metric utility function while taking into account individual unobserved heterogene-
ity. Our approach combines elementary revealed preference concepts (in particular the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) with nonparametric (kernel) estimation techniques.
In this manner, our approach remains independent of any parametric speciĕcation on the
underlying household utility functions or on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
We further demonstrate how the framework can be used to establish bounds on the dis-
tribution of the demand functions in counterfactual price regimes. An illustration using
the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a US cross–sectional household consumption data set,
demonstrates the practical usefulness of our results.
1is chapter is based on joint work with omas Demuynck (Maastricht University). I refer to the working
paper version of Cosaert and Demuynck (2014a).
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Motivation Demand analysis provides a powerful tool to analyse behavioural responses
and welfare effects due to price and income variations. In a typical demand study, the re-
searcher ĕrst estimates the parameters of some parametric demand system,2 and uses these
estimates to calculate the associated indirect utilities. is ‘parametric’ approach has two
major shortcomings. e ĕrst shortcoming is that the outcome is sensitive to the speciĕc
functional structure chosen by the researcher. Imposing the wrong functional form can
therefore severely bias the resulting analysis. A second shortcoming concerns the treatment
of individual (unobserved) heterogeneity. In a typical consumer data set, we observe indi-
viduals or households only once. Given this data limitation, it is oen assumed that sim-
ilar looking individuals have similar preferences. Many demand studies therefore model
a household’s demand to equal a rational systematic component, from a common utility
function across all (similar looking) households, and a household speciĕc additive error
term capturing the unobserved heterogeneity or taste variation. By controlling for various
observable characteristics (like household size), it is hoped that the issue of heterogeneity
across the households is adequately addressed by including such additive error term. is
assumption, however, disregards the ĕnding that individuals who look very similar may
actually differ dramatically in their actual choice behaviour.3 As shown by Lewbel (2001),
imposing additivity of the unobserved heterogeneity is a strong assumption. Its resulting im-
plications come very close to enforcing a representative agent assumption.4 To summarise,
we see that different people (although they may look the same) have different tastes and,
consequentially, behave differently. In order to take this into account, it is crucial to allow
for non-additive unobserved heterogeneity.
2Popular parametric demand systems are the Translog (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975)), the Almost
Ideal (Deaton andMuellbauer (1980)), or theQuadraticAlmost Ideal (Banks, Blundell, andLewbel (1997)) demand
system.
3Unobserved heterogeneity is oen seen as the main reason why demand estimations on cross sectional data
typically have low r-squared values.
4See also Brown andWalker (1989) andMcElroy (1987) for a discussion of other issueswhen taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity.
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Literature overview In order to deal with aforementioned two problems, one can distin-
guish between two approaches. e ĕrst approach looks at the nonparametric differential
‘smooth’ restriction that can still be established in a heterogeneous population. ese usu-
ally take the form of population level generalisations of Slutsky symmetry, negativity and
homogeneity. Recent examples that follow this approach are Hoderlein (2011), Blundell,
Horowitz, and Parey (2013), Hausman and Newey (2013), and Hoderlein and Vanhems
(2013). A second approach, followed in this paper, is to rely on revealed preference the-
ory. Revealed preference theory was initiated by Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and
further developed in several seminal contributions by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and
Varian (1982). e main aim of revealed preferences theory is to establish (combinatorial)
restrictions on observed demand behaviour of a certain individual or household such that it
is consistent with the classical model of utility maximisation subject to a budget constraint.
One of the main advantages of revealed preference theory is that it imposes no functional
restrictions on the underlying utility function, except for some regularity conditions like
local non-satiation.
Revealed preference theory, as it was initially developed, has two main problems. First,
from an empirical point of view, the method does not really seem to provide very tight
bounds. e main reason for this is that relative price variations usually tend to be quite
small in comparison to income variation. is implies that budget hyperplanes oen do not
cross. We refer to Bronars (1987) and Varian (1982) for a discussion of this problem. e
second problem is that revealed preference theory is not well suited to deal with unobserved
individual heterogeneity. As a result, most of its applications remain conĕned to a few panel
consumption data sets, where the same household or individual is observed over multiple
periods.
eĕrst problemhas been the subject of several recent studies that apply revealed prefer-
ence theory to repeated cross sectional data by combining insights from revealed preference
theory with nonparametric estimation techniques (see Blundell (2005); Blundell, Browning,
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and Crawford (2003, 2007, 2008) and Blundell, Browning, Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock,
and Vermeulen (2012)). e main contribution from this literature is that it shows how to
use nonparametric Engel curve demand estimates as an input for revealed preference analy-
sis. If we assume that households in the same time period and location face the same relative
prices, then the nonparametric Engel curves estimate themean (or average) expansion paths
for each price regime. e availability of these expansion paths greatly improves the non-
parametric bounds on various welfare related concepts and on the counterfactual demand
estimates that can be obtained using revealed preference techniques.
A remaining drawback of this approach is the way it deals with the issue of unobserved
heterogeneity. Given that the Engel curve estimates are obtained from a mean regression,
the methodology is subject to Lewbel (2001)’s critique: imposing revealed preference re-
strictions on the mean Engel curve estimates comes very close to imposing a representa-
tive consumer assumption. Given this, the approach does not fully address the individual
heterogeneity problem. Moreover, despite the fact that the procedure has the potential to
produce tight bounds on the ‘representative’ money metric utility and demand functions, it
does not give us any information concerning the distribution of these functions across the
heterogeneous population.
A useful extension of revealed preference theory that explicitly takes into account indi-
vidual heterogeneity is Stochastic Revealed Preference eory, initiated by McFadden and
Richter (1971) and Falmagne (1978).5 We refer to McFadden (2005) for an overview of the
literature. Stochastic revealed preference takes as input the entire distribution of demand be-
haviour over a heterogeneous population of households for a ĕnite number of budget sets.6
erefore, it is well suited to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. e literature
has put forward several rationality axioms (e.g. the Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference
5See also Block and Marschak (1959), McFadden (1975), Fishburn (1978), Cohen (1980), Barberá and Pat-
tanaik (1986), Fishburn and Falmagne (1989), Cohen and Falmagne (1990), Fishburn (1992) and Bandyopadhyay,
Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) for other contributions.
6A second interpretation of stochastic revealed preference theory is that the demand behaviour is generated by
a single household with a random utility function.
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and theWeak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference) that provide conditions on the dis-
tributions of choices such that a population of individuals is consistent with rational choice
theory, which postulates that individuals are preference maximisers. Although the litera-
ture is mainly theoretical, several recent papers have started to develop statistical tests to
verify whether the stochastic revealed preference axioms are satisĕed in reality. Hoderlein
and Stoye (2014) derive a statistical procedure to infer bounds on the fraction of the popu-
lation that violates the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference. Kitamura and Stoye
(2013) derive a statistical test to verify whether a population of heterogeneous households
satisĕes the Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference for a ĕnite collection of budget sets,
thereby explicitly taking into account that preferences are transitive. Finally, Kawaguchi
(2012) derives several procedures to test the validity of various axioms of revealed stochas-
tic preference. Interestingly, these studies ĕnd little evidence that the stochastic revealed
preference restrictions are violated. e main difference between these papers and ours is
the focus. While the existing contributions mainly deal with testing whether the axioms
imposed by the stochastic revealed preference literature hold, we are more interested in the
restrictions that the stochastic revealed preference axioms impose on the resulting distri-
bution of the money metric utility and demand functions. In the terminology of Varian
(1982); while above papers deal with testing the theory, we concentrate on the recovery of
the underlying structure of the model.
Another closely related paper is Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014). ese au-
thors focus on the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in a two goods setting. In particular,
they tackle the problem of individual unobserved heterogeneity using nonparametric quan-
tile demand estimates in combination with standard revealed preference tests (i.e. SARP).
Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) recently showed that in a two goods setting, imposing the usual
revealed preference axioms on the quantile demands is equivalent to imposing the Axiom
of Stochastic Revealed Preference on the entire data set.7 Moreover, the analysis of Blun-
7In a two-goods setting, the analysis is simpliĕed by the fact that in a two goods setting, the Weak Axiom of
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dell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2014) is based on (at least) two assumptions: the random
component is univariate and uniformly distributed and demand is invertible in the random
component. In our framework, we abstain from imposing these assumptions.
Contribution emain contribution of this paper is to derive nonparametric bounds on
the money metric utility functions and the demand functions without imposing any func-
tional structure on the household utility functions and the unobserved heterogeneity struc-
ture. As such, we avoid the problem that our results might be biased because of a wrong
functional speciĕcation or because the households do not satisfy the ‘representative agent’
condition. We establish our results by combining elementary stochastic revealed prefer-
ence theory and nonparametric estimation techniques. Our framework not only allows us
to derive bounds on the mean of the money metric utility and demand functions, but on
the entire distribution of these functions over the heterogeneous population. is provides
important additional information concerning the distribution of welfare and demand over
the population.
In order to obtain our results, we exploit theWeakAxiomofRevealedPreferences (WARP)
applied to a population of heterogeneous households. Although this axiom is weaker than
the revealed preference axioms that exploit transitivity (e.g. the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference), we nevertheless show that it is powerful enough to establish narrow bounds.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our results by applying it to the Consumer Expenditure
survey, a US cross sectional consumption data set.
In Section 5.2, we set out our framework andwe present the necessary notation, concepts
and deĕnitions for the remaining part of the paper. Section 5.3 establishes the theoretical
results that provide the bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function and
the demand functions. Section 5.4 contains our empirical application. We discuss estima-
tion, statistical inference and we present several results. Section 5.5 concludes and points
(Stochastic) Revealed Preference coincides with the Strong Axiom of (Stochastic) Revealed Preference. In other
words, imposing transitivity implies no additional testable implications, see Rose (1958).
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towards future research.
5.2 Notation and Deĕnitions
In this section, we set out our basic framework andwe introduce the notation and deĕnitions
that are needed in order to establish the results in the following sections.
Set up We consider an economy with a large (inĕnite) number of different households.
Each household, h, is endowed with a utility function which we denote by u(qh;ah;h).
is utility function depends on a (column) vector of consumed goods qh 2 Rn+, where n
is the number of goods, a vector of observable household speciĕc attributes ah, e.g. house-
hold composition, and a household speciĕc vector of unobservable attributes h, capturing
unobserved preference heterogeneity.8 In order to decide howmuch to consume, the house-
hold maximises its utility function subject to a household budget constraint,
q(p; xh;ah;h) = argmax
q
u(q;ah;h) s.t. pq  xh:
Here we denote by p 2 Rn++ a (row) vector of strictly positive prices and by xh 2 R++
the total household disposable income. We assume that the solution of this optimisation
problem gives a system of n demand functions qh = q(p; xh;ah;h)which depend on the
vector of prices, the income and the household observable and unobservable attributes. We
assume that the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and twice continuously differen-
tiable in q such that the demand functions are well deĕned and continuous in p and x. For
a price vector pt and an expenditure level x, we denote by (pt; x), the budget set consisting
of all bundles q such that ptq  x.
We treat  as a random vector. Using F (j) to denote the conditional distribution
8Different households have different utility functions because they have different values of the vectors ah and
h. In other words, it is as if each household has a household speciĕc utility function uh(:) = u(:;ah;h).
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of the unobserved preference attributes over the population of households, we impose the
following assumption.
Assumption 5.1. For all income levels x and prices p,
F (jp; x;a) = F (ja):
Assumption 5.1 requires that the vector of unobserved attributes is independent of prices
and income, conditional on all observable attributes. is ‘independence of budget sets’
condition is frequently used in the literature.9 If we interpret  as a vector of preference pa-
rameters, Assumption 5.1 encompasses the idea, common in consumer demand, that pref-
erences do not vary with prices and income. For notational convenience, we omit from now
the dependence on the observable attributes a, taking into account that every expression is
valid conditional on a particular value of this vector.
For the remaining part of the paper, it will bemore useful toworkwith the indirect utility
function v(p; xh;h) which gives the maximal utility that household h can obtain at prices
p and income xh. e indirect utility function is deĕned from the direct utility function by,
v(p; xh;h) = u(q(p; xh;h);h):
e indirect utility function is strictly increasing in the level of disposable income xh. If we
invert the indirect utility function v(p; xh;h), with respect to xh, we obtain the expendi-
ture function e(p; uh;h) which gives the minimal outlay for household h to reach utility
level uh at pricesp. Finally, using the expenditure function, we can deĕne themoneymetric
utility function,
(pv;pt; x
h;h)  e(pv; v(pt; xh;h);h):
9See for example, Lewbel (2001, equation 4), Hausman and Newey (2013, Assumption 1) and Blundell, Kris-
tensen, and Matzkin (2014, Assumption A.1).
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e money metric utility (pv;pt; xh;h) gives the minimal amount of expenditure that
household h needs at pricespv to be equally well of as it would have been when facing prices
pt and incomexh. emoneymetric utility lies at the basis ofmany cost of living indices. In
particular, given two price vectors pt and pv and some reference budget (p; x), the Konüs
cost of living index, describing the price increase from pt to pv , is deĕned as,
(pv;p; x;)
(pt;p; x;)
ere are two natural choices for p, namely pt and pv . Setting p equal to the initial price
pt gives the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index,
(pv;pt; x;)
x
:
If we set p equal to the ĕnal price vector pv , we obtain the Paasche-Konüs cost of living
index,
x
(pt;pv; x;)
;
Both indices are used to describe the increase in the cost necessary to maintain the same
living standard over time. eir distributions can easily be constructed provided that we
know the distribution of the money metric utility function. e money metric utility also
provides a cardinalisation of the utility function in the sense that for any reference price
vector p and for any two budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y):
(p;pt; x;
h)  (p;pv; y;h) () v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h):
As such, the difference in the money metric can be used as a measure for the welfare differ-
ence for two different budgets: if (pt; x) is the old budget and (pv; y) is the new one, then
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the welfare change can be measured by,
(p;pv; y;
h)  (p;pt; x;h)
Again, there are two obvious choices for the base price vector p, namely pt or pv . e ĕrst
leads to the equivalent variation,
EV = (pt;pv; y;
h)  x:
e second gives the compensating variation,
CV = y   (pv;pt; x;h):
Revealed preferences e analysis in the following sections depends on a very simple re-
vealed preference idea. Fix a household h and consider two distinct budgets (pt; x) and
(pv; y). If the household is utility maximising, then the following condition must hold,
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h): (5.1)
e reasoning behind the condition is simple, if x  ptq(pv; y;h), then the con-
sumed bundle q(pv; y;h) at the budget (pv; y) was also feasible when q(pt; x;h) was
chosen. Given that the household is utility maximising and that the budget sets are distinct,
it follows that u(q(pt; x;h);h) > u(q(pv; y;h);h), or equivalently, v(pt; x;h) >
v(pv; y;
h). It is easy to see that Condition (5.1) implies the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (Samuelson (1938)), which states that for any two distinct budgets (pt; x) and
(pv; y),
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then y < pvq(pt; x;h):
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5.3 Nonparametric bounds
In this section we show how to use basic revealed preference restrictions, in particular Con-
dition (5.1), together with information on the distribution of q(pt; x;) in order to estab-
lish bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility function and the mean demand
functions. As a ĕrst partial result, we demonstrate the possibility to obtain bounds on the
proportion of households in the economy that prefer a certain budget over another.
Observational assumptions We depart from the observational restrictions imposed by a
repeated cross sectional household consumption data set, where different households face
the same prices in each cross section. is gives us a data structure that consists of a lim-
ited set of different price regimes, and for each price regime a large number of consumption
bundles which are obtained from a random sample of households in the economy. We de-
note by T = f1; : : : ; jT jg, the set of cross sections. e price vector corresponding to cross
section t 2 T is denoted by pt.
Given that different households face distinct expenditure levels, it is possible to observe
(or estimate) the distribution of the random consumption bundles q(pt; x;) for every
cross sectional price vector pt; (t 2 T ) and for any level of expenditure x. Actually, none
of our results will require us to estimate the distributions of q(pt; x;) but it will be easier
to conceptualise things if we assume that these distributions are known. Estimation will
be discussed in Section 5.4. We assume that q(pt; x;) has a continuous density function
which is strictly positive on its domain.
Before we start, let us introduce one last piece of notation. Let A() represent a col-
lection of conditions involving the random vector  . We use the notation Pr(A()) as a
shorthand for the following probability,
Pr(A()) =
Z
1[A()]dF ();
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where 1[] is the binary indicator function which equals one if and only if the term between
brackets is true. Pr [A()] gives us the fraction of the households for which the statement
A(h) is true. Equivalently, it gives us the probability thatA(h)holds if we draw at random
a household h from the population.
Using this notation, we further require that there is sufficient variation of preferences
and demand such that for any two distinct budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y),
Pr [x = ptq(pv; y;)] = 0; and
Pr [v(pt; x;) = v(pv; y;)] = 0
is will allow us to freely interchange strict and weak inequalities within the functionPr[:].
5.3.1 Bounds on population preferences
In this section, we showhow to establish bounds on the proportion of populations that prefer
a certain budget (pt; x) over another budget (pv; y). Given the notation introduced above,
this proportion is given by,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] :
e following shows how to obtain bounds on this proportion using only information on the
distribution ofq(pv; y;). Consider the fraction of households forwhichx  ptq(pv; y;h).
rt;v(x; y) = Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]
We claim that this number provides a lower bound on the fraction of households that prefer
the budget (pt; x) over the budget (pv; y).
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Lemma 5.2.
rt;v(x; y)  Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] :
Proof. Given that all households are rational, we know from Condition (5.1) that for all
values h of the random vector:
If x  ptq(pv; y;h) then, v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h):
is means that 1

x  ptq(pv; y;h)
  1 v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h). Integrating
both sides over all values of the random vector  and using Assumption 5.1, we obtain,
Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]  Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] ;
() rt;v(x; y)  Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] :
Figure 5.1 illustrates the reasoning behind the lemma in the two goods case. e ĕgure
gives two budget sets (pv; y) and (pt; x). Given budget exhaustion, consumption within
each budget set is distributed over the respective budget lines. All consumption bundles on
the dashed segment capture the consumption bundles of the households that satisfy x >
ptq(pv; y;
h). As such, the mass of households that consume on this line segment is equal
to rt;v(x; y). What the lemma says is that this fraction is smaller than the proportion of
households for which v(pt; x;h)  v(pv; y;h). If this would not be the case, then there
would be an individual with v(pt; x;h) < v(pv; y;h) who consumes a bundle on the
dashed line segment when facing the budget (pv; y). However, this is impossible because
this consumption bundle is in the interior of the budget set (pt; x), which means, using
Condition (5.1), that v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h).
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of Lemma 5.2
Given above lemma, and the fact that,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] + Pr [v(pv; y;)  v(pt; x;)] = 1;
We immediately obtain the upper bound,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)]  1  rv;t(y; x):
For both lower and upper bounds to be valid, it should be the case that for all cross sections
t; v 2 T and all expenditure levels x; y,
rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x)  1:
is condition is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference applied
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to our setting (see Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999, 2002, 2004)). Hoderlein
and Stoye (2014) andKawaguchi (2012) recently developed (among other things) a statistical
test that veriĕes (for two given budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y)) whether this condition is satis-
ĕed. If we go back to Figure 5.1, the condition states that the sum of the mass of households
on the dashed line segment and the mass of households on the dotted line segment must be
smaller than 1. If this would not be the case, then there would be a household which is on
the dashed segment when the budget is (pv; y) and on the dotted segment when the budget
is equal to (pt; x). However, this implies that the household violates the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (i.e. x  ptq(pv; y;h) and y  pvq(pt; x;h)).
e condition also shows that our bounds on Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] will be
tighter, the closer rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is to one. In particular, if the sum equals one,
then Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)] will be exactly identiĕed.
ere are two potential issues that may arise. First of all, it may happen that rt;v(x; y)+
rv;t(y; x) is larger than one, in which case the bounds cannot be simultaneously satisĕed.
Alternatively, it may happen that rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is considerably smaller than one,
in which case the range may be too large to contain much useful information. Whether
one of those problems arises is obviously an empirical matter. However, it may nevertheless
be useful to discuss each of the issues a bit more in detail and to present some potential
solutions.
Incompatible bounds A ĕrst problem arises if,
rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) > 1;
for some budgets (pt; x) and (pv; y). In such case, we know that there is at least one house-
hold in the population that violates the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, hence, we
should reject rationality of all households in the population. In order to remedy the sit-
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uation, we see two possible solutions. A ĕrst solution is to allow a certain fraction of the
population to violate theWeakAxiomofRevealed Preference, i.e. a certain subset of the pop-
ulation is considered to be irrational. Applying this solution would amount to subtracting
a certain percentage, that equals the fraction of irrational households, from rt;v(x; y) and
rv;t(y; x), thereby widening the range of possible values for Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)].
A second solution is to relax the rationality constraints for all households simultane-
ously. In revealed preference theory, such relaxation is usually conceived by using a ‘good-
ness–of–ĕt’ measure. e basic idea here is that households may not ‘exactly’ pass the re-
vealed preference restrictions but are still very close to passing them. e way to proceed
is to consider an extended version of the basic revealed preference conditions that focuses
on nearly optimising behaviour rather than exactly optimising behaviour. See also Varian
(1990) for a general discussion on the usefulness of considering such nearly optimising be-
haviour in empirical revealed preference analysis. Here, we consider one way in which this
can be accomplished. We consider an adaptation of an early proposal of Afriat (1973) for
revealed preference tests in a non-stochastic setting to our speciĕc setting. In particular, we
capture optimisation error by a so-called Afriat index e 2 [0; 1]. For a given value of e, the
new rationality criterion adjusts condition (5.1) in the following way,
If e  x  ptq(pv; y;h) then v(pt; x;h) > v(pv; y;h):
When comparing the budget (pt; x) to another budget (pv; y) the Afriat index e reduces
the expenditure level x towards e  x. In other words, we now check whether behaviour is
rational while allowing the household to waste as much as (1  e) of the income x by mak-
ing irrational choices. In other words, we only require the household to prefer the bundle
q(pt; x;) over the bundleq(pv; y;) if the latter is in the budget (pt; ex). As such, wast-
ing/irrational behaviour can also be regarded as sub-optimising behaviour, we thus verify
whether behaviour is rational if we account for an optimisation error equal to (1  e).
5.3. NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS 193
Lowering the value of e will lead to a less strict test. Using this Afriat index, we can
construct the following probabilities,
ret (x; y) = Pr [e  x  ptq(pv; y;)] :
e number ret (x; y) is increasing in e and r0t;v(x; y) = 0. Given this, there will always be a
value of e 2 [0; 1] such that,
ret;v(x; y) + r
e
v;t(y; x)  1:
Notice that when e  x  ptq(pv; y;h) and e  y  pvq(pt; x;h), we have that
v(pt; x;
h) > v(pv; y;
h) and v(pt; x;h) < v(pv; y;h), an impossibility. Indeed,
given a ĕxed level of e, it is still possible to reject rationality. e analysis could then proceed
by replacing rt(x; y) by the numbers re

t (x; y)where e is the largest number for which the
above inequalities are consistent.
Uninformative bounds A second problem arises if rt;v(x; y) + rv;t(y; x) is considerably
below 1. In such cases, the range of values for Pr [v(pt; x;) > v(pv; y;)] will be too
wide and, therefore, not very informative. An approach to tighten the bounds is to impose a
stronger stochastic revealed preference condition. In the construction of rt;v(x; y) above, we
only used information concerning the two budget sets (pt; x) and (pv; y). In some cases,
however, it is possible to include information on additional budget sets to obtain tighter
bounds. One such tightening relies on the fact that for any three distinct numbers a, b and
c it is always the case that,
Pr(a > c)  Pr(a > b) + Pr(b > c)  1:
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e reasoning behind the inequality is simple. e probability that c is larger than b is given
by 1   Pr(b > c). As such, Pr(a > b > c) is bounded from below by Pr(a > b)   (1  
Pr(b > c)). e conclusion then follows from the fact that Pr(a > c)  Pr(a > b > c).
Rewriting above condition shows that it is equivalent to the famous triangle inequality.
Pr(b > c)  Pr(b > a) + Pr(a > c):
e triangle inequality has ĕrst been noted by Guilbaud (1953) and has been popularised
by Marschak (1960). e inequality is one of the key conditions in the literature on binary
probability systems. is literature, which is closely related to the literature on stochastic
revealed preference theory, tries to characterise all collections of binary probabilities over a
ĕnite set of alternatives that are induced by probability distributions over the family of linear
orders (preference relations) on this set.
If we apply above condition to our setting and use the previously established bounds, we
obtain that for all t; v; w 2 T and all incomes x; y; z,
Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)]
 Pr [v(pt; x;)  v(pw; z;)]
+ Pr [v(pw; z;)  v(pv; y;)]  1;
 rt;w(x; z) + rw;v(z; y)  1:
In cases where rt;v(x; y) is lower than
max
w;z
frt;w(x; z) + rw;v(z; y)  1g ;
this improves the lower bound on Pr[v(pt; x;)  v(pv; y;)]. Of course this tightening
of the bounds can be iterated until no further improvements are possible. If the range is still
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too wide, further tightening could still be obtained by using other, though more elaborate
‘binary probability system’ conditions. See, for example, Fishburn (1992) for an overview
of the various kinds of conditions that could be imposed. Although the triangle inequality
potentially improves the bounds, we found that for our application, it does not give any sig-
niĕcant improvements. emain reason is probably that, in our application, the bounds are
already quite narrow. Given this, we abstain from implementing it in the empirical analysis.
5.3.2 Bounds on money metric utility
In this section, we show how to use above results to bound the distribution of the money
metric utility function (pt;p0; x0; ) for some price vectors p0 and pt corresponding to
the prices of two cross sections in the data set and for a particular level of income x0. Let us
ĕrst focus on the upper bounds.
Upper bounds Let us ĕx a cross sectional price vector p0 and an income level x0. For any
number  2 (0; 1) and any cross section t 2 T , let ht() solve the following condition,
 = Pr [ht()  ptq(p0; x0;)] ;
= rt;0(ht(); x0)
e value of ht() corresponds to the th quantile of the random variable ptq(p0; x0;).
From Lemma 5.2, we know that  is lower than the fraction of the households that prefer
the budget (pt; ht()) over the budget (p0; x0).
  Pr [v(pt; ht();)  v(p0; x0;)] ;
= Pr [ht()  (pt;p0; x0;)] :
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e second line is obtained by inverting the indirect utility function v(pt; ht();) with
respect to its second argument. is can be done by the fact that the indirect utility function
is strictly increasing in income.
Let us denote bymt() the quantile function of (pt;p0; x0), i.e. for all  2 (0; 1)
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] = :
en, using our previously established result, we have that,
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] =   Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  ht()] ;
() mt()  ht():
e last line uses the assumption that the cumulative distribution function of(pt;p0; x;)
is strictly increasing on its support. is result shows thatht() is an upper boundon theth
quantile of the distribution of the money metric utility function. Using these upper bounds
on the quantiles; we can also derive an upper bound on the mean value of the money metric
utility. LetM be the mean of the function (pt;p0; x0;). We have that:
M =
Z 1
0
(pt;p0; x0;)dF ((pt;p0; x0;));
=
Z 1
0
mt()d 
Z 1
0
ht()d:
In practice, we compute the values of ht() for a ĕnite grid of values 0; 1; : : : ; n with
0 = 0 and N = 1.10 is allows us to approximate this upper bound by,
Z 1
0
ht()d 
NX
n=1
(n   n 1)ht(n):
10e upper bound ht(1) can be set to the minimal income such that the budget hyperplane for (pt; ht(1))
lies above the hyperplane for (p0; x0).
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e ĕner the grid, the better the approximation.
Lower bounds Weuse a similar procedure to compute lower bounds on the quantiles. For
 2 (0; 1), let `t() solve the following equality,
1   = Pr [x0  p0q(pt; `t();)] ;
= r0;t(x0; `t())
en,
1    Pr [v(p0; x0;)  v(pt; `t();)] ;
= Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  `t()] ;
= 1  Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  `t()]
As before, let mt() be the th quantile of the distribution of the money metric utility
(pt;p0; x0;). We have that,
Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  mt()] =   Pr [(pt;p0; x0;)  `t()] ;
() mt()  `t()
is shows that `t() is a lower bound for the quantilemt(). emeanM is then bounded
frombelowby the quantity
R 1
0
`t()dwhich can be approximated by
PN 1
n=0 `t(n)(n+1 
n).11
11e lower bound `t(0) can be set to the maximal income such that the hyperplane for the budget set
(pt; `t(0)) lies below the hyperplane for (p0; x0).
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5.3.3 Bounds on demand correspondences
In this section, we show how to adapt above framework in order to establish bounds on
the quantiles of the demand functions for unobserved, counterfactual, price regimesp0 and
expenditure levels x0, i.e. p0 does not necessarily correspond to a price vector of a certain
cross section.
Consider a function f : Rn+ ! R : q 7! f(q). In this section, we will provide upper
bounds on the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable f(q(p0; x0;)). e
function f(:) encompasses various interesting measures. For example, if we want to bound
the expenditure share on one of the goods, we can use the function f(q) = 1x0 p0;jqj , where
p0;j is the price of good j in vector p0, qj is the quantity of good j in vector q and x0 is the
expenditure level.
e focus on upper bounds is not restrictive given that we can always use information
on upper bounds to construct lower bounds. In order to see this, let  m(1   ) be the
(1  )th quantile of the variable f(q(p0; x0;)) and let g(1  ) be its upper bound.
We then have that,
1   =
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   m(1  )] dF ();

Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   g(1  )] dF ();
()   1 
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;))   g(1  )] dF ();
=
Z
1 [ f(q(p0; x0;)) >  g(1  )] dF ();
=
Z
1 [f(q(p0; x0;))  g(1  )] dF ():
As such, we see that g(1 ) provides a lower bound on the th quantile of f(q(p0; x0;)).
For example, we can establish a lower bound on the th quantile of f(q) = 1x0 p0;jqj by
constructing an upper bound on the (1 )th quantile of  1x0 p0;jqj(=
P
i 6=j
1
x0
p0;iqi 1).
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For every cross section t, we previously deĕned the value `t(1   ) that satisĕed the
following condition,
 = Pr [x0  p0q(pt; `t(1  );)] ;
= r0;t(x0; `t(1  )):
e value of `t(1   ) can be obtained using information on x0, p0 and the distribution
of q(pt; x;) alone, which we assumed to be known. For the next step, we use the Weak
Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference, which requires that,
rt;0(`t(1  ); x0) + r0;t(x0; `t(1  ))  1;
() r0;t(x0; `t(1  ))  1  rt;0(`t(1  ); x0):
Letm()be theth quantile of the distribution function of the randomvariable f(q(p0; x0;)).
We have that,
Pr [f(q(p0; x0;)  m()] =  = r0;t(x0; `t(1  ));
 1  rt;0(`t(1  ); x0);
= Pr [`t(1  )  ptq(p0; x0;)]
 Pr
264 f(q(p0; x0;))  maxq f(q)
s.t `t(1  )  ptq and p0q = x0
375
e last inequality follows from the fact that whenever `t(1   )  ptq(p0; x0;)
holds, then f(q(p0; x0;))  maxq f(q) s.t `t(1   )  ptq and p0q = x0 must also
hold. In order to see this, assume on the contrary that f(q(p0; x0;)) is larger than f(q) for
all vectors qwhere p0q = x0 and `t(1 )  ptq. en, given that p0q(p0; x0;) = x0,
it must be that `t(1  ) > ptq(p0; x0;), a contradiction.
200 5.3. NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS
Above result shows that,
m()  max
q
f(q) s.t `t(1  )  ptq and p0q = x0;
for all cross sections t. In practice, we compute this right hand side for every cross section
t and then take the lowest value across all cross sections as the upper bound. If f is a linear
function, then the right hand side is a simple linear programming problem which can be
solved efficiently.
e construction of the bounds in the simple two goods setting is illustrated in Figure
5.2. ere are three budget lines corresponding to (p0; x0); (pt; `t(1 )) and (pv; `v()).
e incomes `t(1 ) and `v() are chosen such that themass of households on the dashed
line segment (where x0 > p0q(pt; `t(1  );)) is equal to  and the mass of households
on the dash-dotted line segment (where x0 > p0q(pv; `v();)) is equal to (1  ).
e quantity q2 is the maximum value of good 2 that corresponds to a bundle on the
budget (p0; x0) (where p0q = x0) and `t(1  )  ptq. From the result above, we know
that this value gives an upper bound on the th quantile of the distribution of q2(p0; x0;).
Given that there are only two goods, this upper bound immediately gives a lower bound on
the (1  )th quantile of q1(p0; x0;), given by q1. Similarly, q1 gives an upper bound on
the (1  )th quantile of q1(p0; x0;), while q2 gives a lower bound on the th quantile of
q2(p0; x0;). As such, the th quantile of q2(p0; x0;) is bounded by the quantities q2 and
q
2
. Given these bounds on the quantiles of the demand functions, we can compute bounds
on the mean of the demand function by using a similar procedure as for the money metric
utility function.
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.
good 2
good 1
(pt; `t(1  ))
(pv ; `v())
(p0; x0)

1  
q2
q
2
q1 q1
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the construction of the bounds
5.4 Application
In this section, we discuss the empirical implementation of the theoretical bounds that were
established in the previous section. We ĕrst present our estimation procedure for the mea-
sures rt;v(x; y), `t() and ht(). Next, we discuss a modiĕcation of the estimator with
better ĕnite sample properties and we show how we control for observed heterogeneity and
endogeneity of the total expenditures. We also very brieĘy discuss the issue of statistical
inference on bounds. Finally, we present some empirical results.
5.4.1 Estimation procedure
e construction of the bounds in the previous section assumed that we know the distri-
bution of the variables q(pt; x;) for every cross sectional price pt and every income level
x. Given these distributions it is fairly straightforward to obtain the quantities rt;v(x; y) =
Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)], which form the main building blocks for our bounds. In practice,
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however, these probabilities need to be estimated. We propose a kernel estimator. For the
estimation of the numbers `t() and ht()which are used to bound the money metric util-
ity functions and the demand functions we propose a plug-in estimator.
Consider the vth cross section, v 2 T . Assume that this cross section contains a sample
of n observed household demand bundles fqv;igin where i corresponds to a particular
observation. We denote by fxv;igin the corresponding expenditure levels (xv;i = pvqv;i).
We assume that the sample fqv;igin is i.i.d drawn from the random vector qv . We denote
by xv the random variable pvqv . We denote by '(:) the distribution function of xv .
Consider the value rt;v(x; y) = Pr [x  ptq(pv; y;)]. is value corresponds to the
cdf of the random variable ptqv , conditional on the value xv = y,
rt;v(x; y) =
Z
1 [x  ptq(pv; y;)] dF ();
=
Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y);
where F (qvjxv = y) is the conditional cdf of qv given the level of expenditure xv = y.
is expression is equal to the conditional mean of the indicator function 1 [x  ptqv],
Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y) = E f1 [x  ptqv  0] jxv = yg  g(ln(y)):
We can express this conditional mean as,
1 [x  ptqv;i  0] = g(ln(xv;i)) + "v;i;
where E("v;ijxv = y) = 0 for all values of y. e quantity of interest is given by the value
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of g(ln(y)). A straightforward Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator is given by,
r^t;v(x; y) =
1
nh
Pn
i=1 1 [x  ptqv;i] k

ln(xv;i) ln(y)
h

1
nh
Pn
i=1 k

ln(xv;i) ln(y)
h
 :
whereh is the bandwidth andk (:) is a symmetric kernel function that satisĕes
R
k(v)dv = 1
and
R
vk(v)dv = 0.12 We take the log of expenditure as metric.
If for n!1, h! 0 and nh!1, then the estimator r^t;v(x; y) consistently estimates
rt;v(x; y). If in addition (i) '(y) > 0, (ii) rt;v(x; y) 2 (0; 1), (iii) the functions '(:) and
rt;v(:; :) are sufficiently smooth13 and (iv) nh7 ! 0 then the estimator r^t;v(x; y) has the
following asymptotic distribution (see, for example Li and Racine (2007)).
p
nh
1
V (x; y)1=2
[r^t;v(x; y)  rt;v(x; y) B(x; y)]! N(0; 1):
where
B(x; y) = h22

1
2
@2rt;v(x; y)
@y2
+
@rt;v(x; y)
@y
@'(y)
@y
1
'(y)

is the asymptotic bias and
V (x; y) = rt;v(x; y) [1  rt;v(x; y)]='(y)
is the asymptotic variance. Here 2 =
R
v2k(v)dv and  =
R
k(v)2dv. As usual with
nonparametric kernel estimators, the bias,B(y; x), does not disappear asymptotically when
using the optimal bandwidth h = O(n1=5). One possible solution is to undersmooth.
12In practice, we use the Gaussian kernel.
13e exact condition is that '(y) and rt;v(x; y) have continuous second order derivatives with respect to y.
204 5.4. APPLICATION
e estimates for ht() and `t() are computed as the solution to the following conditions,
 = r^t;0(h^t(); x0);
1   = r^0;t(x0; ^`t()):
is is done using standard binary search algorithms. In order for this algorithm to work,
we assume that r^0;t(x0; ^`t()) is decreasing in ^`t(). is assumption is (asymptotically)
valid if all goods are normal (i.e. all demand functions are increasing in income).14
5.4.2 Adjustments
Wemake several adjustments to the estimator r^t;v(x; y) presented above.
Boundary problems eestimator r^t;v(x; y) has the undesirable property that itmay give
an estimate strictly between zero and one even when the budget sets (pt; xt) and (pv; xv)
do not intersect. In order to see this, assume that x > ptq for all q for which pvq = y,
i.e. the budget set deĕned by price income (pt; x) lies strictly above the budget deĕned by
(pv; y). In this setting, it may still be the case that the indicator function 1 [x  ptQi;v]
is zero for some observations i. From this, it follows that the kernel estimator will also be
strictly below one although the true value of t;v(x; y) is clearly equal to one.
In order to avoid this boundary problem, we reformulate the probability to be estimated
in the following way,
Z
1 [x  ptqv] dF (qvjxv = y) =
Z
1 [xpvsv  ptysv] dF (svjxv = y);
=
Z
1 [(xpv   ypt) sv  0] dF (svjxv = y);
Where sv is the random vector of normalised consumption, sv = qv=xv , and we used
14See also Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003) for a similar assumption.
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the identity pvsv = 1 and the fact that, conditional on xv = y, qv = ysv . If we denote
the realisations of sv by sv;i = qv;i=xv;i, we can estimate this using the Nadaraya-Watson
estimator,
1
nh
Pn
i=1 1 [(xpv   ypt) sv;i  0] k

ln(xv;i) ln(y)
h

1
nh
Pn
i=1 k

ln(xv;i) ln(y)
h
 :
Although this estimator could still over- or underestimate the true proportion slightly, the
bias should be considerably less. Also, the estimator has the advantage that it is either zero
or one if the two budget lines do not intersect. In order to see this, assume that the two
budgets do not intersect, i.e. there is no bundle q such that
ptq = x and,
pvq = y
Now, assume that the estimator is somewhere strictly between zero and one. is means
that there exist observations i and j such that:
(xpv   ypt) sv;i < 0 and,
(xpv   ypt) sv;j  0
As both le hand sides are continuous functions of the shares vector, we can use the inter-
mediate value function and show the existence of a vector s such that:
(xpv   ypt) s = 0;
() pv
y
s =
pt
x
s
If we deĕne  = ypvs =
x
pts
, and let ~q = s, we have that pt~q = x and pv~q = y, a
contradiction.
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Semiparametric adjustment We also adjust the kernel estimator r^t;v(x; y) by including
a semi-parametric speciĕcation. We have two reasons to do this. First of all, given the data
limitations, we would like to allow our estimator to depend on the vector of observed covari-
ates, a, without fully conditioning on each of its values. Next, we need to take into account
the fact that total expenditures are probably endogenous. We follow Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2008), and consider the following semiparametric modiĕcation,
1 [(xpt   ypv) sv;i  0] = g(ln(xv;i)  (a0v;i)) + a0v;i + "v;i;
where av;i be the observed household composition in cross section v for household i. e
function (a0v;i) can be interpreted as the log of a general equivalence scale for the house-
hold, and a0v;i documents the way in which observable demographic differences across
households impact on the le hand side. Similar to Blundell et al. (2008) we use an esti-
mate of the general equivalence scale (a0v;i) taken from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) scales. e semiparametric extension used in this
chapter corresponds to the shape invariant speciĕcation considered by Härdle and Jerison
(1988); Härdle and Marron (1990) and Pinske and Robinson (1995). is speciĕcation al-
lows to pool nonparametric estimates of regression curves (e.g. kernel estimates) associated
with different households without overly restricting the shape of the curves.
In order to control for the endogeneity of the expenditure level xv , Blundell, Browning,
and Crawford (2008) suggest to use a control function approach based on the two step semi-
parametric estimator (this is a linearised version of the procedure set out by Newey, Powell,
and Vella (1999)). In a ĕrst step, we obtain the residuals from a regression of the log of total
expenditure on all exogenous variables in the model and on an excluded instrument. We
take the log of (equivalent) labour income as an instrument. In the second step, we conduct
a semiparametric regression of 1 [(xpt   ypv)sv;i  0] on g(ln(xv;i)   (a0v;i)), a0v;i
and ^v;i, where ^v;i are the residuals from the ĕrst stage regression.
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5.4.3 Inference on bounds
emethodology outlined in Section 5.3 provides nonparametric bounds on various param-
eters of interest (e.g. the quantiles of the money metric utility). In the previous section, we
have also shown how these bounds can be consistently estimated. However, given that the
bounds are based on ĕnite sample estimates, we are confronted with the issue of statistical
inference, in particular, the construction of conĕdence intervals. Given that our estimates
only provide bounds, this problem ĕts in the literature that deals with the construction of
conĕdence intervals for partially identiĕed estimators. We refer to the several recent pa-
pers by Imbens and Manski (2004); Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007); Stoye (2009);
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) and in particular to the recent paper of Hoderlein
and Stoye (2014) who consider the problem of constructing conĕdence intervals in a setting
which is similar to ours.
Given that the main contribution of this study is not on statistical inference, we will only
brieĘy discuss this issue and instead refer to abovementioned papers formore details on how
to construct conĕdence intervals in our setting. As an example of how such construction
could look like, consider the case of the quantilemt() which gives the th quantile of the
money metric utility (pt; p0; x0;). Using the results above, we know that
mt() 2 0 = [`t();ht()]
In practice, however, we only have estimates ^`t() and h^t(). ere are two kinds of inter-
vals that can be constructed. e ĕrst is a conĕdence interval for the interval 0, i.e. a set
CI such that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (0  CI) = :
A second kind of interval, CIm , constructs an interval for the quantilemt() itself in the
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sense that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CIm ) = :
One important result from the literature (see, for example, Imbens and Manski (2004)) is
that,
lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CI)  lim
nh!1
Pr (mt() 2 CIm ) = 
As such, any conĕdence set for the interval,0, is also a (conservative) conĕdence interval
for the parametermt(). An intervalCI can be constructed in the followingway, provided
that the estimates of the upper and lower bounds are asymptotically normally distributed
with zero asymptotic bias.15 Let [^`t()  c^lpnh ; ^`t()+
c blp
nh
] be an asymptotic%conĕdence
interval for the lower bound `t() and let [h^t()  cchpnh ; h^t()+ cchpnh ] be an asymptotic%
conĕdence interval for the upper bound ht(), where bl andch are consistent estimates of
the standard errors of the asymptotic distribution of the lower and upper bound and where
c is chosen such that,
(c)  ( c) = ;
where(:) is the standard normal probability distribution. en, using a simple Bonferroni
argument, we know that,

^`
t()  c blp
nh
; h^t() +
cchp
nh

;
is a conservative asymptotic % conĕdence interval for0.
Finally, in order to construct conĕdence intervals for the estimates of the bounds, we
notice that the estimates of our bounds are obtained as the maximum or minimum of a
number of estimators that are computed using samples from different cross sections. It
can be shown that in such cases, the usual bootstrap procedure is not valid (see Andrews
(2000) for similar type of examples). In order to obtain asymptotic valid inference we use
15For kernel estimators, we could get the bias to converge to zero by undersmoothing.
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the subsampling procedure which is presented and discussed in detail by Politis, Romano,
andWolf (1999). Subsampling is similar to bootstrap but the samples taken are smaller and
draws are obtained without replacement. e subsampling procedure is valid under very
weak assumptions, in particular for extrema estimators such as ours.
5.4.4 Data Description
We illustrate our approach by using a data sample from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), a repeated cross section. We use data on consumption decisions by US households
from 1994 to 2007 (14 years). It is important to note that the consumer expenditures are
derived from the diary survey (and not from the interview data). e diary data seem well-
suited for (static) demand analysis. First of all, given that we focus on non-durable con-
sumption, which is customary in static demand analysis, information on the purchase of
big, durable items is unnecessary. Second, for non-durable commodities, the diary survey
invites respondents to indicate their consumption in a two-week period. Because this period
is relatively short, respondents should be able to recall their expenditures. We follow Blun-
dell et al. (2008) by focusing our attention to three broad expenditure categories, namely,
food, other non-durables and services.16 As the diary survey reports expenditures on a two-
week basis, we convert these to yearly equivalents. Converting two-week expenditures to
yearly data poses an important problem of seasonality. erefore, we deseasonalise using a
dummy regression approach. Speciĕcally, the expenditures on each category (reported for
two weeks) are regressed on month dummies. Residuals from this regression (which can
be interpreted as the variation in expenditures which can not be explained by seasonality
or by months) are added to the mean expenditures for each category in order to construct
deseasonalised expenditures. Observations with negative total expenditures are dropped.
As mentioned above, we also take into account that variation in expenditures can be driven
by the household composition, e.g. the number of adults or the number of kids living in
16See Appendix 5.A for a list of the different goods used for the construction of the aggregates.
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the family. erefore, we deĘate total expenditures as well as total income by an OECD
equivalence scale.
For the empirical analysis, we restrict attention to (i) households who have completed
the two-week diary, (ii) households who are not living in student housing, (iii) households
who are vehicle owners (to include fuel expenses), (iv) households where both members
work at least 17 hours, (v) households in which both members are not self-employed, (vi)
households in which the age of the reference person is at least 21 and ĕnally we restrict at-
tention to (vii) households that consist of a husband, a wife and possibly children. As a ĕnal
step we also remove some outlier observations.17 On average, we are le with 2163 obser-
vations per cross-section with a minimum of 1775 observations in 1994 and a maximum of
2379 observations in 2007. e upper panel in Figure 5.3 plots the evolution of the mean
consumption shares of the three goods over the considered periods. e lower panel plots
the evolution of prices obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, Figure 5.4 sets
out the evolution of different percentiles of the distribution of total expenditures across all
years.
5.4.5 Empirical results
In this section, we provide the results of several exercises. Due to limited space, we need to
restrict our analysis to some particular base years and some reference income levels. Addi-
tional results are available from the authors upon request.
Bounds on themean cost of living Let us ĕrst showhowour bounds performwith respect
to the computation of the mean of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index,
Z
(pt;p0; x0;)
x0
dF () =
1
x0
Z
(pt;p0; x0;)dF ():
17In particular, we removed observations for which rescaled total expenditures or expenditure shares are not
within 3 standard deviations from the mean and observations for which rescaled total expenditures are among the
5 per cent lowest or 5 per cent highest expenditures or for which the expenditure shares on are close to 0.
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Figure 5.3: Evolution of average consumption shares and prices
e Laspeyres-Konüs price index measures the income that one would need, relative to the
income in period 0, in order to be equally well off as in the initial period. We take 1994 as
the reference year whichmeans thatp0 corresponds to the price vector in the year 1994. We
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Figure 5.4: Evolution of 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of total expenditures
choose x0 as the (OECD equivalence scale deĘated) median expenditure level in 1994. e
bounds on the cost of living that we obtain using our procedure are given in the last column
of Table 5.1. e table also reports values for various other prices indices like the Laspeyres
(L), the Paasche (P) and the Tornqvist price index (T).18 We also provide information on
three other nonparametric bounds. e ĕrst are the Lerner bounds which are obtained from
the fact that:
min
j

pt;j
p0;j

 (pt;p0; x0)
x0
 max
j

pt;j
p0;j

:
ebounds byPollak (1971) improve upon this by replacing the upper boundby the Laspeyres
price index.
min
j

pt;j
p0;j

 (pt;p0; x0)
x0
 ptq0
x0
:
18ese are computed on the basis of nonparametric Engel curve estimates.
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e second to last column gives the bounds that are obtained by using the procedure set out
by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003). is method ĕrst estimates nonparametric
Engel curves and subsequently uses these estimates in combination with revealed prefer-
ence restrictions to establish nonparametric bounds. We would like to emphasise that there
is a clear conceptual difference between the bounds of Blundell, Browning, and Crawford
(2003) (and Pollak), and ours. eir procedure provides bounds on the cost of living that
correspond to some kind of ‘representative individual’ whose demand functions equal the
mean demand functions over the population. Our bounds, on the other hand, correspond
to bounds on the mean cost of living over all households within the population. Although
it is reassuring to see that both procedures give very similar results, this does not have to be
the case in general.
Price indices Nonparametric Bounds
year L P T Lerner Pollak BBC bounds
1994 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000, 1.0000] [1.0000 1.0000]
1995 1.0275 1.0271 1.0273 [1.0086, 1.0357] [1.0086, 1.0275] [1.0250, 1.0275] [1.0249 1.0292]
1996 1.0604 1.0596 1.0600 [1.0358, 1.0708] [1.0358, 1.0604] [1.0591, 1.0604] [1.0574 1.0621]
1997 1.0860 1.0844 1.0852 [1.0483, 1.1019] [1.0483, 1.0860] [1.0830, 1.0860] [1.0819 1.0875]
1998 1.0972 1.0929 1.0951 [1.0327, 1.1236] [1.0327, 1.0972] [1.0932, 1.0972] [1.0900 1.0983]
1999 1.1242 1.1212 1.1227 [1.0709, 1.1470] [1.0709, 1.1242] [1.1205, 1.1242] [1.1180 1.1256]
2000 1.1716 1.1712 1.1714 [1.1480, 1.1886] [1.1480, 1.1716] [1.1689, 1.1716] [1.1692 1.1739]
2001 1.2066 1.2048 1.2057 [1.1456, 1.2437] [1.1456, 1.2066] [1.2025, 1.2066] [1.2025 1.2086]
2002 1.2206 1.2154 1.2181 [1.1301, 1.2742] [1.1301, 1.2206] [1.2143, 1.2201] [1.2122 1.2222]
2003 1.2618 1.2562 1.2591 [1.1659, 1.3263] [1.1659, 1.2618] [1.2556, 1.2607] [1.2534 1.2636]
2004 1.3094 1.3066 1.3080 [1.2243, 1.3679] [1.2243, 1.3094] [1.3048, 1.3089] [1.3042 1.3115]
2005 1.3666 1.3698 1.3682 [1.3115, 1.4247] [1.3115, 1.3666] [1.3648, 1.3665] [1.3658 1.3706]
2006 1.4181 1.4206 1.4194 [1.3400, 1.4839] [1.3400, 1.4184] [1.4157, 1.4178] [1.4164 1.4202]
2007 1.4655 1.4679 1.4667 [1.3966, 1.5276] [1.3966, 1.4655] [1.4633, 1.4655] [1.4644 1.4691]
Table 5.1: Bounds on the mean Laspeyres Konüs cost of living index
Distribution of the cost-of-living Let us now have a look at the bounds on the quantiles
of this cost of living index over the population. Figure 5.5 provides bounds on the quantiles
of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index, for the 10th (red), 50th (black) and 90th (blue)
percentile. Upper and lower bounds on a particular quantile are presented by the same color.
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Again the base year is 1994 and the reference income is given by the median expenditure
level in this year. In general, we see that the bounds on the quantiles are quite narrow. e
width of the distribution for a particular year depends to a large extent on the difference in
relative slopes between the base year (p0=x0) and the evaluation year (pt=xt). e closer
the relative prices, the narrower the difference between the largest and smallest cost of living
for the particular year. e reason is that the distribution is naturally bounded between the
minimum and maximum values of y=x0 for which the budget hyperplanes corresponding
to (pt; y) and (p0; x0) do not intersect. We see that the distribution is narrow in the year
2000 and the widest in the year 2002 giving differences in cost of living up to more than 5
percentage points between the 10th and 90th percentile. One noticeable feature about the
ĕgure is that there seems to be a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the population
although the width of the distribution remains more or less constant for the latter 5 years.
Finally, we present conĕdence intervals (from subsampling) for the results in Figure 5.5 (and
for the 30th and 70th percentile) in Appendix 5.B.
Figure 5.6 gives another illustration of the kind of questions that can be answered given
the framework in this paper. e ĕgure gives bounds on the average of the Laspeyres-Konüs
cost of living for different starting quantiles,
Z
(pt;p0; x0;i;)
x0;i
dF ():
Here, x0;i represents the income at the ith quantile of the income distribution in 1994, p0
are the prices in 1994 and pt is the price vector for 2007. e ĕgure gives an idea of the
average price increase (over the heterogeneous population) for households starting at dif-
ferent quantiles of the income distribution in 1994. On average one sees an increase over
the quantiles, which means that (on average) the cost of living for households starting at the
lower end of the income distribution in 1994 was lower than for household starting at the
higher end of the income distribution. In other words, the households that started at the
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the cost of living
lower end of the income distribution had (on average) a lower increase in the cost of living.
Also, notice that the upper bound for the lowest quantile is below the lower bound for the
upper quantile. is shows that the average cost of living values are signiĕcantly different
(although the numbers are very close to each other in absolute terms).
Distributionof the compensating variation Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of the com-
pensating variation,
xt   (pt;p0; x0;)
Here, x0 is taken to be the median income in 2000 and xt is the median income in cross
section t. is compensating variation gives the difference between the median income in
year t and the minimum income that would be necessary in order to obtain the welfare level
at budget (p0; x0). Values above zero indicate a welfare gain for a household at the median
income in year t compared to a household at the median income in year 1994. We see that
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Figure 5.6: Change in mean cost of living 1994-2007 for different starting quantiles of in-
come
all quantiles are below zero for the years 1994-1999 and 2001 and quantiles are above zero
for the years 2005-2007. is corresponds to the signiĕcant increase in total expenditures
aer 2004, presented in Figure 5.4.
Once again, there seems to be quite a lot of heterogeneity present in the population. For
many years, the range between the 10th and 90th percentile is around $400 per year which
is substantial.
Distribution of demand As a last exercise, let us have a look at the bounds on the de-
manded consumption shares for counterfactual price regimes. To keep focus, we restrict
ourselves to the computation of bounds for the own price effect for the food aggregate. We
construct normalised prices by dividing all cross sectional prices by the median income in
the corresponding year, and we take the mean of these normalised prices as a reference
point. e reference income level x0 is set at 1. We let the price for food range from 0.95
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of compensating variation, baseyear 2000
times its reference level to 1.05 times its reference level. e prices of all others goods are
held constant. Figure 5.8 presents the results for three quantiles, the 10th (in red), the me-
dian (in black) and the 90th (in blue). Again we see a lot of heterogeneity in the demand
curves over the population although the price responses look very similar across the three
quantiles. Interestingly, the bounds seem to allow for Cobb Douglas preferences. It is possi-
ble to construct a curve of expenditure shares (in function of prices) which is relatively Ęat,
indicating that expenditure shares are independent of prices.
As is customary in revealed preference analysis, it is only possible to construct bounds
on the counterfactual demands for prices in the convex support of the observed prices. is
explains the large and simultaneous drop of all lowerbounds at the 3% price increase.
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Figure 5.8: Bounds on the demand shares
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we used elementary revealed preference techniques together with nonpara-
metric estimation techniques in order to bound the distribution of the money metric utility
and the demand functions over a population of heterogeneous households. Our method-
ology has two attractive features. First of all, the results are entirely nonparametric which
means that they are not dependent on any functional form imposed on the underlying util-
ity functions. Second, we impose minimal conditions on the structure of the individual,
unobserved heterogeneity. When we apply our techniques to data from the US consumer
expenditure survey, we ĕnd that our method generates narrow and informative bounds on
the quantiles of the money metric utility function. Our results also demonstrate that in-
dividual heterogeneity creates considerable variation in welfare between households in the
population (conditional on the same level of expenditure). We also demonstrate how our re-
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sults can be used to obtain informative bounds on the distribution of the demand functions
in counterfactual price-income situations.
ere are several avenues for followup research. First of all, we only brieĘy touched upon
the highly relevant topic of statistical inference. However, given that our data is obtained
from a random sample, measurement error and small sample biases inĘuence our bounds,
and statistical inference becomes relevant. Next, it would be interesting to see how our
methodology extends to discrete choice settings. One way to incorporate discrete choices
would be to consider a setting where individuals make discrete choices in addition to con-
tinuous choices. Many of the results from this paper readily extend to such setting. Alterna-
tively one could imagine a setting where all choices are discrete (seeManski (2007) and Sher,
il Kim, Fox, and Bajari (2011) for a theoretical account of stochastic revealed preferences re-
covery in such setting). It would be interesting to look how the methodology developed
in this paper transfers to such discrete choice setting. Finally, it would be interesting to
see how other (more strict) stochastic revealed preference axioms that explicitly take into
account transitivity may even further improve our bounds.
5.A Construction of aggregates
Food is an aggregate of cereals, bakery products, beef, pork, poultry, seafood, other meat,
eggs, milk products, other dairy products, fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, processed fruit, pro-
cessed vegetables, sweets, fat and oils, non-alcoholic beverages, prepared food, snacks and
condiments.
Other non-durables contain expenditures on alcohol consumption, tobacco, clothes (for
all household members), footwear, reading material, stationery, school supplies, cleaning
products, garden supplies, household textile, non-durable housewares, medical products,
personal care products, audio-visual equipment, recreational goods, pet goods and vehicle
expenses.
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Services include utilities, media bills, repair services, insurance, postal services, gaso-
line, vehicle expenses (services), public transportation, medical care services, personal care
services, recreational services, home services, rental services, membership fees, school fees,
other fees, pet services and care services.
5.B Conĕdence intervals
To compute the Bonferroni intervals we followed a subsampling procedure (in line with
Politis, Romano, and Wolf (1999)). Subsampling is similar to the bootstrap procedure but
the samples are smaller and the draws are obtained without replacement. Consider a dataset
of size n and an estimator g^n which converges at a rate such that n(g^   g) converges to a
non-degenerate asymptotic distribution for n ! 1. In our case, n =
p
nhn where hn
is the bandwidth. e subsampling procedure proceeds by taking (without replacement)
subsamples of sizem and computing the associated estimator gm. en, under very weak
conditions, it can be shown that form ! 1, m=n ! 0 and m=n ! 0 as n ! 1, the
statistic m(g   g^) converges to the same asymptotic distribution as n(g^   g).
We apply the subsampling approach to the distribution of the (Laspeyres-Konüs) cost of
living index using 999 subsamples of sizem  pn. Table 5.2 presents our original estimates
of upper and lower bounds on the quantiles of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index and
the corresponding asymptotic 95% conĕdence intervals for the setting in Figure 5.5.
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year 10th percentile 30th percentile 50th percentile 70th percentile 90th percentile
bounds 1994 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
CI 1994 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
bounds 1995 1:019 1:023 1:023 1:028 1:025 1:030 1:028 1:032 1:030 1:034
CI 1995 1:018 1:025 1:022 1:029 1:025 1:031 1:027 1:033 1:030 1:035
bounds 1996 1:051 1:055 1:055 1:061 1:058 1:063 1:061 1:066 1:064 1:069
CI 1996 1:049 1:056 1:054 1:061 1:058 1:064 1:060 1:066 1:063 1:069
bounds 1997 1:070 1:076 1:078 1:085 1:083 1:090 1:088 1:093 1:093 1:097
CI 1997 1:068 1:078 1:077 1:086 1:082 1:091 1:087 1:094 1:092 1:098
bounds 1998 1:070 1:079 1:085 1:094 1:093 1:102 1:100 1:108 1:109 1:116
CI 1998 1:066 1:082 1:081 1:096 1:091 1:103 1:098 1:110 1:107 1:117
bounds 1999 1:103 1:109 1:113 1:122 1:120 1:128 1:127 1:134 1:134 1:139
CI 1999 1:100 1:112 1:111 1:124 1:118 1:130 1:126 1:135 1:133 1:141
bounds 2000 1:159 1:165 1:165 1:170 1:169 1:175 1:173 1:178 1:178 1:182
CI 2000 1:158 1:166 1:164 1:171 1:168 1:176 1:172 1:179 1:177 1:183
bounds 2001 1:180 1:187 1:193 1:202 1:204 1:211 1:213 1:219 1:223 1:227
CI 2001 1:177 1:190 1:191 1:204 1:201 1:213 1:210 1:220 1:221 1:229
bounds 2002 1:180 1:190 1:199 1:213 1:214 1:226 1:226 1:237 1:245 1:250
CI 2002 1:177 1:195 1:195 1:216 1:211 1:229 1:223 1:239 1:241 1:252
bounds 2003 1:216 1:228 1:240 1:252 1:254 1:268 1:268 1:280 1:290 1:295
CI 2003 1:212 1:232 1:237 1:255 1:252 1:270 1:265 1:282 1:286 1:297
bounds 2004 1:273 1:279 1:292 1:300 1:304 1:315 1:317 1:326 1:335 1:340
CI 2004 1:270 1:283 1:289 1:304 1:302 1:317 1:315 1:328 1:332 1:343
bounds 2005 1:336 1:340 1:354 1:358 1:366 1:371 1:378 1:382 1:393 1:395
CI 2005 1:333 1:343 1:351 1:361 1:363 1:373 1:375 1:384 1:390 1:397
bounds 2006 1:385 1:389 1:403 1:408 1:417 1:422 1:431 1:435 1:443 1:449
CI 2006 1:381 1:393 1:400 1:411 1:414 1:425 1:427 1:437 1:440 1:452
bounds 2007 1:433 1:439 1:452 1:457 1:464 1:470 1:475 1:481 1:493 1:495
CI 2007 1:430 1:442 1:449 1:460 1:461 1:472 1:473 1:483 1:490 1:498
Table 5.2: Conĕdence bounds on the distribution of the Laspeyres-Konüs cost of living index
- bounds: sample estimates of lower and upper bounds on cost of living, CI: conĕdence
interval with lower and upper bounds on cost of living
Part V
General Conclusion
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Let me brieĘy review the contributions set out in this dissertation, and subsequently
propose avenues for follow-up research.
I have presented several extensions of the revealed preference method. e extensions
clearly show that the revealed preference methodology cannot be conĕned to one particular
theory or one particular application. On the theoretical level, I have shown howAfriat’se-
orem no longer holds in a ĕnite choice set-setting. I also extended the revealed preference
approach to allow for non-classical (value-dependent) preferences and I considered a re-
vealed preference approach to study externalities in consumption. On a more applied level,
I have shown how to use revealed preference in an experimental setting with ĕnite choice
sets. I have also explained how revealed preference can deal with unobserved heterogeneity
when panel data are unavailable. All of my contributions build on the so called ‘restricted
domain version’ of revealed preference, developed by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) andVar-
ian (1982). ese authors showed how revealed preference tests can provide information on
the consumer’s degree of rationality, his or her preferences and even his or her welfare with-
out restricting demands or utility functions in any sense, and when only a limited number
of price-demand observations are available. I have positioned my contributions along the
lines of three main themes in demand analysis (in general) and revealed preference (in par-
ticular): testing, identiĕcation and prediction.
First of all, the revealed preference approach can be used to test consistency with the
hypothesis of utility maximisation subject to a linear budget. Testing the utility maximi-
sation hypothesis is clearly non-trivial, because the rationality assumption lies at the basis
of many identiĕcation and estimation strategies. Moreover, rationality is relevant in itself
given that irrational behaviour is wasteful behaviour. Standard revealed preference axioms,
such as the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), test rationality while as-
suming that consumers make choices from linear budget sets. Nonetheless, there are many
settings in which choice sets are inherently ĕnite. First, many real-life consumption deci-
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sions involve integer quantities, or distinct alternatives with different characteristics. Sec-
ond, experiments involving children are typically based on ĕnite choice sets. Aer all, let-
ting respondents choose from ĕnite choice sets allows the researcher to restrict attention to
the pure concept of rationality, whereas letting respondents choose from linear budget sets
also involves practical problems of budget exhaustion and tedious calculations which are, in
particular, complex tasks for children.
In Chapter 1, I have used new experimental data on children’s consumption decisions
from ĕnite choice sets. e design of our experiment is similar to the experiment by Har-
baugh, Krause and Berry (2001) but our experiment involves choices between 3 commodi-
ties instead of 2. is more complicated design, in combination with the ĕnite nature of the
choice set, also implied that the GARP is no longer a necessary and sufficient test for ratio-
nality. I therefore discussed an alternative revealed preference approach to analyse choices
from ĕnite choice sets. However, the focus of Chapter 1 was on testing rationality and ex-
plaining the drivers of rationality among children. Towards this end, I used information
on various child characteristics. e results mainly suggested that younger children are less
likely to be rational. I have also found that it is important to take the multidimensional
nature of intelligence into account when explaining rationality.
In Chapter 2, I have further investigated the implications of a ĕnite choice-set setting on
the equivalence between different rationalisability concepts. Speciĕcally, rationalisability by
aweaklymonotone utility function, rationalisability by a stronglymonotone utility function,
rationalisability by a weakly monotone and concave utility function and rationalisability by
a strongly monotone and concave utility function are no longer equivalent when choice sets
are ĕnite. I have shown that the rationality results obtained by Harbaugh, Krause and Berry
(2001) and the ones obtained in Chapter 1 strongly depend on the characterisation at hand.
I also investigated assumptions on the choice sets under which the characterisations are
still equivalent. ese assumptions explain why the GARP could be applied by Harbaugh,
Krause and Berry (2001) whereas alternative axioms were required to analyse the choices
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in Chapter 1. At a more general level, the results from Chapter 2 built a bridge between
the ‘extended domain version’ of revealed preference in the spirit of Arrow (1959) and the
‘restricted domain version’ of revealed preference following Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973)
and Varian (1982). Indeed, I studied consumption decisions from ĕnite choice sets but I
used these choices in order to test rationalisability by standard (monotone and/or concave)
utility functions.
Second, the revealed preference method can identify elements of the preference struc-
ture of economic agents. For neo-classical preferences, recovery typically focuses on the
‘revealed better’ or ‘revealed worse’ regions in the indifference maps of individuals. In Part
2, I have studied identiĕcation for alternative types of preferences. In particular, I allowed
for externalities in consumption (preferences for others’ consumption, Chapter 3) and dia-
mond effects (preferences for value, Chapter 4).
In Chapter 3, I have proposed ‘selĕshness’ parameters to capture individuals’ willing-
ness to pay for own consumption (vis-a-vis the other’s consumption). I embedded these
parameters in the revealed preference characterisation of the collective model of consumer
behaviour, which assumes that collective decisions lead to a Pareto efficient outcome. Hence,
instead of relaxing the assumption of Pareto efficiency (see e.g. the revealed preference char-
acterisation of the non-cooperative model by Cherchye et al. (2011b)), the ‘selĕshness’ pa-
rameter relaxes the assumption of purely self-interested consumers. Aer all, there is much
evidence that individuals not only care about the own consumption. I have applied the
method to experimental data on joint consumption decisions by children. Information on
the intra-dyad allocation of private goods allowed to bound the selĕshness parameter. I
found that selĕshness is related to various dyad characteristics, such as the level of friend-
ship between groupmembers. As expected, children had stronger preferences for the other’s
consumption (i.e. a lower selĕshness parameter) when the group partner was a friend. On
a more general level, my approach implemented an idea put forward by Rabin (2013): the
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selĕshness parameter determines whether the collectivemodel reduces to the egoisticmodel
(according to which consumers care only about own consumption) or whether externalities
are allowed. As such, it easily deĕned portable extensions of an existing model.
In Chapter 4, I extended the GARP to analyse individual consumers who have prefer-
ences for the value of a purchase. is corresponds to the so called diamond effect, intro-
duced by Ng, 1987. e purpose of this chapter was to bring the conjecture of value-(and
price-)dependent preferences to the data, without making prior assumptions on the form
of utility functions. Moreover, by following a revealed preference approach, I could analyse
diamond (and conspicuous consumption) effects without having to assume that different
people have homogeneous preferences for value. In particular, I have modiĕed the GARP
to test for utility functions with both quantities and value as arguments. e newly proposed
test allowed to distinguish between preferences for material consumption and preferences
for the value associated with consumption (i.e. the diamondness). e results suggested that
there are strong preferences for value and that these preferences are driven by conspicuous
consumption effects. Speciĕcally, commodities with higher visibility scores were associated
with higher diamondness values. is insight might motivate differentiated tax rates for
commodities like alcohol, luxury clothing, jewellery, etc (Ng, 1987). Again, this contribu-
tion ĕts in Rabin’s (2013) PEEM approach, by adding psychological realism to amodel while
still retaining testable implications.
Finally, Chapter 5 differed from the other chapters in two ways. First, I focused on the
estimation and prediction of welfare measures and demand correspondences rather than
on the consistency or identiĕcation of preferences. Second, I have applied the method to
cross-sectional data (from the US Consumer EXpenditure survey) rather than panel data.
is leads to issues of unobserved heterogeneity because it is no longer possible to analyse
each agent separately. e main contribution of Chapter 5 is the application of the stochas-
tic revealed preference conditions (initiated byMcFadden and Richter (1971) and Falmagne
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(1978)) to derive bounds on the distribution of welfare and the distribution of demand. In-
sight into the distribution of welfare and demand across the population is important from a
policy perspective. It allows policy makers and researchers to study the gap between house-
holds with the highest level of welfare and households who are worst off. One can reason-
ably argue that extreme variation in welfare across households is unfavourable. emethod
also allows policy makers to estimate and/or predict the change in welfare that results from
an income or price change. e method presented in Chapter 5 imposes no structure on
the utility functions of consumers and treats unobserved heterogeneity in the most general
(non-additive) way.
In this dissertation, I have discussed the versatility of the revealed preference method.
e scope for future research is obviously very large. In the ĕnal paragraphs, I will restrict
attention to extensions that could follow from the contributions presented in this thesis.
First of all, I have treated children as decision makers in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Children
could choose fromdifferent sets of alternatives. e results clearly suggested that young chil-
dren are unable to consume rationally. e negative relationship between children’s ability
to make rational decisions on the one hand and their age on the other hand was prominent.
For this reason, parents typically make decisions on behalf of the (young) children. Child
well-being can then be treated as an intra-household (and domestically produced) public
good. Blundell et al. (2005) and Cherchye et al. (2012), for instance, assume a domestic pro-
duction function which maps parental time and resources allocated to children on a vari-
able that indicates the child’s utility. Both studies use a parametric form for this production
function. An interesting avenue for future research is therefore the development of a fully
nonparametric counterpart for these models. Such study would require data on the time
use of parents and the intra-household allocation of consumption goods. is type of data
is available, for instance, in the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences)
panel.
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Second, I have presented a general method to recover willingness to pay for others’ con-
sumption in Chapter 3. e proposed ‘selĕshness’ parameter allowed us to compare the
egoistic model of collective consumption with more general collective models that incor-
porated strong externalities in consumption. I have not distinguished between different
sources of externalities. ere are various reasons why individuals could care about the con-
sumption of others: altruism, preferences for equality, preferences for the material pay-off
of the least well off, etc. e focus of Chapter 3 was on the measurement of other-regarding
preferences, in general. Future research could impose additional restrictions on the utility
functions which, in combination with a speciĕcally tailored experiment, would shed light
on the precise motivation underlying these other-regarding preferences. Another extension
could focus on the implicit assumption of Pareto efficient decision-making. e collective
model used in Chapter 3 assumes that the joint decisions lead to a Pareto efficient outcome,
which implies that the sum of marginal willingness’ to pay for one individual’s ‘assignable’
good is equal to the market price in equilibrium. In my opinion, it would also be interesting
to investigate what happens if the Pareto efficiency requirement is replaced with the assump-
tion that the outcome corresponds to aNash equilibrium. Towards this end, one could apply
the so called noncooperative model. According to this model, group members are not able
or willing to coordinate to achieve the ‘optimal’ level of consumption, for instance because
they conceal their true marginal willingness to pay for the good. Interestingly, Cherchye
et al. (2011b) provided a revealed preference characterisation of noncooperative group con-
sumption. is could be a starting point to incorporate preferences for others’ consumption
and externalities in a setting where the assumption of Pareto efficiency does not hold.
A third avenue for future research is to further investigate the link between the visibility
of commodities and the corresponding conspicuous consumption effects. In Chapter 4, I
found more outspoken preferences for value associated with the more visible commodity
groups. On the basis of these results, one could expect that particular consumers signal their
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wealth by purchasing visible (and expensive) goods. In this respect, amodelwhich combines
the rationality assumptionwith a signalling equilibriummight signiĕcantly contribute to the
understanding of individuals’ decisions. One could, for instance, deĕne individual utility
functions over material consumption on the one hand and a perceived status outcome on
the other hand. Each consumer would then form beliefs regarding the status outcome of
another consumer based on the position of the others’ level of visible consumption in the
distribution of visible consumption across the population. Beside rationality, a signalling
equilibrium would also require that the consumers’ beliefs are (Bayesian) consistent. e
combination of a signallingmodel and the revealed preferencemethodology could construct
a powerful framework to study conspicuous consumption effects.
e fourth avenue for further research is to combine the insights fromChapter 2with the
contributions in Chapter 5. Indeed, one could investigate the implications of stochastic re-
vealed preference when choice sets are ĕnite. I have already argued that ĕnite choice sets oc-
cur naturally inmany settings. An interesting paper in this respect is by Bhattacharya (2014).
e author presents a ĕnite-choice analog to the paper of Hausman and Newey (2013) by
showing that various welfare measures are nonparametrically point-identiĕed (rather than
set-identiĕed) for binary and multinomial choice.
Finally, in my General Introduction I have explained that revealed preference is a non-
parametric methodology to study demand. Similar to other econometric methods, the re-
vealed preference approach is typically concerned with Type I and Type II error. On the one
hand, the revealed preference method should not reject the (null) hypothesis of utility max-
imisation whenever it holds true. On the other hand, irrational consumption data - which
are for example simulated by letting a computer draw random bundles - should not pass the
corresponding revealed preference test. e magnitude of Type II error in revealed prefer-
ence is estimated by so called discriminatory powermeasures, i.e. the higher discriminatory
power, the less likely that random data sets will pass the conditions of a model. Together
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with pass rates, discriminatory power provides information on the empirical performance
of a revealed preferencemodel. However, the assessment procedure itself is not independent
of methodological choices.
First, there are many ways to simulate random bundles. In this dissertation, I have
simulated random data sets both by drawing budget shares from a uniform distribution
(Bronars’ approach, 1987) and by randomly combining the observed budget shares of dif-
ferent, heterogeneous consumers (bootstrap approach). Andreoni, Gillen, and Harbaugh
(2011) present an insightful overview of differentmethods to estimate discriminatory power.
Second, throughout the dissertation I summarised pass rates and power by using a mea-
sure of predictive success. e predictive success provides a direct comparison of the pass
rate of observed data and the pass rate of random, simulated data (which is one minus
power). However, it is clear that predictive success information is no substitute for the sepa-
rate reporting of pass rates and power. Moreover, the ‘additive’ speciĕcation of the predictive
success measure is only one possible way to summarise pass rates and power. In this respect,
I refer to Selten (1991) and Beatty and Crawford (2011) who have shown that the additive
predictive success measure satisĕes some desirable properties. One of these properties is ag-
gregability. Aggregability implies additivity of individual predictive success measures across
the sample. According to Selten’s eorem, all other measures that satisfy these properties
are simple linear transformations of the additive predictive success measure.
e two arguments discussed above illustrate that the assessment procedure itself is
based on various implicit assumptions. It is clear that the further development of the re-
vealed preference approach as a successful methodology depends on the development of
convincing measures of empirical performance.
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